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Abstract: This dissertation comprises with three chapters. In first chapter, I investigate a 
novel feature of collateral: its role as a commitment device that induces a speedier 
adjustment of leverage to the optimal ratio. As a manifestation of commitment, firms 
increase the speed of adjustment of book leverage ratio (to the optimal) by 3.0% if they 
possess higher tangible assets. This commitment value of tangible assets is more important 
if the adjustment is expensive, and the monitoring from creditors is costly. I find that firms 
with higher tangible assets adjust leverage more speedily than those with lower tangible 
assets even if they are over-levered, headquartered in weak creditor rights countries, or 
both. Further, firms with financial flexibility (spare debt capacity) and higher tangible 
assets invest more by issuing new debt. In the second chapter, I document that social trust 
is an important country-level factor of capital structure choice using firm-level data from 
32 countries (excluding the U.S.), Specifically, higher social trust is associated positively 
with long-term debt ratio. The findings are robust when I control for other important 
country-level and firm-level factors. In particular, the association becomes stronger when 
governance quality, creditors’ rights, and financial development of a country are weak. I 
also analyze firm-level factors such as tangible assets, profitability, growth opportunity, 
and financial distress, with their interaction effect on leverage ratio. Factors that hinder 
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COLLATERAL, COMMITMENT, AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: INTERNATIONAL 
EVIDENCE 
Introduction 
Most theoretical and empirical studies of capital structure have unequivocally recognized tangible 
assets or collateral as one of the first-order determinants of capital structure (Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Guedes & Opler, 1996; Oztekin, 2015; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988).1 The 
tangible nature and ease of access in default (Liberti & Sturgess, 2018) make tangible assets 
particularly valuable to creditors which in turn affects issuers' capital structure choice as they trade-
off the benefits of debt against equity.  More recently, in his 2019 presidential address to the 
American Finance Association DeMarzo (2019) has suggested another role for tangible assets—its 
implication as a natural commitment device. In an agency theory framework, the conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders and the consequent transfer of wealth implications magnify when 
firms deviate far away from the target leverage ratio (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this context, 
commitment to the lenders implies that firms will not deviate from the target capital structure
                                                          
1 The term collateral refers to assets that lenders accept as security for a loan. Both tangible and intangible 
assets can be used as collateral. Tangible assets are assets that have finite monetary values and physical forms. 
I use tangible assets and collateral interchangeably, as most of the countries in this study use tangible assets 
as effective collateral, e.g., India, France. Some countries even pass legislation to use movable tangible assets 
as collateral, e.g., Chile, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Srilanka, Turkey. In the US, 63% of the medium and small enterprise loans are 





significantly.2  To the extent tangible assets serve as an effective commitment mechanism, an 
interesting empirical question, which I examine in this paper, is whether tangible assets are 
associated with a faster capital structure adjustment process towards the target. 
DeMarzo (2019) considers commitment as the primary determinant of capital structure, 
and collateral is an essential commitment mechanism. The static trade-off theory suggests that firms 
would rely almost entirely on debt for exploiting tax advantages when they can commit to fully 
repaying the loans. But without commitment, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theory 
will hold because lenders can anticipate the risk and adjust the cost of debt, which eventually 
eliminates the cost advantages of debt financing. Firms that are unable to commit to their future 
capital structure choices cannot benefit current shareholders by taking more leverage. Thus, to 
capture the potential tax advantage of debt financing, firms need to commit ex-ante to constrain 
future capital choices. However, this ex-ante constraint may make the ex-post capital structure 
choice inefficient as well as path-dependent. As a result, collateral endogenously appears as a 
pertinent factor of capital structure choice. 
DeMarzo (2019) further argues that firms readjust leverage back to the ex-ante optimal 
level as a demonstration of higher commitment. The commitment to reduce the leverage, if firms 
are over-levered, mitigates the anticipated default cost and further ensures a lower cost of debt 
upfront. Thus, firms adjust the leverage ratio back to its value-maximizing level. On the other hand, 
firms would always choose to issue debt, no matter how excessive the leverage would be, in the 
state of absent commitment. This is a manifestation of the leverage rachet effect noted by Admati 
et al. (2018). 3  Anticipating firms' value-destroying risky attitude, lenders adjust the cost of 
                                                          
2 Graham and Harvey’s (2001) seminal survey finds that firms have target capital ratios and adjust their 
capital ratios by issuing debt or equity.  
3 According to the leverage rachet effect, once a firm becomes over-levered, shareholders do not gain from 






financing that may offset the advantages of debt. Consistent with this viewpoint, I argue that 
tangible assets increase the ex-ante commitment, which leads firms to adjust the leverage ratio 
dynamically towards the target. To test the proposition of the commitment nature of the collateral, 
I apply the dynamic capital structure framework. 
Specifically, this paper addresses the following question: how does the commitment value 
of collateral affect capital structure dynamics (i.e., speed of adjustment, SOA)? While much of the 
capital structure literature is done in a static setting, there has been considerable interest in capital 
structure choice in a dynamic context (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Oztekin & Flannery, 2012; 
Oztekin, 2015). Practically, the choice of financing is not static but dynamic (DeMarzo, 2019; 
Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989).  Several recent empirical studies focus on dynamic aspects of 
capital structure choice with an emphasis on deviations from target capital structure and the factors 
that affect the relative speed of adjustment of leverage (Cook & Tang, 2010; Devos, Rahman, and 
Tsang, 2017; Faulkender et al., 2012; Oztekin & Flannery, 2012; Rahman, 2019; among others). 
This study focuses on examining the role of tangible assets in the SOA of leverage using a global 
sample of firms from 32 different countries covering the period from 1990 through 2018. The use 
of an international sample allows to test the universality of the commitment nature of tangible assets 
across countries and provides for rich insight into the role of commitment and possible interplay 
with institutional differences across varied countries.   
Following the capital structure SOA methodology used in the existing literature, I regress 
deviation between target leverage ratio and lag actual leverage ratio on the change of leverage ratio 
(Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Oztekin & Flannery 2012; Oztekin, 2015, and many others). Then, I 
include the interaction effect between tangible assets and deviation in the model to find the marginal 
effect of tangible assets in the SOA. I find consistent results with the hypothesis: higher tangible 





of the total adjustment speed of 20.1%. The result is both economically and statistically significant 
at 1% level.4 In addition to the main hypothesis, I examine several others. The second hypothesis 
argues that commitment is especially salient when firms are over-levered and subject to significant 
adjustment costs.5  Previous literature finds a higher adjustment cost for over-levered firms (Byoun, 
2008) for several reasons.  First, they are less financially flexible due to the higher financing cost. 
Second, de-levering with internal financing sources may be more expensive as firms can lose the 
opportunity to invest in future positive NPV projects. Consequently, over-levered firms opt to 
remain over-levered.6 In this context, commitment from firms to lenders becomes more valuable. 
Therefore, tangible assets' commitment value should be higher for over-levered firms.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that over-levered firms enhance their SOA of 
leverage if firms are highly committed. Over-levered firms with high tangible assets adjust their 
book (market) leverage ratio by 7.2% (4.3%) speedier than those with low tangible assets. 
Furthermore, I test more severe tests of commitment when firms are over-levered and they have 
deficit financing or experience declining profitability.7 The previous study of Byoun (2008) finds 
that over-levered firms enhance the SOA of the leverage ratio towards the target if firms have 
surplus cash. I supplement these findings by showing that firms adjust leverage even if they have 
deficit financing to maintain the initial commitment. The results show that over-levered and deficit 
                                                          
4 The book leverage ratio is long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets. Market leverage is long 
term debt plus short term debt scaled by long term debt plus short term debt plus market value of firm’s 
equity. 
5 Firms are over-levered if the firm’s leverage ratio is above the target leverage ratio. Following existing 
literature (Faulkender et al., 2012), I estimate the target leverage ratio using the 2-stage system GMM. 
6 As DeMarzo (2019) argues that over-levered firms even increase the leverage ratio at the expense of the 
shareholders’ value when the firms lack the commitment.  
7  Deficit financing refers to the inadequacy of internal cash flows for real investment and dividend 
commitments. Following Frank and Goyal (2009), I calculate deficit financing as the net negative cashflow 
after adjusting for the investment, dividend, and net working capital needs. 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
 (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 +  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + ∆𝑊𝐶 −  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐹)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠. I define declining profitability if the 
firm’s EBIT declines from the previous year for consecutive previous three years to capture the sudden shock 





financing firms with relatively more tangible assets have a 6.7% higher SOA of book leverage than 
similar firms with lower tangible assets. This is consistent with tangible assets serving as a 
commitment mechanism. Next, I examine the role of commitment nature of tangible assets during 
the period of declining profitability. Extant studies find a negative association between profitability 
and leverage ratio, perhaps due to profitable firms' passive profits accumulation. However, during 
declining profitability periods, firms incur higher leverage adjustment costs to fulfill the 
commitment as they become more constrained to use internal sources to reduce leverage towards 
the optimal level. Thus, I analyze whether firms with higher tangible assets increase the adjustment 
speed of leverage towards the target from the over-levered position if they experience declining 
profitability in the previous three consecutive years. The result suggests that firms with declining 
profitability increase the book leverage ratio's adjustment speed if they have more tangible assets 
than ones with lower tangible assets.  
Delving further into the role of tangible assets on the speed of leverage adjustment, given 
the international nature of the dataset, I examine the commitment aspect of tangible assets 
considering institutional heterogeneity across countries. Differences in creditor rights matter in loan 
contracting because the law determines who controls the insolvency process and who possesses the 
right of assets during bankruptcy (Bae & Goyal, 2009). Stronger creditor rights delegates more 
authority to lenders in exercising control over firms and collateral in case firms fail to conform to 
their commitment. Consequently, firms in higher creditor rights countries have less flexibility to 
deviate from the target ratio (Oztekin, 2015). On the other hand, covenant violations and deviation 
from the target leverage ratio may be expected for firms located in low creditor rights countries 
(Daher, 2017). In this situation, commitment to lenders plays a prominent role if firms are located 
in a weak creditor rights environment. Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), I argue that 





to creditors may be redundant. On the other hand, the role of the commitment of tangible assets 
comes into play when the monitoring and enforceability from lenders are low. Hence, I hypothesize 
that firms with high tangible assets located in weaker creditor rights environments display a higher 
commitment to lenders keeping leverage closer to the optimal ratio.  
To test the hypothesis, I construct two subsamples: weak creditor rights countries and 
strong creditor rights countries. Weak creditor rights countries are those with creditor rights indices 
of 0, 1, or 2.8 After constructing the subsamples, I analyze the commitment nature of tangible assets 
for firms in the weak creditor rights countries.  The result shows that firms adjust book leverage 
ratio by 5.9% more speedily if those firms possess higher tangible assets, ex-ante than firms with 
low tangible assets, given the creditor rights are weak. This effect is enhanced further when firms 
are over-levered. As discussed before, due to reduced financial flexibilities, firms are reluctant to 
adjust their debt when over-levered. This reluctance may be acute if the creditors' monitoring, i.e., 
creditor rights, is low. If commitment figures prominently in lenders' and issuers' decision making, 
then it should drive firms to adjust their over-levered positions even when effective monitoring 
from creditors is constrained by institutional considerations. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find 
that over-levered firms with higher tangible assets increase the adjustment speed by 7.8% though 
located in lower creditor rights environment than firms with low tangible assets located in the same 
creditor rights environment.  
                                                          
8 Creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 represents the weakest rights and 4 represents the strongest. 
Each of the four components of the index adds 1 to the index value if the component is present in the country. 
The components of creditor rights are as follows: MGMT_NOT_ STAY (captures the ability of creditors or 
courts to replace the incumbent management during bankruptcy), NO_AUTOSTAY (equals one if the 
bankruptcy code prohibits an automatic stay on assets), RESTRICT_REORG (equals one if the bankruptcy 
code prevents management from unilaterally filing a reorganization plan), and SECURED_FIRST (equals 





In the final test, I examine how the commitment value of collateral associates with the 
investment opportunities that arise over time. Prior evidence suggests that firms, on average, are 
under-levered relative to what the static trade-off model predicts (Graham, 2000). Perhaps, firms 
prefer to preserve the debt capacity for future financing needs and adjust to the target capital 
structure slowly (Byoun, 2008). However, anecdotal evidence is less supportive that being under-
levered increases the ability to use financial flexibility to capitalize on investment opportunities 
(Bessler et al., 2013). In Bessler et al. (2013), unconstrained firms (financially flexible firms) with 
higher cash holding increase the investment. However, DeMarzo (2019) states that claims against 
cash or cash flows suffer for non-exclusivity, but claims against the collateral do not. Firms having 
higher commitment as collateral can mitigate the non-exclusivity problem, which reduces the 
associated adverse selection problem and enhances future investment by issuing less expensive 
secured debt financing. Thus, looking at the financing and investment behavior of under-levered 
firms provides another setting to test collateral's commitment effect.    
Based on the foregoing, I posit that having more tangible assets helps firms to use financial 
flexibility with a lower cost of debt. DeMarzo (2019) shows that issuing secured debt can restore 
the firms' ability to capture the funding cost advantages of leverage. In contrast, firms with lower 
tangible assets cannot utilize the debt capacity cheaply even though they have financial flexibility, 
due to their presumed inability to issue secured debt and therefore having to rely on more expensive 
unsecured debt (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). Thus, I assess firms’ 
ability to take on profitable projects by regressing investment on Q as in Cleary (1999) when firms 
have high tangible assets. I find that firms with higher financial flexibility (low leverage) can utilize 
the financial flexibility to make more investment decisions if firms possess higher tangible assets, 
ex-ante. The interaction effect of financial flexibility and tangible assets is positive and significant 





when they possess higher tangible assets. Relating this to capital structure dynamics, I find that 
financially flexible firms with higher tangible assets are likely to issue debt because of the higher 
associated commitment enabling them to adjust their leverage ratio towards the target.  
This study contributes to our knowledge of capital structure in several ways. First, to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study that empirically examines the role of tangible assets in 
the capital structure not previously emphasized—its role as a commitment. Second, I contribute to 
the dynamic capital structure (SOA) literature. In this paper, I argue that the commitment nature of 
tangible assets fosters a faster adjustment of leverage towards the target. The results offer robust 
evidence of faster leverage ratio adjustments to the optimal when firms possess more tangible 
assets. Third, I contribute to the investment literature. I show that firms with higher tangible assets 
can also increase investment if firms have higher financial flexibility. Lastly, I contribute to 
international capital structure literature. I show that institutional heterogeneity across countries has 
significant implications for the role of tangible assets as a determinant of firm leverage in the 
context of its role as a commitment device.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I survey the existing literature.  Next, I 
develop the testable hypotheses in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the data and sample statistics. 
In Section 1.5, I discuss the results of the role of tangible assets as a commitment mechanism. In 
section 1.6, I consider endogeneity issues. Section 1.7 examines investment decisions with financial 
flexibility. In Section 1.8, I perform some robustness tests. Finally, Section 1.9 concludes the paper. 
 
1.2. Literature Review  
The first part of this section presents a brief overview of the capital structure literature 





structure from a dynamic perspective, a framework that is more suited to the investigation into 
collateral as a commitment device.  
1.2.1. Capital Structure from a Static Perspective 
In the perfect market world of Modigiliani and Miller (1958) with no taxes, the choice 
between debt and equity is irrelevant. Following this ground-breaking research, subsequent 
theoretical and empirical research have identified conditions and factors that imply capital structure 
relevance (Graham & Leary, 2011; Graham, Leary, & Roberts, 2015; Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Although capital structure relevance literature can be classified in 
different ways, it is useful to classify it into the demand-side and supply-side view of leverage. 
Notably, the demand-side view is motivated by highly prominent theories, such as Modigliani and 
Miller's (1958) tax subsidy model, pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), trade-off theory 
(Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), asset substitution theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and many 
others. These theories focus on firm-level determinants of capital structure, e.g., tangible assets or 
collateral.  On the other hand, the supply-side view of the capital structure emphasizes the 
completeness and enforceability of the contracts that increase the accessibility of external financing 
(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997). Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that firms with higher credit 
ratings have significantly higher debt ratios; thus, firms without access to bond markets face a 
different supply schedule. Other studies reinforce the identification of supply effects by analyzing 
the shocks in the supply curve for the bank-dependent firms. Sufi (2009) finds that the introduction 
of bond ratings for syndicated loans increases debt issuance and investment opportunity for riskier 
borrowers. The supply of debt is further contingent upon the competition of the banks. Rice and 
Strahan (2010) study the change in competition due to bank deregulation and find that the credit 
supply is lower for the states of stricter restrictions. Thus, the supply side is affected by the strength 





This research focuses on tangible assets or collateral as a natural commitment device that 
can mitigate firm-level and market-level frictions. The traditional capital structure literature has 
long recognized the importance of tangible assets as an essential determinant of firm leverage 
policy (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Oztekin, 2015; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Titman & Wessels, 1988). Campello and Giambona (2013) find that tangibility is one of the single 
most important factors of leverage. They further add that asset tangibility enhances the debt 
capacity of a firm by reducing the market friction for corporate borrowing. Theoretical research 
emphasizes collateral as the first-order factor of financing in many of the models (Banerjee & 
Newman, 1993; Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; DeMarzo, 2019; Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Rampini & 
Viswanathan, 2013). Such papers argue that the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders creates an agency cost, but collateral helps to reduce this cost to a possible optimum level. 
Higher repossession value and lower asymmetric information about the quality of tangible assets 
help firms to get more external financing at an affordable price (Hart & Moore, 1994). Consistent 
with this view, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find that firms with lower tangible assets face a 
higher cost of debt.  
1.2.2. Dynamic Capital Structure 
 The traditional trade-off and pecking order theories consider capital structure as a static 
decision. The limitation of the static choice of capital structure is that it ignores firms' optimal 
restructuring choice due to the fluctuation of the asset value over time.  In practice, the capital 
structure decision is dynamic (DeMarzo, 2019; Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989). Though 
Lemmon et al. (2008) report the corporate capital structure is stable, other empirical studies provide 
evidence in favor of the existence of deviations from target capital structure. Pioneering research 
by Flannery and Rangan (2006) finds an SOA of 30% of leverage by the US firms. Kayhan and 





study, Huang and Ritter (2009) find that SOA is between 11% and 23%. The speed of adjustment 
literature further disentangles the rates of the adjustment analyzing various firm-level and country-
level factors. Reasons for the deviation include the institutional environment (Oztekin & Flannery, 
2012), the magnitude of the financial deficit (Faulkender et al., 2012), macroeconomic conditions 
(Cook & Tang, 2010), debt covenants (Devos et al., 2017), credit supply (Rahman, 2019), and so 
on. Though the capital structure literature and SOA literature is huge and substantial, the role of 
tangible assets in the adjustment process of leverage is yet to be explored in the literature.  
 
1.3. Hypotheses Development 
As mentioned in the introduction, in an influential paper DeMarzo (2019) makes a case for 
the importance of commitment as a primary determinant of capital structure and collateral is one 
of the essential commitment mechanisms. Consistent with DeMarzo (2019), I argue that firms 
dynamically adjust the capital structure towards the target to fulfill their commitment. Any 
deviation from the target capital structure will be anticipated by the creditors; thus, they set the 
price of the debt accordingly that will offset the tax advantage of debt. On the other hand, firms 
with higher commitment (high tangible assets) would not deviate from the target leverage because 
issuing excessive debt will destroy firms’ value. DeMarzo(2019) also states that firm without 
commitment, ex-ante, actively manages its capital structure at each point to maximize the 
shareholders’ value. In this case, firms do not choose to actively reduce the leverage instead they 
deviate more from the optimal capital structure even though it may be detrimental to the firm value 
(Admati et al., 2018). If firms are not committed, they cannot increase the firm value by issuing 
debt from the under-levered position either because of higher cost of unsecured debt. Thus, lack of 





theoretical background, I argue that firms having higher tangible assets are more committed to the 
creditors. Hence, firms with higher tangible assets adjust their leverage ratio more speedily towards 
the target leverage ratio to maintain the commitment than those of lower tangible assets. 
 H1. Firms with higher tangible assets adjust the leverage ratio towards the target faster 
than firms with lower tangible assets.  
1.3.1. Over-leverage and Dynamic Capital Structure 
Prior studies suggest that the SOA of capital structure is asymmetric (Faulkender et al., 
2012). Over-levered firms face more costly financing than under levered firms (Byoun, 2008). 
Moreover, over-levered firms may experience several types of adjustment costs, i.e., expensive 
financing, covenant violations, and so on. On the other hand, de-levering from an internal source 
(e.g., cash) may further deepen the financial inflexibility and preclude opportunities to invest in 
future projects from cash on hand. Therefore, over-levered firms often choose to remain over-
levered or move further away from the target capital structure (Admati et al., 2018). However, firms 
with higher commitment set the leverage ratio close to the target because the higher cost of taking 
excessive leverage offsets the tax advantage of the leverage. According to the DeMarzo (2019), 
creditors anticipate the expropriation behavior of firms and set debt prices accordingly, thus, 
shareholders do not get benefit from the additional leverage. Consistent with this belief, I argue 
that collateral's commitment value prompts faster adjustment towards the target, even when the 
cost of adjustment is expensive from the over-levered position.   
H2a. Over-levered firms with higher tangible assets adjust their leverage ratios towards 
the targets faster than do over-levered firms with lower tangible assets. 
The commitment test is especially severe when over-levered firms are subject to deficit 





surplus financing can easily de-lever using internal sources (Byoun, 2008). But, adjustment to 
target by over-levered firms in the presence of deficit financing would be especially a relevant test 
of the commitment hypothesis.  I hypothesize that firms having higher tangible assets, ex-ante, 
adjust leverage faster than those of lower tangible assets from the over-levered positions even 
though they have deficit financing.  
H2b. Given the firms are over-levered and have deficit financing, firms with high tangible 
assets adjust the leverage ratio faster towards the target than those with low tangible assets.   
Another stress test of commitment relates to the adjustment of leverage by over-levered 
firms during declining profitability. The empirical association between profitability and leverage 
is negative (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Oztekin, 2015; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Titman & Wessels, 1988). However, increasing leverage or even keeping leverage unchanged 
during declining profitability periods increases the likelihood of distress because the interest 
coverage ratio declines. I argue that firms' higher commitment motivates them to reduce debt rather 
than increasing it from the over-levered positions to shield them from financial distress.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that over-levered firms with higher commitment increase the adjustment speed of 
leverage when their profitability declines. 
H2c. Given firms are over-levered and experiencing declining profitability, firms with 
higher tangible assets adjust the leverage ratio faster than those with low tangible assets.  
1.3.2. Creditors’ Rights and Dynamic Capital Structure 
The role of commitment is especially valuable where oversight by creditors is insufficient.  
Given the international dataset, creditor rights differences across countries serve as a useful proxy 
for creditors' oversight capability. Strong creditor rights enhance ex-ante contractibility (Rajan & 





expropriation making firms more disciplined. Leverage increases the firm-level risk that benefits 
shareholders at bondholders' cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, stronger creditor rights lead 
firms to adhere to capital structure (Oztekin, 2015) through lenders’ monitoring (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995). On the other hand, the lack of monitoring in the weak creditor rights countries may lead to 
covenant violations as well as the deviation from the optimal capital structure (Daher, 2017). In 
this context, firms that are highly committed upfront will comply with debt covenants regardless 
of their countries’ creditor rights framework.  
H3a. Firms with high tangible assets in weaker creditor rights countries adjust leverage 
faster than those with low tangible assets in the same countries. 
As discussed before, firms incur higher expenses to adjust leverage when they are over-
levered due to the reduced financial flexibility (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012). Hence, firms 
often show reluctance to reduce leverage from the over-levered positions and may even move 
farther from the target leverage (Admati et al., 2018). This problem is expected to become more 
acute if the creditors' monitoring is weak, especially in low creditor rights environments. On the 
other hand, stronger creditor rights are associated with higher leverage adjustment (Oztekin, 2015). 
Thus, the commitment nature of collateral appears less important in the stronger creditors' 
protection countries. In light of the discussion, I argue that the commitment between borrowers and 
lenders becomes more vital to leverage adjustment from the over-levered position for the firms 
headquartered in weak creditor rights countries than ones in high creditor rights countries. 
H3b. Over-levered Firms with high tangible assets in weaker creditor rights countries 






1.3.3. Tangible Assets, Financial Flexibility, and Investment Decision 
 Firms adjust leverage towards the targets when they invest in a large project (Dudley, 
2012). Capital structure decisions by firms are puzzling because most firms borrow less than their 
debt capacity (Graham, 2000). One reason that firms intentionally retain spare debt capacity might 
be to access the capital markets in the event of positive shocks to their investment opportunities 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Otherwise, firms may forego some of the profitable projects. 
Marchica and Mura (2010) find that firms with higher financial flexibility (spare debt capacity) 
make more investments in issuing new debt financing. However, in the absence of collateral, firms 
may not have access to cheap external financing, as Benmelech and Bergman (2009) and Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find a negative association between collateral and credit spread. The cost 
advantage of debt may disappear if firms issue unsecured debt (DeMarzo, 2019) as lenders perceive 
borrowers as risky without collateral. As a result, positive NPV projects may become unattractive 
due to the higher cost of unsecured financing.  I argue that firms with higher tangible assets and 
financial flexibility can better adjust leverage towards the target, enabling them to undertake 
profitable investment opportunities. Financially flexible firms (under-levered ones) with high 
tangible assets can adjust leverage towards their target to invest in new projects. This is how they 
can maintain the commitment of keeping the leverage ratio towards the targets. I make another 
relevant hypothesis that firms with high tangible assets and spare debt capacity issue debt to 
maintain capital structure targets.  
  H4a. Firms with higher tangible assets invest more if they have spare debt capacity than 
those of lower tangible assets but with spare debt capacity. 






1.4. Data and Sample Description 
 In this section, I describe the data, sources of data, and the data cleaning processes to get 
the final sample of the study.  
1.4.1 Data 
The sample consists of firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT Global database for the 
years 1990 through 2018. COMPUSTAT Global database contains accounting data for over 24,000 
firms in countries outside the U.S. and Canada.9 Moreover, I use a series of country-level control 
variables collected from a variety of sources. Country-level governance data is from World 
Governance Indicators (WGI).10 GDP, stock and bond market development, inflation, and the time 
required for enforceability are collected from World Development Indicators (WDI). The creditor 
rights data is from La Porta et al. (1997), hereafter LLSV (1997), and Djankov et al. (2007). Finally, 
I use the mergers and acquisition data from SDC platinum to calculate measures of asset 
redeployability.11  
The raw data sample in the study includes 662,933 international firm-year observations 
from COMPUSTAT Global. I then apply a series of filters. Following Morellec et al. (2018), first, 
I drop all regulated (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). Then, I drop firm-years 
if key variables, e.g., cash, tangibility, total assets, cash-flow, book leverage, total debt ratio, are 
                                                          
9 In case I find any North American firms in the study, I drop them. I collect US sample from COMPUSTAT 
to test robustness of the results using US sample. 
10 Almost 200 countries that report the aggregate and individual governance indicators are recorded in the 
WGI project. I collect six variables from the database: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Governance Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
11 I use SDC platinum to calculate the historical mergers and acquisition transaction value of the completed 
mergers and acquisition deals to use in the instrumental variable appraoch. I obtain the value of all M&A 
activity involving publicly traded targeted firms in each of the 3 digits SIC industry from SDC. SDC covers 
all the countries in the sample period. The available datapoint decreases to 77,398 firm-year observations 






missing. I also exclude firm-years if cash, total assets, and sales are negative. Further, I eliminate 
firms with excessive debt ratios that are likely due to reporting errors. In particular, I drop firms 
with ratios that exceed one for the following leverage measures: long term debt to total assets, short 
term debt to total assets, and total debt to total assets. To keep the sample free from small firm bias, 
I exclude firms if the total assets' value is less than USD 1 million.12 I only consider countries that 
are also included in LLSV (1997), the source of creditor rights data. Finally, I drop observations if 
the dependent and independent variables of the regressions are missing. The final sample includes 
149,859 firm-year observations from 32 countries covering the period of 1990 to 2018. 
1.4.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1.1 reports the country-wise summary statistics of the main variables. Australian, 
British, and South Korean firms dominate the sample. Australian firms account for almost 11.2% 
of observations. On average, Australian firms possess 34.2% of fixed assets (PPENT/AT) in the 
asset portfolio. Noticeably, the book leverage of Australian firms is lower than that of other 
countries. On average, Australian firms use 12.8% book leverage in their capital structure and 
maintain on average 14.0% market leverage. The creditor rights index in Australia is high, 3 out 4. 
UK firms are the second most dominant sample in the study with 13,488 firm-year observations 
accounting for 9% of the total sample size. On average, these firms use 17.4%, and 20% book 
leverage and market leverage in the capital structure. The average fixed assets of UK firms is 27.9% 
of its total assets. Creditor rights in the UK are perfect, meaning 4 out of 4. South Korean firms 
comprise the third-largest subset at 9% of the sample. On average, South Korean firms use 27.1% 
of total debt in the capital structure with 41.1% market leverage. For South Korean firms, fixed 
assets make up 33.6% of assets and the creditor rights index is 3. At the other end, Zimbabwe has 
                                                          





the fewest observations with only 32 firm-year observations. Most surprisingly, these firms possess 
a higher proportion of fixed assets at 43.9%, but comparatively a lower total debt ratio of 14.3%. 
Moreover, creditors get higher protection in Zimbabwe as the index value is 4. 
Table 1.2 panel A reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The 
mean total value of assets in USD is 1,478.502 million, while the median value is 141.782. The 
mean and median value of the capital expenditures scaled by total assets are 0.048 and 0.029 
respectively. Tangible assets to total assets have a mean (median) value of 0.309(0.272). The mean 
(median) value of the market to book ratio is 1.586 (1.146). The sample mean of book leverage is 
21.1% and the average market leverage is 27.6%. The Altman Z score measure of financial distress 
averages 1.272 and the fiftieth percentile value is 1.427. Lastly, the average (median) of creditor 
rights is 2 (3). Table 1.2 panel B presents the correlation matrix of change of leverage and all the 
independent variables. Results show that firms' fixed assets and mean industry leverage are 
negatively correlated with both changes of book leverage and market leverage. Besides, firm size, 
tangible assets, and mean industry leverage are also negatively associated with the leverage ratio 
change. On the other hand, growth opportunities, Z-score, creditor rights correlate positively with 
the change of the leverage ratio. There is little evidence that firm-level independent variables 
correlate with size.  
   
1.5. Empirical Results of Capital Structure Dynamics  
Following standard dynamic capital structure models, I estimate firms' capital adjustments 
towards the target using a partial adjustment model (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Faulkender et al., 





and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).13 Conventionally, the adjustment towards the 
capital structure is estimated using the following equation: 
∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝜆 (𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ ) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1               (1) 
Where, ∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 is the leverage (book or market leverage) ratio at 
time t+1. 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is equal to 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  minus 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, while 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the estimated target debt 
ratio regressing the firm characteristics at time t using equation (2). 𝜆 captures the SOA towards 
the target capital structure of a firm.  
I begin by estimating the partial adjustment model of leverage ratio using the following 
restricted model: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾) ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1                  (2) 
Where 𝛽 is a coefficient vector of the control variables to estimate the leverage ratio.14 Following 
existing literature, I primarily take 13 firm, industry, or country-level control variables that 
determine the capital structure. The firm-level controls are tangible assets, firm-size, return on 
                                                          
13 System GMM is the augmented version of the difference GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The SOA (SOA) literature predominantly uses Blundell and Bond system GMM to model the dynamic capital 
structure. 
14 Faulkender et al. (2012) considered firm fixed effects in the model. I use Blundell and Bond (1998) 2 step 
system GMM to predict the leverage ratio in equation (2). Faulkender et al. (2012) conclude that the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) system GMM estimations methods provide adequate estimates. System GMM considers 
orthogonal deviations instead of the first differencing. According to Roodman (2003) “Same as differencing, 
taking orthogonal deviations removes fixed effects. Because lagged observations of a variable do not enter 
the formula for the transformation, they remain orthogonal to the transformed errors (assuming no serial 
correlation), and available as instruments. In fact, for consistency,  the software stores the orthogonal 
deviation of an observation one period  late, so that, as with differencing, observations for period 1 are 
missing and, for an instrumenting variable w, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 enters the formula  for the transformed observation 






asset, market to book ratio, research and development scaled by sales, and Altman Z score. Industry 
mean leverage is the only industry-level control in the model. Moreover, I take the following 
country-level factors: GDP per capita, the enforceability of the contracts, the rule of law, 
government effectiveness, creditor rights, and stock market development. Variable descriptions are 
provided in Appendix B.1. Equation (2) requires instruments for the endogenous variables and 
lagged dependent variables. Huang and Ritter (2009) and Flannery and Hankins (2013) state that 
Blundell and Bond System GMM can sufficiently estimate the adequate coefficients. Thus, in this 
SOA study, I use a 2-step system GMM taking the lag of right-hand side variables as the 
instruments of the same variables consistent with Oztekin (2015). I test the validity of the models 
and find the tests are valid using the Wald test and AR2 test. Appendix A.1 reports the result of 
equation (2).   
After estimating equation (2) using Blundell and Bond's system GMM, I predict the 
leverage ratio, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ . Next, I estimate equation (1) using OLS with bootstrapped standard errors. 
Table 3 reports the SOA of leverage of the firms globally. I find that the SOA of book leverage is 
20.1%, which corresponds closely to Faulkender et al. (2012). Using the US sample, Faulkender et 
al. (2012) find that the average SOA is 21.9%, while Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report 21.1% 
for the global firms. Panel A column 2 reports the SOA for market leverage of the global firms is 
23.1%, while Faulkender et al. (2012) find the SOA of 22.3% for the US firms.15 
 
                                                          
15 Yin and Ritter (2020) state that SOA of market leverage estimates upward bias due to the passive influence 
of stock price fluctuations. Firms adjust book leverage and empirical evidence supports that they don’t issue 
securities to offset the market leverage. Thus, the empirical determination of market leverage’s speed of 
adjustment is flawed (Yin and Ritter, 2020). In another study by Kisgen (2009) finds that firms tend to target 
their book leverage rather than the market leverage ratio. Moreover, the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) 





1.5.1. Tangible Assets and SOA of Leverage 
To test whether tangible assets affect a firm’s speed of adjustment toward its target leverage 
ratio, I decompose the coefficient 𝜆.16 Following Faulkender et al.  (2012) and Devos et al. (2017), 
I modify equation (1) by specifying that a firm's adjustment speed 𝜆 depends on a variable of 
interest (in this case, this variable is tangible assets or collateral). Thus, the marginal effect of 
tangible assets in the SOA of leverage can be expressed in equation (3). 
∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝜆1 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ + 𝜆2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  +
 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                                                                           (3) 
Where, ∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 is the leverage (book or market leverage) ratio at 
the time t+1. 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is equal to 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  minus 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, while 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the estimated target debt 
ratio regressing the firm characteristics at time t using equation (2). 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable of 1 if tangible assets are larger than the industry median value at time t. One may argue 
that the level of tangible assets is partially determined by the industry that a firm belongs. By taking 
higher than the industry median value, the model captures the effect of high tangible assets in the 
SOA of leverage within each industry in comparison to those of lower than the industry median 
value. 
Panel B of Table 1.3 reports the effect of asset tangibility on the SOA.17 Column 1 reports 
that firms with high tangible assets adjust the book leverage ratio by 21.5% (18.5%+3.0%), while 
the firms with low tangible assets adjust book leverage by 18.5%. More precisely, firms with low 
                                                          
16 The previous literature shows the role of various firm level characteristics and their impact on the SOA of 
the leverage, e.g., growth firms (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006), financial constraints (Korajczyk & Levy, 
2003), over-levered firms (Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001). 
17 High tangible assets is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s tangible assets are higher than the industry 
median tangible assets. The results are robust when I use tercile instead of the median tangible assets to 





tangible assets need 5.41 years (1 over 0.185) to adjust their leverage towards the optimal. On the 
other hand, firms with high tangible assets can close the gap in 4.65 years, which is nine months 
less than firms with low tangible assets.  Column 2 reports that firms with high tangible assets 
adjust the market leverage ratios by 24.6%, which is 3% faster than firms with low tangible assets. 
It means that firms with high tangible assets can close the gap between the target leverage and 
actual leverage in 4.06 years (1 over 0.246), which is seven months less time than firms with low 
tangible assets. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors replicated ten times. Both the 
coefficients are economically and statistically significant at 1% level. The results offer a consistent 
viewpoint with the hypothesis H1 that tangible assets enhance the SOA if firms deviate from the 
target.  
1.5.2. Asset Tangibility and SOA: Over and Under Leverage 
 The lack of commitment leads borrowers to assume excessive leverage (Bizer & DeMarzo, 
1992) that increases the conflict between creditors and management (shareholders). Especially, the 
tension intensifies if the firms are over-levered. Often, firms show reluctance to adjust the leverage 
ratio as the adjustment is costly. The cost of adjustment is higher for firms that are over-levered as 
the firms become financially inflexible to finance from external sources (Byoun, 2008). In other 
words, the cost of losing flexibility is endogenously increasing and convex in the amount of 
external funds (e Whited, & Wu, 2016). Thus, firms choose to remain over-levered due to the 
associated higher adjustment costs. In hypothesis H2a, I argue that even though the cost of 
adjustment for over-levered firms is higher, over-levered firms with higher tangible assets display 
higher commitment increasing the SOA of the leverage ratio towards the target to maintain its 
commitment. Table 1.4 panel A columns (1) and (2) report that over-levered firms increase the 
SOA by 7.2% and 4.3% of the book and market leverage, respectively, supporting the hypothesis 





levered. Under-levered firms with high tangible assets increase the book leverage's adjustment 
speed towards the target by 7.2%.  
1.5.2.1. Adjustment of Over-leverage Position if Firms Have a Deficit Financing    
Byoun (2008) finds that over-levered firms are unlikely to reduce their leverage if they have 
a financial deficit. Byoun's findings suggest that over-levered firms adjust leverage toward the target 
from their financial surplus. Using surplus funds to adjust the leverage ratio has lower adjustment 
costs. Though costly, over-levered firms with financing deficits have the option of adjusting towards 
the target leverage ratio by issuing equity. I argue that firms are self-motivated to assume this extra 
cost due to the initial commitment to the lenders. Thus, in hypothesis H2b, I predict that over-levered 
firms adjust their leverage ratio towards the target though they have a deficit financing. In table 4 
panel B, I document the SOA for high tangible assets firms that are over-levered and having deficit 
financing simultaneously. Following Frank and Goyal (2003, page 221), I calculate the deficit 
financing as the sum of dividends, investment, and change of working capital minus internal cash 
flow scaled by total assets.  
Table 1.4 panel B column 1 reports the adjustment of book leverage for over-levered and 
deficit financing firms. The results display that over-levered firms with deficit financing increase 
the adjustment speed by 6.7%. The results are both statistically and economically significant. In 
column 2, I find that over-levered and deficit financing firms enhance the market leverage's 







1.5.2.2. The Commitment of Over-levered Firms During Declining Profitability 
The existing literature counter-intuitively finds a negative association between profitability 
and leverage ratio (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Oztekin (2015) finds that 
leverage ratios are negatively associated with profitability for firms from 23 out of 25 countries. 
Declining profitability leads firms to distress or financially constraint. In this situation, the interest 
coverage ratio decreases if firms do not decrease leverage; thus, it intensifies the tension between 
the creditors and borrowers. From a commitment perspective, I argue in hypothesis H2C that firms' 
ex-ante higher tangible assets increase the commitment to lenders and result in a speedier 
adjustment of leverage when firms' profitability declines. By reducing the leverage ratio, firms can 
increase the interest coverage ratio and avoid distress costs.  
To test this belief, in Table 1.4 panel B, I run equation (3) in a sub-sample of firms that are 
over-levered and experiencing declining profitability for the last three years.18  I compare the SOA 
of high commitment firms against low commitment firms, given that firms are both over-levered 
and experienced declining profitability. In column 3, I find that over-levered firms with declining 
profitability increase book leverage's adjustment speed by 11.0% if firms have higher tangible 
assets compared to those having lower tangible assets.  The result is both statistically and 
economically significant. In column 4, using market leverage I do not find the interaction effect as 
significant. Overall, the results are mixed. Firms with high commitment adjust the book leverage 
when the firms are over-levered and face declining profitability, but the results with the market 
leverage are not robust.  
                                                          
18 I create a sub-sample of firms if the profitability of the firms declines for previous consecutive three 





1.5.3. SOA, Creditors' Rights, and Tangible Assets 
Up until now, I did not consider the institutional heterogeneity in different countries other 
than as control variables. In this section, I extend the analysis of the association of tangible assets 
and leverage ratio in different institutional settings, i.e., creditor rights. The commitment nature of 
tangible assets is important in a weak creditor rights environment because the deviation from the 
target may be persistent due to the weaker enforceability.19 As a shield of protection, creditors 
typically add a variety of covenants in weak creditor rights countries, e.g., imposing a low dividend 
payout clause (Brockman & Unlu, 2009). Thus, the commitment to lenders becomes vital in this 
case. I hypothesize in H3a that firms with higher tangible assets exhibit a higher commitment to 
lenders by speedier adjustment of leverage ratio towards the target, especially if the institutional 
monitoring from creditors is weak. Table 5 presents the role of tangible assets in the speed of the 
adjustment process of leverage in the weaker and stronger creditor rights countries.  
In Table 1.5 Panel A, column 1 presents the marginal effect of having higher tangible assets 
in the SOA of book leverage for firms located in weaker creditor rights countries. Firms with higher 
tangible assets increase the book leverage ratio's adjustment speed by 5.9% faster than firms with 
lower tangible assets in weaker creditor rights environment. The coefficient is economically and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The SOA of market leverage is 29.3% for firms with high 
tangible assets in comparison to the SOA of 27.1% for firms with low tangible assets. Overall, the 
results are consistent with the hypothesis H3a that firms with higher tangible assets increase the 
SOA of leverage even if creditors' protection is weak. In columns 3 and 4, the interaction effect of 
high collateral and deviation is insignificant when creditor rights are strong, meaning that the 
                                                          
19 Stronger creditor rights is associated with a faster leverage adjustment by 1% to 6% (Oztekin, 2015). Thus, 





collateral's commitment nature is not important when the creditors' protection is strong.  The 
findings support the view that creditor rights and asset tangibility are substitutes. 
As previously discussed, firms are reluctant to adjust leverage if over-levered due to higher 
adjustment costs (Byoun, 2008). Thus, a natural question arises whether firms adjust over-levered 
positions when the creditors' monitoring is low. Though the cost of adjusting the leverage is high 
for the over-levered firms, I hypothesize in H3b that firms with higher collateral adjust leverage 
towards the target to maintain the commitment even though the creditors’ monitoring is low. Table 
1.5 panel B performs the analysis in two subsamples: low creditor rights and over-levered and high 
creditor rights and over-levered. Column 1 shows that firms with high commitment and being over-
levered in weaker creditors' right countries adjust the book leverage back to the target by 7.8% 
faster than those firms with low commitment in the same countries. Column 3 reports that firms 
with higher tangible assets adjust the market leverage. I find that firms with high commitment and 
are over-levered in weaker creditor rights countries adjust market leverage by 4.0% faster than 
those with low commitment. On the other hand, the sub-samples of over-levered and higher 
creditors' right display some interesting results. The interaction term is insignificant in columns 2 
and 4, meaning that the collateral's commitment nature is not important in the high creditor rights 
countries. The results offer a consistent view with hypothesis H3b that the commitment is more 
prominent in the adjustment process if firms are over-levered and headquartered in low creditor 
rights countries than firms' are over-levered but headquartered in high creditor rights countries.     
In table 1.6, a more granular test of examining each of the four components of creditor 
rights in the adjustment process is reported. I create four sub-samples where each of the elements 
of creditor rights is zero. From the results, I find that the interaction effect between high tangible 
and 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 is positive for each component of creditor rights except SECURED_FIRST, meaning 





components of creditor rights are absent in the country. The results support the previous findings 
in table 1.5.  The most interesting findings of the table are the negative association between the 
interaction and dependent variables, change of leverage, when the country lacks secured creditors 
to pay first (SECURED_FIRST) provision in the creditor rights. The negative association is 
intuitive as this particular component does not provide secured creditors a higher priority of 
repossession, meaning that firms will rarely lose control of tangible assets in case of default. In this 
case, the commitment nature of tangible assets barely works. Columns 5 to 8 report the speed of 
adjustment of leverage when the components of creditors’ rights are not zero. I find that the speed 
of association is less positive if firms located in countries with non-zero creditors’ rights 
components and the tangible assets are higher. The results are consistent with previous findings 
that tangible assets commitment nature is less important when the creditors’ rights of the country 
is higher.  
1.6. Endogeneity 
A big concern in testing the commitment feature of collateral in the leverage adjustment 
process is endogeneity. The endogeneity arises because the adjustment of leverage may increase 
the investment in tangible assets at the same time. Hence, asset tangibility and SOA may determine 
simultaneously that results in a reverse causality. This issue is more critical if firms are under-
levered and issue debt to adjust the leverage ratio. Addressing the endogeneity, I adopt two 
techniques to mitigate the issue: instrumental variable approach and propensity score matching 
method. First, I adopt an instrumental variable approach (IV) by taking three instruments 
following Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014). The first instrument is the financial slack 
(𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦) of rival firms. I take the minus average book leverage of the rivals in the industry 
(3 digits SIC code industry) averaged over the previous three years on a rolling basis to minimize 





(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴), which reflects higher liquidity of assets. I collect M&A transaction data from the SDC 
platinum. I consider only the completed deals following Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014). Along 
with the instruments mentioned above, I also use the mean industry (SIC 2 digit industry) tangible 
assets as an instrument of tangible assets. All these three instruments can explain tangible assets 
but do not directly affect an individual firm's leverage decision. To test the validity of the 
instruments, I consider two measures: Hansen J tests of overidentification and correlation between 
tangible assets and predicted tangible assets. I cannot reject the Hansen test's null hypothesis, 
meaning that the instruments are valid and exogenouos. Moreover, the correlation coefficient 
between the tangible assets and the predicted values is 0.69, which is quite high and validates the 
instruments.  
Second, I adopt the propensity score matching (PSM) approach to match high tangible assets 
with low tangible assets firms. Since the endogeneity may arise from the causal inference, the 
PSM may better handle the issue as the method is very popular to estimate the reverse causality 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Specifically, the outcome involves speculation about how an 
individual firm would have performed if the firm had received the treatment. Here, I am concerned 
about how the firms' SOAs are affected if firms have higher collateral ex-ante. In this process, I 
create a treatment group of firms (with high collateral) and a control group of firms (with low 
collateral). First, I rank all the firms based on tangible assets and then identifying firms in the 
lowest (highest) quartile as low (high) collateral firms. Using this sample, I generate the propensity 
score running a logistic regression with a high tangible assets dummy as a dependent variable (1 
for high quartile collateral firms and 0 for low quartile collateral firms) and size, profitability, 
market to book ratio, and R&D as independent variables for each of the industry. I then match 





of 0.1% to find the closest match.20 After matching, I get 29,030 firm-year pair observations as 
treatment and control groups. Using this propensity score-matched sample, I re-estimate equation 
(3).   
Table 1.7, panel A (columns 2 and 3) reports the second stage regression results of the 
equation (3) using the instrumental variable approach.  In column 1, I report the first-stage 
regression. Column 2 shows that the interaction effect between predicted high tangible assets and 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. More precisely, firms with high 
collateral adjust book leverage towards the target by 12.5% more speedily than firms with low 
tangible assets. In column 3, I report the SOA of market leverage. I find that firms with high 
collateral adjust market leverage by 7.45% more speedily than firms with low collateral.  In panel 
B, I report the results using the propensity score matching approach. In column 1, the interaction 
coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level. More precisely, the firms with high collateral 
increase the SOA of book leverage by 3.6% than that of low collateral firms.  Results using market 
leverage are not significant. 
 
1.7. Investment Opportunity When Firms Have Financial Flexibility and Commitment 
In this section, I explore the implications of commitment for exploiting investment 
opportunities. I argue that firms with higher financial flexibility can utilize it to invest in value-
maximizing projects.21 Financial flexibility refers to how easily firms are able to finance positive 
NPV investment opportunities. Under-levered firms can issue less expensive debt financing to 
invest in value-maximizing projects. Firms with higher tangible assets can enjoy better bargaining 
power in issuing debt (Benmelech and Bergman, 2009; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). Moreover, 
                                                          
20 Caliper refers to the difference in the predicted propensity scores between the treatment and the match. 





DeMarzo (2019) argues that firms with high collateral can commit to lenders by issuing secured 
debt. In contrast, firms with lower tangible assets (lower commitment) may have financial 
flexibility, but debt might be too costly to issue. The higher cost of financing could turn the positive 
NPV projects negative.  In these circumstances, firms may forego some projects that would 
generate positive NPV with a lower cost of capital but become a negative NPV project because of 
additional financing costs.  
 This section argues that financially flexible and highly committed firms can issue debt 
financing at affordable conditions, eventually increasing investment opportunities. By issuing new 
debt from the under-levered positions, firms can adjust leverage towards the target and maintain 
commitment from the under-levered position. To test this, I use the following model to predict the 
investment of financially flexible firms (following Bessler et al., 2013 and Marchica & Mura, 
2010).22 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐹2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽6𝐹𝐹2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                              (4)  
where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡   is the sum of the capital expenditure, R & D expenditure, and sales and general 
expenditure scaled by total assets of a firm in period t following ghoule, Jackson, and Tao Ma 
(2018). 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is the cash flow of a firm at period t-1. 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is tangible assets of a firm at 
period t-1. 𝐹𝐹2𝑖,𝑡 refers to whether the firms are under levered for the last two consecutive years.
23 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the market to book ratio. 𝑑𝑡 is the year fixed effects and 𝑑𝑖 is the firm fixed effect.  
                                                          
22 I augment the Q model of Cleary (1999) to see the marginal effect of the interaction effect between 
tangible assets and financial flexibility on the total investment.  
23 For robustness, I also consider previous three years and previous one-year under-leverage position to 






 In Table 1.8, consistent with Marchica and Mura (2010), I find the positive association 
between investment and Tobin's Q. Columns 1 to 3 report the regression results of panel regression 
using pooled and fixed-effects models. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that financially 
flexible, FF2 dummy, firms with high tangible assets invest more in the next period.24 In column 
3, I include the industry fixed effect along with the year fixed effect to capture the industry level 
variation as some industries may invest more than others. I find that the results are robust. 
Importantly, one might argue that a fraction of the investment may reflect an increase in collateral; 
thus, there is a potentiality for endogenous association. I address this concern and adopt the 
instrumental variable approach to handle this reverse causality issue. I use the same instruments 
that I use in section 6. In column 4, I report the second stage regression results of an instrumental 
variable approach. 25  I find robust evidence that firms with financial flexibility increase the 
investment with the increase of tangible assets. 
A relevant question arises how do under-levered firms finance the investment, debt or 
equity? Dudley (2012) argue that firms issue debt to adjust the leverage ratio towards the target to 
take a large project. I argue that the collateral's commitment nature fosters the adjustment process 
of leverage towards the optimal if firms need to invest more. Following Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman 2001, I run the probit regressions to estimate the effect of financial flexibility on equity or 
debt issuance in table 1.9 in a sub-sample of higher commitment at the beginning of the period.26 I 
find that the association of 𝐹𝐹2 on debt issue (equity issue) is positive (negative) and statistically 
significant at 1% level. More specifically, the likelihood of issuing debt is 4.0%, while firms reduce 
                                                          
24 The empirical findings further provide evidence that the interaction effect between the low tangible assets 
and financial flexibility is negative, meaning that low tangible assets firms invest less even though these firms 
have higher financial flexibility. The results are displayed in Appendix A.2. 
25 I use the same control variables that are used in table 7.  
26 I use split regressions since interaction terms are difficult to interpret in a probit setting (Norton, Wang, 





equity issue by 2.2% if firms have both financial flexibility and high tangible assets. The results 
support the empirical assumption that highly committed firms adjust the leverage ratio towards the 
target. 
1.8. Robustness Check Using US Data 
The global database of this study does not include US firms. Though this is only one country, 
the generalizability of the results may be called into question as the US firms, both in numbers 
and market capitalization, often dwarf all other countries. Thus, this global study may remain 
incomplete if I do not consider the US sample.  This section appends the US firm-year observations 
to the global sample to validate the original findings. Table 1.10 panel A replicates table 4 
including the US firm-year observations with the global data. Consistent with the previous 
findings, I find that the interaction term between the high tangible assets and 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is positive. 
Firms with more tangible assets increase the adjustment of book leverage by 3.3%. Column 2 
confirms the results using market leverage. Both of the results are economically and statistically 
significant. In panel B, I present results only with the US sample. US firms with more tangible 
assets adjust book leverage (market leverage) by 6.8% (11.4%) faster than those of low tangible 
assets, again consistent with the commitment hypothesis.  
In table 1.11, I check for robustness excluding the dominating countries from the sample, 
i.e., the US, Australia, and the UK. In panel A, I exclude all three dominating countries from the 
sample and find that firms from other than these three countries enhance the book's adjustment 
speed (market) leverage ratio by 2.7% (1.6%). The findings are economically and statistically 
significant at 1% level. In panel B, I exclude Australia and UK from the sample and find the results 






In an agency framework, the conflict between managers and debtholders intensifies when 
the capital structure deviates from the target. In DeMarzo (2019), firms adjust the leverage ratio 
dynamically to maintain commitment to the lenders. Firms can commit to lenders in several 
different ways. Placing higher collateral is viewed as an essential commitment mechanism that 
constrains the future capital structure choices. In this study, I highlight the role of tangible assets 
(collateral) as a commitment device in the setting of a dynamic capital structure. I argue that firms 
with higher tangible assets posit higher commitment to lenders that restrict firms from deviating 
far away from the target capital structure. The deviation above the target is viewed as riskier for 
firms; thus, it results in higher agency conflict between managers and bondholders.  
As a natural commitment mechanism, higher tangible assets increase firms’ speeds of 
adjustment towards leverage targets. I find that firms maintain this commitment, even though firms 
have deficit financing. As a test of commitment intensity, I analyze SOA when profitability is 
declining. The empirical findings validate the commitment of adjusting the leverage towards the 
target during the declining profitability. Oztekin and Flannery (2012) demonstrate how institutional 
heterogeneity fosters the speed of adjustment. In this study, I supplement their empirical findings 
by modeling commitment to the adjustment process. I find that the association is higher for firms 
situated in the weaker creditors’ rights countries because of the firms' higher commitment to the 
lenders. The stronger effect for weak creditor countries remains when confined to the subsample 
of firms that are overleveraged. Lastly, I extend the analysis to see if greater commitment improves 
financially flexible firms’ abilities to exploit investment opportunities. The results show that under-
levered and more committed firms invest more in the next period. In this process, firms finance 





To my knowledge, this study is the first to empirically investigate the commitment nature 
of the collateral. Future research may explore how the commitment value from tangible assets 
affects other financial policies, such as payout policies, firm performance, and so on. Further, as 
DeMarzo (2019) states, collateral is one of many commitment devices. Other devices, such as the 






Figure 1.1. Tangible Assets and Leverage 
This figure reports the mean of tangible assets scaled by total assets, book leverage ratio, market leverage ratio, long-term debt ratio, 









Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics: By Country 
This table presents the mean value of variables for each country. Book leverage is long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. Market leverage is long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled 
by long term debt plus short-term debt plus market value. ROA is EBIT scaled by total assets. Tangible Assets are property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. MkttoBook is the ratio of market 
value over book value. RnD is R &D expenditure scaled by Sales. Altman Z score is 3.3*(EBIT/AT) +1.0 *(Sales/AT) +1.4* (RE/AT) +1.2*(WC/AT). CAPEX is capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
Mean Ind. Lev is the 2-digit SIC industry mean book leverage. Creditors rights data is from Djankov et al. (2007). N represents the total number of firm-year for this sample country  













ARGENTINA 0.218 0.287 0.387 0.087 1.518 0.000 1.611 0.061 0.212 1 674 
AUSTRALIA 0.128 0.140 0.342 -0.069 1.882 0.022 -1.071 0.071 0.130 3 16,763 
BRAZIL 0.285 0.339 0.337 0.065 2.659 0.002 1.070 0.053 0.285 1 2,908 
CHILE 0.240 0.220 0.431 0.054 2.986 0.000 1.261 0.056 0.240 2 1,559 
COLOMBIA 0.147 0.252 0.448 0.055 1.140 0.000 4.621 0.042 0.152 0 308 
EGYPT 0.177 0.214 0.390 0.078 1.356 0.000 1.461 0.041 0.179 2 10,90 
FINLAND 0.241 0.313 0.275 0.058 1.469 0.028 1.843 0.055 0.243 1 1,717 
FRANCE 0.210 0.314 0.184 0.045 1.430 0.018 1.392 0.041 0.213 0 9,018 
GERMANY 0.189 0.265 0.231 0.027 1.518 0.023 1.468 0.043 0.189 3 10,294 
HONGKONG 0.186 0.260 0.313 0.017 1.494 0.006 0.849 0.044 0.192 4 2,250 
INDIA 0.234 0.307 0.314 0.101 2.025 0.005 1.947 0.061 0.286 2 1,452 
INDONESIA 0.297 0.329 0.401 0.073 2.074 0.000 4.421 0.060 0.297 2 4,475 
ISRAEL 0.256 0.293 0.203 0.024 2.115 0.050 0.551 0.035 0.250 3 3,084 
ITALY 0.257 0.441 0.234 0.030 1.251 0.007 1.591 0.037 0.259 2 3,201 
JAPAN 0.202 0.268 0.263 0.048 1.391 0.015 1.851 0.027 0.216 2 10,151 
JORDAN 0.174 0.214 0.407 0.034 1.297 0.001 1.073 0.024 0.173 1 1,038 
MALAYSIA 0.208 0.285 0.350 0.042 1.267 0.004 1.217 0.042 0.209 3 11,305 
MEXICO 0.251 0.352 0.452 0.083 1.364 0.000 1.582 0.049 0.251 0 1,677 
NETHERLANDS 0.219 0.259 0.260 0.065 1.612 0.015 1.780 0.049 0.219 3 2,481 
NIGERIA 0.186 0.223 0.456 0.078 1.907 0.001 1.450 0.069 0.200 4 686 
NORWAY 0.281 0.295 0.330 0.012 2.087 0.015 0.985 0.063 0.281 2 2,674 
PAKISTAN 0.301 0.423 0.468 0.093 1.303 0.001 1.799 0.055 0.303 1 2,873 
PERU 0.200 0.370 0.504 0.089 1.186 0.001 1.353 0.053 0.203 0 831 
S KOREA 0.271 0.411 0.336 0.037 1.180 0.015 2.108 0.050 0.273 3 13,400 
SINGAPORE 0.195 0.267 0.290 0.028 1.297 0.004 1.232 0.047 0.200 3 6,846 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.155 0.199 0.330 0.099 1.563 0.003 2.122 0.059 0.159 3 2,739 
SPAIN 0.267 0.367 0.321 0.053 1.472 0.006 1.123 0.035 0.267 2 2,120 
SWEDEN 0.185 0.234 0.201 0.002 1.773 0.033 1.200 0.036 0.184 1 3,949 
SWITZERLAND 0.213 0.263 0.306 0.049 1.613 0.030 1.520 0.043 0.213 1 3,244 





TURKEY 0.215 0.252 0.329 0.049 1.746 0.005 1.317 0.043 0.214 4 3,001 
UK 0.174 0.200 0.279 0.028 1.779 0.023 1.144 0.049 0.171 4 13,488 





Table 1.2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the major variables used in the study. Book leverage is long term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. Market leverage is 
long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by long-term debt plus short-term debt plus market value. ROA is EBIT scaled by total assets. Tangible Assets are property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R &D expenditure scaled by Sales. Altman Z score is 3.3*(EBIT/AT) +1.0 *(Sales/AT) +1.4* (RE/AT) +1.2*(WC/AT). The description 
of all the variables is in Appendix B.1.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev P1 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99 N 
Total Assets (USD) 1478.502 7665.573 2.517 15.061 42.617 141.782 549.197 2229.324 27299.734 149,859 
Book leverage 0.211 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.184 0.334 0.469 0.725 149,859 
Market Leverage 0.276 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.203 0.454 0.694 0.959 149,859 
Tangible Assets 0.309 0.232 0.002 0.031 0.112 0.272 0.460 0.649 0.905 149,859 
Investment 0.048 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.029 0.065 0.122 0.250 149,859 
ROA 0.031 0.134 -0.493 -0.103 0.004 0.051 0.099 0.157 0.253 149,859 
MkttoBook 1.586 1.347 0.467 0.711 0.893 1.146 1.674 2.808 7.625 149,859 
RnD 0.014 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.034 0.238 149,859 
Altman Z 1.272 4.010 -8.578 -0.438 0.689 1.427 2.143 2.904 6.404 149,859 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.214 0.104 0.027 0.096 0.141 0.201 0.269 0.344 0.532 149,859 
Creditor rights 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 4 4 149,859 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 (1) ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 1.000 
 (2) ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 0.556 1.000 
 (3) Size (USD) -0.024 -0.001 1.000 
 (4) Tangible Assets -0.025 -0.018 0.107 1.000 
 (5) ROA -0.000 0.010 0.220 0.038 1.000 
 (6) Mkt to Book 0.031 0.099 -0.107 -0.102 0.005 1.000 
 (7) RnD/Sale 0.007 -0.004 -0.067 -0.194 -0.161 0.178 1.000 
 (8) Altman Z 0.005 0.007 0.237 -0.040 0.762 -0.067 -0.161 1.000 
 (9) Mean Ind. Leverage -0.060 -0.033 0.198 0.246 0.078 -0.124 -0.170 0.063 1.000 
 (10) GDP per capita/10000 -0.003 -0.001 0.128 -0.166 -0.127 -0.005 0.184 -0.098 -0.238 1.000 
 (11) Enforceability of Law 0.012 -0.015 -0.194 0.007 0.028 0.100 -0.026 -0.021 0.035 -0.363 1.000 
 (12) Rule of Law 0.002 0.009 0.096 -0.166 -0.135 0.008 0.176 -0.098 -0.270 0.814 -0.480 1.000 
 (13) Governance Effective 0.003 0.007 0.062 -0.153 -0.118 0.008 0.159 -0.080 -0.345 0.730 -0.447 0.918 1.000 
 (14) Creditors’ Rights 0.012 0.015 -0.148 0.016 -0.055 0.045 0.032 -0.066 -0.180 0.028 -0.011 0.212 0.267 1.000 





Table 1.3. Tangible Assets and SOA 
Panel A of this table provides regression analysis of equation (1) where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡.  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the predicted leverage ratio using 
equation (2). The dependent variable is the actual change of book or market leverage, i.e., ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1, ∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1. Panel B provides the 
regression analysis of equation (3). 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if tangible assets are above the industry median. BookLev is long-term 
debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets MktLev is long-term debt plus short-term debt over long-term debt plus short-term debt plus market 
value. T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
Panel A:  SOA 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.201*** 0.231*** 
 (54.204) (112.590) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (11.193) (8.453) 
   
Observations 149,859 149,475 
R-squared 0.020 0.044 
Std. Err. Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel B: High Tangible Assets and SOA 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.185*** 0.216*** 
 (32.217) (75.465) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.002*** 0.001 
 (-4.594) (0.868) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗  𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (5.105) (5.009) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (8.239) (7.984) 
   
Observations 149,859 149,475 
R-squared 0.020 0.044 





Table 1.4. Tangible Assets, SOA, and Over-leverage 
Panel A presents the regression results of the interaction effect of deviations, high tangible assets on change of leverage in the sub-sample of over-
levered and under-levered firms. Panel B reports the regression results when firms are over-levered and have deficit financing or firms are over-
levered and experienced declining profitability. Where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the predicted leverage ratio using equation (2). The 
dependent variable is the actual change of book or market leverage, i.e., ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1. Firms are 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 if  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ −
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 < 0. Firms are  𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 if  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 > 0. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if tangible assets are above the industry 
median value, 0 otherwise. Deficit financing is calculated as dividend plus investment plus the change of working capital minus cash flow (CF) 
scaled by total assets following Frank and Goyal (2009). Declining profitability is when firms' profitability is less than the previous year for the 
previous three consecutive years. T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate 
that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: High tangible assets and SOA of over-levered firms 
 Over-Levered Sample Under-Levered Sample 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  
        
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.143*** 0.283*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 
 (10.078) (27.654) (12.507) (15.174) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 0.002* 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002* 
 (1.728) (1.101) (-6.281) (1.668) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 0.072*** 0.043*** 0.072*** 0.001 
 (4.143) (3.910) (5.249) (0.087) 
Constant -0.001 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 (-0.580) (6.358) (6.604) (9.527) 
     
Observations 58,815 59,822 72,091 70,777 
R-squared 0.009 0.039 0.012 0.011 
Std Err Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel B: High tangible assets and SOA of over-levered and deficit financing (or declining profit) firms 
 
Over-Levered and Deficit Financing 
Sample 
Over-Levered and Declining 
Profitability Sample 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  
        
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.113*** 0.288*** 0.093** 0.301*** 
 (9.732) (21.363) (2.316) (9.258) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 0.004*** 0.004 0.005* 0.001 
 (2.771) (1.510) (1.789) (0.179) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 0.067*** 0.037** 0.110* -0.019 
 (4.130) (2.148) (1.940) (-0.354) 
Constant 0.001 0.017*** -0.003 0.014*** 
 (0.455) (7.244) (-1.018) (3.668) 
     
Observations 39,081 37,786 5,441 5,677 
R-squared 0.007 0.042 0.008 0.037 







Table 1.5. Tangible assets, SOA, and Creditor Rights 
Panel A presents the effect of high tangible assets on SOA for firms headquartered in weak or strong creditor rights countries. Panel B presents the 
effect of high tangible assets on SOA for over-levered firms headquartered in weak or strong creditor rights countries. The dependent variable is 
the actual change of book or market leverage, i.e., ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if tangible assets are 
above the industry median value. Where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 .  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the predicted leverage ratio using equation (2). Weak creditor 
right is a sub-sample when the creditor rights index is 0, 1, or 2. Strong creditor rights are a sub-sample when the creditor rights index is 3 or 4. 
Creditor rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: High tangible assets, creditor rights, and SOA 
 Weak creditor rights Strong creditor rights 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
        
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.159*** 0.271*** 0.418*** 0.314*** 
 (29.542) (35.491) (34.723) (48.402) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 
 (-0.604) (0.508) (1.174) (3.230) 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 *𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗  0.059*** 0.022** -0.030*** -0.002 
 (6.120) (2.001) (-2.667) (-0.164) 
Constant 0.009*** 0.023*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
 (13.641) (35.831) (-12.018) (-15.723) 
     
Observations 64,097 63,895 85,762 85,580 
R-squared 0.020 0.056 0.037 0.054 
Std.  Err Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel B: High tangible assets, creditor rights, and SOA for over-levered firms 
VARIABLES 
Weak creditors  











 ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
     
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.210*** 0.591*** 0.338*** 0.489*** 
 (14.202) (14.162) (24.221) (19.831) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 0.002 0.007*** 0.003 0.009** 
 (1.285) (8.988) (1.467) (2.382) 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 *𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗   0.078*** -0.077 0.040** -0.008 
 (3.358) (-1.327) (1.987) (-0.277) 
Constant 0.012*** -0.013*** 0.033*** -0.013*** 
 (11.390) (-16.882) (16.761) (-4.746) 
     
Observations 37,063 21,752 36,990 22,832 
R-squared 0.020 0.032 0.059 0.053 





Table 1.6. Tangible assets, SOA, and Low Creditors’ Right: Each Component of Creditors’ Rights 
This table presents the SOA of firms headquartered in countries if each component of the creditor rights index is zero or one. In each of the sub-samples, the component of the creditor rights is zero in the first 4 columns and one 
in the last four columns. Where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡.  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is the predicted leverage ratio using equation (2). The dependent variable is the actual change of book or market leverage, i.e., ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  and 
∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1.  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if tangible assets are above the industry median value, 0 otherwise. The components of creditor rights are MGMT_NOT_ STAY (which captures the ability of creditors or 
courts to replace the incumbent management during bankruptcy), NO_AUTOSTAY (which equals one if the bankruptcy code prohibits an automatic stay on assets) and RESTRICT_REORG (which equals one if the bankruptcy 
code prevents management from unilaterally filing a reorganization plan), and SECURED_FIRST (which equals one if secured creditors’ claims are given absolute priority relative to government or employee claims). T-values 
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 


















 Panel A: ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.165*** 0.374*** 0.189*** 0.169*** 0.310*** 0.282*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 
 (52.889) (12.306) (19.356) (42.068) (24.236) (32.607) (44.585) (27.205) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (-7.815) (-5.605) (-9.335) (-5.631) (6.868) (0.844) (3.957) (3.548) 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 *𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.020** -0.103*** 0.027*** 0.030*** -0.039*** -0.022** -0.040*** -0.019 
 (2.351) (-2.909) (2.795) (2.735) (-2.910) (-2.369) (-3.623) (-1.256) 
Constant 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.005*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (17.519) (16.839) (17.895) (22.717) (-8.050) (-2.072) (-5.039) (-5.676) 
         
Observations 67,413 14,838 67,764 66,896 81,345 133,829 80,985 81,862 
R-squared 0.018 0.033 0.021 0.019 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.025 
Std Err Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel B: ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1     
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.209*** 0.483*** 0.208*** 0.218*** 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.245*** 
 (38.630) (25.020) (41.335) (53.905) (35.124) (52.883) (30.623) (41.384) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.003* -0.014** -0.006*** -0.000 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (-1.666) (-2.390) (-4.580) (-0.307) (6.758) (11.697) (10.435) (5.252) 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 *𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  -0.008 -0.075** 0.023** 0.001 0.016 -0.006 -0.017* 0.036*** 
 (-1.137) (-2.378) (2.471) (0.156) (1.431) (-0.812) (-1.774) (5.118) 
Constant 0.007*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004*** 
 (19.732) (26.242) (19.805) (12.324) (-7.273) (-9.157) (-11.516) (-5.650) 
         
Observations 67,413 14,838 67,764 66,896 81,218 133,521 80,782 81,763 
R-squared 0.020 0.036 0.023 0.021 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.048 





Table 1.7. Endogeneity Tests 
Panel A provides the regression analysis of equation (3) using the instrumental variable approach. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if the predicted 
values of tangible assets are above the industry median value. In the first stage, I take three instruments. The instruments are financial slack 
(𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦), total M & A activity of the firms’ industry (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴), and SIC 2 digit mean industry leverage. BookLev is long term debt plus 
short-term debt scaled by total assets. MktLev is long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by long-term debt plus short-term debt plus the market 
value. Panel B reports the results with the propensity score matching approach. I matched the treated sample (high tangible assets firms) with the 
control sample (low tangible assets firms) using caliper 0.1%. T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped errors or 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted robust.  ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
Panel A: Instrumental variable approach 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗   0.157*** 0.192*** 
  (27.440) (30.571) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  -0.006*** -0.003*** 
  (-9.824) (-2.650) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗  𝑯𝒊𝒈?̂?𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆   0.125*** 0.0745*** 
  (9.274) (9.012) 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑀&𝐴 0.009***   
 (14.171)   
𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌 -0.000   
 (-1.132)   
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔 1.037***   
 (242.12)   
    
Constant -0.058*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (-14.193) (12.610) (4.105) 
Observations 73,963 73,963 73,769 
R-squared  0.021 0.041 
Std. Err.  Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Hansen J Test 0.103   
 (0.950)   
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗   0.203*** 0.227*** 
  (23.700) (31.600) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  -0.005*** -0.003*** 
  (-5.878) (-2.635) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗  𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆   0.036*** -0.015 
  (2.909) (-1.581) 
Constant  0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (9.759) (7.308) 
    
Observations  59,051 58,925 





Table 1.8. Financial Flexibility, Tangible assets, and Investment 
This table presents the panel regression for the Q-model of investment as specified in Eq. (4). The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣 is the sum 
of CAPEX, R&D expense, and sells and general expenditure scaled by total assets. 𝐶𝐹 is the cash flow scaled by total assets. FF2 is the financial 
flexibility of a firm if a firm is under-levered for the previous two consecutive years. 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is property, plant and equipment 
(PPENT) scaled by total assets. 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 is the market value plus total debt minus current debt scaled by gross PPENT following Andrei et al. 
(2019). Column 4 reports the 2nd stage of instrumental variable approach taking the following instruments: financial slack (𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦), total M 
& A activity of the firms’ industry (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴), and SIC 2 digit mean industry leverage. T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are 
robust standard errors or clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 







IV (2nd Stage) 
        
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 0.663*** 0.268 0.653*** 0.995*** 
 (3.041) (1.419) (2.889) (62.115) 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 0.007 -0.004 0.007 0.130*** 
 (1.070) (-0.907) (1.104) (6.836) 
𝐹𝐹2 0.127*** 0.029 0.115*** -0.003 
 (7.453) (0.534) (3.682) (-1.082) 
𝐹𝐹2*𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.086*** -0.003 -0.084*** -0.057** 
 (-3.386) (-0.099) (-2.621) (-2.425) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.035*** -0.052 -0.011  
 (-6.681) (-1.471) (-0.433)  
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏*𝑭𝑭𝟐 0.019** 0.051*** 0.021**  
 (2.536) (4.000) (2.270)  
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒̂ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1    -0.022*** 
    (-2.711) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒̂ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1*𝐹𝐹2    0.040*** 
    (3.891) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (1.799) (0.731) (1.382) (3.156) 
Constant 0.092* 0.114*** 0.055* 0.002 
 (1.768) (5.883) (1.753) (0.272) 
Observations 90,975 90,975 90,910 45,505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.592 0.835 0.598 0.894 
Year FE NO YES YES YES 
Ind. FE NO NO YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO 
Cluster No Firm-Level 
 
Firm-Level Firm-Level 
Instruments     
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑀&𝐴    0.009*** 
    (14.171) 
𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌    -0.000 
    (-1.132) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔    1.037*** 
    (242.12) 
Hansen J Test    0.103 






Table 1.9. Equity Issue or Debt Issue When Firms Have the Financial Flexibility and High Tangible 
Assets 
This table presents the regression coefficient of financial flexibility on debt or equity issue in a subsample of high tangible assets at the beginning 
of the period using probit regression model. Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), the equity issue is 1 if the sale of common stock 
minus purchase of common stock scaled by total assets is greater than 5%, 0 otherwise. Following Frank and Goyal (2003), the debt issue is a 
dummy 1 if 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡  minus 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 scaled by total assets > 5%, 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable of 1 if tangible assets 
are higher than the industry median value. FF2 measures the financial flexibility of a firm if firms are under-levered for the previous two consecutive 
two years. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐷/𝐴 is the target leverage ratio predicted after equation (2). 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐷/𝐴 is the mean leverage of Fama and French 49 
industry. 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 is the market to book ratio. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on asset. Short-term debt ratio is the leverage due within 1 year. Standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity adjusted robust (Huber-White estimators). T values are in parenthesis. The marginal effects of the coefficients are in the 
square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 
      
FF2 -0.170*** 0.243*** 
 (-3.746) (4.621) 
 [-0.022] [0.04] 
TargetD/A- Industry MeanD/A 0.347*** -0.438*** 
 (2.704) (-2.850) 
IndustryMeanD/A -Actual D/A -0.182 -1.411*** 
 (-0.992) (-6.077) 
MkttoBook 0.001 0.019 
 (0.092) (0.940) 
MkttoBook>1 dummy 0.252*** -0.253*** 
 (6.207) (-4.952) 
ROA -1.886*** 1.239*** 
 (-4.268) (2.586) 
Short-term debt ratio -1.406*** 2.553*** 
 (-6.610) (10.166) 
Constant -1.066*** 2.222*** 
 (-3.100) (10.191) 
   
Observations 12,521 7,340 
Psuedo R-squared 0.046 0.244 





Table 1.10. Robustness Test: Tangible Assets and SOA (with US sample) 
This table provides regression analysis of equation (3), including US sample with the global sample. Where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡.  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  
is the predicted leverage ratio using equation (2). The dependent variable is the actual change of book or market leverage, i.e., ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable if tangible assets are above the industry median, 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the results when 
I include US samples with the global sample. Panel B reports results from only US firms. T-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
Panel A: US and global sample 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.167*** 0.165*** 
 (29.582) (81.117) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.005*** 0.000 
 (-11.553) (0.006) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 0.033*** 0.030*** 
 (5.883) (7.062) 
Constant 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (27.966) (21.009) 
   
Observations 276,192 275,817 
R-squared 0.016 0.030 
Std. Err. Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel B: Only US Sample 
   
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.468*** 0.373*** 
 (34.041) (49.789) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.006*** -0.001 
 (-10.963) (-1.174) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 0.068*** 0.114*** 
 (3.301) (9.912) 
Constant 0.011*** 0.002*** 
 (27.806) (4.212) 
   
 129,546 129,268 
Observations 0.041 0.060 









Table 1.11. Robustness Test: Tangible Assets and SOA (without the US, Australia, and the UK) 




∗  is the predicted leverage ratio using equation (2). The dependent variable is the actual change of book or market leverage, i .e., 
∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1, ∆𝑀𝐾𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1. The sample is now reduced without considering firms from the US, Australia, and the UK.  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a 
dummy variable if tangible assets are above the industry median value. Panel A reports results when I exclude the sample from the dominating 
countries, i.e., the US, Australia, and the UK. Panel B reports results when I exclude only Australia and the UK from the analysis. T-values are 
reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 
Panel A: Without US, Australia, and the UK sample 
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.090*** 0.161*** 
 (30.903) (47.135) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.004*** -0.001 
 (-10.841) (-1.201) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 0.027*** 0.016*** 
 (6.890) (4.234) 
Constant 0.005*** 0.014*** 
 (11.276) (29.948) 
   
Observations 116,761 116,709 
R-squared 0.010 0.030 
Std. Err. Bootstrap Bootstrap 
Panel A: Without Australia and the UK sample 
   
𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  0.182*** 0.198*** 
 (42.287) (62.861) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 -0.005*** 0.000 
 (-9.770) (0.010) 
𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
∗ ∗ 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 0.041*** 0.031*** 
 (6.179) (7.567) 
Constant 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 (22.858) (24.585) 
   
Observations 246,307 245,977 
R-squared 0.018 0.036 








SOCIAL TRUST AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM 
INTERNATIONAL DATA 
Introduction 
Social trust is a key component of economic success in society (Arrow, 1972; Coleman, 1990; 
Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; among others).27 A growing stream of research is focused on the 
role of social trust in corporate finance, for example trust and financing cost (Duarte, Siegel, & 
Young, 2012; Gupta, Raman, & Shang, 2018; Hasan et al., 2017; Meng & Yin, 2019), economic 
development (Fukuyama, 1995), cash holdings decision (Dudley & Zhang, 2016), bilateral trade 
(Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009), financial development (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004), 
peer-to-peer lending (Duarte et al., 2012), venture capital activity (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellman, 2016), and cross-border acquisition (Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2015).  
This study attempts to contribute to the growing literature by analyzing the importance of social 
trust on the capital structure decision for firms globally. Though the literature of social trust in 
corporate finance is not insubstantial, few studies examine the potential association between social 
trust and corporate capital structure. In a recent paper, Hasan et al. (2017) show that U.S. firms
                                                          
27 Social trust is an important component of social capital. Social capital refers to certain norms and values 
that permit cooperation among individuals in a society (Fukuyama, 1995). In this study, I use social trust 




headquartered in high social trust environments enjoy lower credit spreads. In another study using 
global data, Meng and Yin (2019) find that the cost of debt is cheaper in high trust countries. Gupta, 
Raman, and Shang (2018) examine the effect of social trust on the cost of equity for U.S. firms and 
find a negative association. None of these studies considers the effect on capital structure policy. 
Given that both equity and debt costs benefit from social trust impacts, it is not clear what the net 
impact will be on capital structure policy. Thus, an analysis of the resulting impact on capital 
structure policy is a relevant undertaking and exciting addition to the existing literature.  
The potential impact of social trust on financial policy can be evaluated from the perspective 
of agency and information asymmetry theories of capital structure. In the agency problem 
framework, conflicts between managers and shareholders on the one hand and between 
shareholders and debtholders on the other hand are different due to the heterogeneous rights of the 
parties (shareholders and debtholders) on the cash flow of the firm. To mitigate the former agency 
problem, shareholders nominate representation on the board to oversee the activities of the agents. 
However, in the latter case, monitoring by bondholders is not as direct as in the case of shareholders, 
relying largely on the firm’s promise to abide by certain covenants. Consequently, the cost of debt 
varies by the easiness of monitoring, the riskiness of the borrowers, and the mutual relationship 
between debtors and creditors. Existing social science studies state that cooperative norms are 
nonreligious social values that limit the opportunistic behavior in a transaction (Coleman, 1988). 
In a community with strong social trust, individuals view opportunistic behavior as the 
contradiction to the established values of society. In line with this argument, debtholders perceive 
social trust as constraining the firms’ opportunistic behaviors in debt financing. Thus, the cost of 
monitoring is cheaper if a high level of mutual trust prevails in society. This reduced cost induces 
a rational manager to issue more debt financing over equity financing as the cost of issuing debt is 
cheaper in two ways — lower information asymmetry of issuing debt and lower monitoring cost.  
Prior literature emphasizes both the benefits and the costs of leverage financing. On the one 




regularly, strengthening management oversight through credit monitoring (Harris & Raviv, 1990) 
and reducing managerial entrenchment through the associated risk of financial distress (Hennessy 
& Livdan, 2009). On the other hand, issuing excessive leverage drives firms to financial distress 
and increases tension between shareholders and creditors at the same time. By issuing short-term 
debt, firms try to reduce this conflict. Short-term debt binds issuers with a short-term commitment 
to repay that reduces management expropriation of wealth from bondholders (Harris & Raviv, 
1990). I argue that firms located in higher social trust environments enjoy reduced costs of 
monitoring from bondholders because of the constrained opportunistic behavior by debt issuers. 
Thus, issuing short-term debt is redundant. Moreover, debt is cheaper in high trust countries (Hasan 
et al., 2017; Meng & Yin, 2019), and issuing debt has less information asymmetry. Thus, managers 
may be motivated to favor more long-term debt financing with lower cost and lower information 
asymmetry.  
Based on the foregoing, I hypothesize that social trust differentials can systematically affect 
capital structure choice. my primary hypothesis is that higher social trust results in a higher leverage 
ratio in capital structures. The intuition behind the hypothesis, as discussed above, is that reduced 
contracting cost of debt makes it relatively cheaper. Thus, a rational manager will favor debt to 
equity financing, holding all else constant. I also look at several additional hypotheses. I 
hypothesize that social trust plays a complement to weak governance, low financial development, 
and weak creditors’ rights in a country. In a trust intensive society, the mutual understanding 
between borrowers and lenders can potentially overshadow other country-level institutional traits 
such as weak governance, low financial development, and weak creditor protections. I hypothesize 
that the association between trust and long-term leverage is more prominent if countries have weak 
governance, weak creditors’ rights, and low financial development. Lastly, I hypothesize that social 
trust may mediate certain firm-level determinants of capital structure ratio, such as tangible assets, 




I test the hypotheses using firm-year panel data from 32 countries globally over the years 1990 
to 2018. I measure social trust using survey data from the World Value Survey (WVS). More 
specifically, social trust is the proportion of respondents who trust most of the people in the society 
(Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004; Pevzner, Xie, & Xin, 2015; Meng & Yin, 2019). I start the 
investigation with a macro-level funds-flow analysis to determine which source of external 
financing effectively flows to the firms in a trust intensive society. The intuition behind this is to 
explore the country-level funds' appropriation to firms by sorting social trust from the lowest to the 
highest tercile. The preliminary inquiry finds that at the aggregate economy level, long-term debt 
issued by firms increases with the economy’s social trust. Having established that the main thesis 
holds at the economy level, I explore the hypotheses at the firm-level using panel regressions. The 
results show that social trust is positively related to long-term debt ratio. I find that if social trust 
increases from 25th percentile to 75th percentile (1-IQR change), the long-term debt ratio increases 
by 7.73% relative to the sample mean leverage of 10.5%. The result is both economically and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In all the statistical tests, I take various treatments of firm 
and year fixed effects with clustered standard deviations and find the results are robust.   
Next, I explore how heterogeneous institutional environments contribute differently to the 
association between social trust and capital structure. Theories of market frictions (Hart & Moore, 
1994; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997) suggest that the presence of market friction (such as weak 
governance quality, weak creditors’ rights, and low financial development) reduces the 
accessibility of external financing, especially debt financing. It is conceivable that social trust can 
ameliorate some of these institutional elements that affect capital structure. More specifically, I 
investigate the effect of social trust in countries with heterogeneous governance quality, creditors’ 
rights, and financial development. First, I analyze the impact of social trust on capital structure 
across countries that vary in their overall governance quality. Cheng and Shiu (2007) find that firms 
located in better-governing countries use more leverage than those of weaker governing countries. 




governance quality inherent at the country-level. The empirical evidence supports such a view, i.e., 
the interaction between trust and poor governance associates positively with the long-
term debt ratio. Second, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) find that the existence of creditors’ 
rights promotes private credit. I argue that trust in society increases confidence between 
bondholders and issuers, which can minimize the impact of low creditors’ rights and encourage 
more leverage financing. I find consistent evidence, i.e., the association of trust and long-term debt 
ratio is higher in low creditors’ rights countries. Finally, I also analyze how trust influences capital 
structure when the financial development of a country is weak. Extant literature supports the 
importance of financial development in promoting debt financing (Qian & Strahan, 2007; Liberti 
& Mian, 2010). I find that the sensitivity of social trust on leverage is stronger if the financial 
development of a country is weak.    
Next, I extend the investigation to show how trust interacts with key firm-level variables in 
moderating their impact on capital structure policy. I consider the following fundamental variables: 
tangible assets, profitability, growth opportunity, and financial distress. The argument is that trust 
can mitigate some of the underlying risk factors for which fundamental variables proxy. For 
example, tangible assets are positively associated with firm leverage, presumably because they 
provide some degree of assurance of where funds are being invested and potential for recovery in 
the event of failure. In a high trust environment, creditors may not rely as much on tangible assets 
to ensure their interests; therefore, I expect tangible assets to be less sensitive to debt financing in 
high trust economies compared to low trust economies. Empirical studies find a negative 
association between profitability and leverage, perhaps due to passive internal funds accumulation 
by profitable firms. According to the Pecking Order Theory, using internal funds reduces the 
adverse selection problem. In a trust intensive society, the problem of adverse selection is less 
acute; thus, social trust moderates the negative association between profitability and leverage. Prior 
evidence shows that growth (market-to-book) firms are associated with lower debt ratios, possibly 




Wessels, 1988). A high trust environment may ameliorate concerns over information asymmetry, 
thereby implying a less negative effect of growth on debt ratio. Extant evidence also shows that 
greater earnings volatility and financial distress (Altman’s Z-score) are associated with a lower debt 
ratio. Higher volatility and distress imply a greater potential for agency costs for debt.  In a high 
trust environment, creditors may not view these costs to be as significant. Thus, the sensitivity of 
earnings volatility and financial distress to debt financing may be less negative in high trust 
environments relative to low trust environments.   
Endogeneity issues are a common concern in most corporate finance research investigations.  
Given that the concern about social trust at the country level, and that firms do not, or at least are 
highly unlikely, to choose their domicile based on social trust, I can generally assume that social 
trust is exogenous to the firm. Nonetheless, I accommodate concerns over endogeneity by two 
methods. First, I use an instrumental variables (IV) approach by taking rainfall variation as an 
instrument of social trust. As an alternative method, I use propensity score matching to identify the 
sample and handle causal inferences, if any.28 I obtain results that are robust. The details of the 
instrumental variable approach and propensity score matching is discussed in Section 2.6. 
However, another issue with using multi-country data is whether the results are mainly due to other 
country-level factors. Since trust is a very sticky measure, variation of social trust in every year in 
a country is rare. This fact raises a concern of spurious association between trust and leverage as 
other country-level factors may drive the association. To overcome this problem, I control for other 
firm-level and country-level factors along with Hofstede’s cultural variables and find the 
association of social trust and leverage holds. Finally, as an additional measure to ensure that the 
results are not spurious, I study the association between large changes in trust and changes in 
following leverage ratios (Adhikari & Agarwal, 2016). I find that a five years’ large change in 
social trust is associated positively with a five-year change of long-term debt ratio, while a five 
                                                          
28 In some extreme scenarios, if firms’ headquarter locations are endogenously chosen, then social trust 




years small change is associated negatively. The results offer robust evidence of a positive 
association between trust and long-term leverage ratio.  
To my best knowledge, this study is the first to offer a comprehensive evaluation of how trust 
influences the formation of capital structure in different institutional settings. The study by Huang 
and Shang (2019) is the closest to this study, analyzing the effects of U.S. state-level social capital 
on leverage. They find a negative association between social capital and total book (market) 
leverage. However, I find the opposite association between social trust and long-term leverage. 
There are several possible reasons why results differ from Huang and Shang (2019). First, they 
analyze the effect of social capital and leverage ratio for U.S. firms while this study involves global 
data. Since social trust is likely to vary across countries more so than across regions within a 
country, the analysis of global data adds deeper insight to the existing literature.  
Secondly, methodological differences may account for the different findings. Huang and Shang 
(2019) use the Putnam index primarily as a measure of social capital, which is a comprehensive 
measure of social capital, and the measure is also static with no time variation.29 I use the survey 
data of WVS, which has several waves.30  Thus, the variable of interest, trust, has little time 
variation. Third, Huang and Shang (2019) do not consider the independent effect of long-term debt 
ratio in their analysis. In their study, they consider short-term debt, book leverage, and market 
leverage. The latter two measures, while incorporating long-term debt, also include short-term debt. 
Thus, their results may reflect the effect of short-term debt and not the long-term debt. Leverage, 
especially short-term leverage, helps managers to be disciplined as shorter maturity forces firms to 
repay loans and renegotiate with issuers on a more frequent basis, which fosters improved 
monitoring (Harris & Raviv, 1990). Since social trust constrains opportunistic behavior and reduces 
self-dealing (Cline & Williamson, 2016), firms no longer need to issue short-term debt to monitor 
                                                          
29 They also use the Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006) measure of social capital, which has time 
variation.  




managers. Rather, firms could issue long-term debt, which may be the cheaper alternative and has 
fewer liquidity consequences. Hence, I consider the long-term debt ratio as a measure of leverage; 
moreover, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) also use long-term debt 
ratio in their research. Further, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Johnson (2003) state that long-term 
debt is a main driver of total leverage ratio. Lastly, the study offers more comprehensive analyses 
with robust evidence when I consider both U.S. and global data. I also consider the large change 
effect on trust and its impact on the leverage and find the results robust. Thus, in methodological 
viewpoints, this study offers a more granular analysis of how trust affects firms’ capital structure 
decisions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the existing literature, and Section 2.3 
develops the hypotheses. The data and sample statistics are presented in Section 2.4, followed by 
the empirical findings with analysis in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents endogeneity and other 
robustness tests. Finally, I conclude in Section 2.7.    
2.2.  Literature Review  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) were among the first to emphasize the importance of understanding 
capital structure differences across countries. Their motivation was to see how well traditional 
theories based on fundamental variables to characterized firms’ leverage differences across 
countries. One of the implications of their study is the potentially important role that institutional 
differences may play in explaining capital structure choice. Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), 
for example, find that country-level factors explain one-third of the variation in firm debt ratios. In 
another study, De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) find that firm-specific factors vary from country 
to country, and country-specific factors indirectly influence the roles of firm-specific factors of the 
leverage ratio. Relatedly, there has been an increasing research focus on nonfundamental attributes 
such as cultural or social factors as determinants of firm capital structure policy. Chui, Lloyd, and 




and “mastery” possess less leverage in capital structures. They argue that country-level cultural 
dimensions have implications for agency problems and moral hazard, which in turn can influence 
capital structure preferences across countries.   
Social trust, a vital country-level factor, is also studied heavily in the finance literature in many 
contexts. Social trust helps to develop informal institutions, which can create unwritten 
communications and enforce unofficial sanctioned channels (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). According 
to Dudley and Zhang (2016), social trust can be defined as a set of beliefs for a group of firms and 
organizations. In other words, trust is the value in an overall society regarding how much its people 
feel they can rely on each other. Relevant to this study are two areas of the social trust literature, 
which I summarize next: (1) its relation to macro-economic development, and (2) its impact on the 
cost of capital.  
2.2.1. Social Trust and Macro-Economic Development 
Various researchers discuss social trust that affects various macro-economic variables. 
Fukuyama (1995, p. 10) states that “…. Social trust can be defined as the existence of a certain set 
of informal values or norms shared among members that permit cooperation among them.” He 
hypothesizes that social trust fosters efficiency on a large scale and finds supporting results. This 
hypothesis is verified by La Porta et al. (1996), who find that trust promotes cooperation, large 
organizations, and efficiency in government. In another study, Guiso et al. (2004) find that in an 
environment of high social trust, people invest less in cash and more in stock, use more checks, and 
have higher access to institutional credit. The results are more robust even in an environment of 
poor governance and less educated countries. Trust is also shown to facilitate bilateral trade 
between countries (Guiso et al., 2009). Den Butter and Mosch (2003) find that increasing trust by 




COVID-19 crisis period, firms located in higher social trust U.S. states associate with better 
performance (Mazumder, 2020). 
2.2.2.  Trust and the Cost of Capital 
More related to corporate finance, several researchers study the impact of social capital on the 
cost of capital. In a study of U.S. firms, Gupta et al. (2018) find that the association of social capital 
and cost of equity is inversely related. They add that this specific relationship may be due to the 
effect of social monitoring channels through social trust. As a consequence, higher managerial 
credibility in high trust societies increases firm value and decreases the cost of equity. Hasan et al. 
(2017) and Meng and Yin (2019) examine whether social trust impacts the cost of debt. They also 
find evidence that social trust reduces the cost of debt. The findings are more robust when the 
countries have poor governance or during the period of a financial crisis. 
2.3.  Hypothesis Development 
 This section is organized into three parts. In the first part, I develop the core hypothesis on 
social trust as a determinant of capital structure policy. In the second part, I generate several 
hypotheses on the moderating role of trust on institutional environment impacts on capital structure 
choice. In the final part, I present several hypotheses on how social trust may interact with the 
impact of certain traditional firm fundamental determinants of leverage choice. 
2.3.1. Trust and Capital Structure Choice 
Social trust plays a vital role in ensuring reduced agency costs, which increases investors’ 
confidence in agents and their proclivity to engage in opportunistic behavior. More precisely, 
higher social trust reduces self-serving behavior by agents (Gupta et al., 2018) as well as decreasing 
value expropriation in favor of equity holders (Hasan et al., 2017). In an agency theory framework, 




debtholders and shareholders. To minimize the former agency cost, shareholders appoint a board 
of directors to directly monitor the activities of agents (Fama, 1980). In the latter, managers are 
presumed to engage in wealth expropriation in favor of shareholders at the expense of bondholders. 
To protect their interests, creditors to resort to covenants to constrain management behavior. 
However, firms’ compliance with the covenants requires monitoring by debtholders (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). Thus, the cost of debt varies with the ease of monitoring. I argue that social trust 
mitigates information asymmetry and acts as intangible collateral (Karlan et al., 2009). Thus, 
creditors located in high trust countries require less monitoring of debtors, which reduces the cost 
of debt and also increases the supply of debt. Social trust reduces incentive conflicts between the 
parties and induces creditors to extend favorable terms. This leads to the first hypothesis that 
rational managers will issue more long-term debt in high trustworthy societies.  
 H1: The higher a country’s trustworthiness, the more the use of long-term debt in the 
capital structure of firms. 
2.3.2. Trust, Institutional Differences, and Capital Structure Choice 
 Here I explore the potential mediating role of social trust on institutional environment traits 
that extant literature shows to affect corporate debt structure. Informal and formal institutions play 
vital roles in a number of spheres, including economic development (Law & Azman-Saini, 2012), 
capital market development (Guiso et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1998), determining the cost of debt 
(Duarte et al., 2012), stock market performance (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006), firm performance 
(Anderson & Gupta, 2009), and capital structure decisions (Guiso et al., 2004). In a trust intensive 
society, the mutual understanding between borrowers and lenders can potentially complement other 
country-level institutional traits such as governance, financial development, and creditors’ 




prominent if countries have weak governance, weak creditors’ rights, and low financial 
development. 
Trust and Governance: Countries’ governance, such as the judicial system, anti-corruption 
efforts, voting rights, accountability, and political stability improves countries’ economic 
development (La Porta et al., 1996). Considerable evidence shows that country-level governance 
variables are important determinants of firm policies along with risk-taking by firms (John, Litov, 
& Yeung, 2008). Prior studies find the choice of capital structure is contingent on a country’s legal 
environment. Firms in stronger formal institutional environments use more financial leverage 
(Cheng & Shiu, 2007). I suggest that social trust can substitute for governance in countries with 
weak governance. Thus, even though firms are located in poorly governed countries, high social 
trust can serve as a mediating factor and fosters more debt financing. Consistent with this 
perception, I hypothesize that social trust associates more positively with the long-term debt ratio 
if firms are located in poorly governed countries. 
H2. Social trust is more positively associated with long-term debt if country governance 
is weak.  
Trust and Creditors’ Rights: Stronger creditors’ rights offer higher protection to creditors and 
encourages debt financing. Economies with better creditor protections demonstrate higher private 
credit to countries’ GDP ratio (Djankov et al., 2007) and market development (La Porta et al., 
1996). Creditors’ rights can be defined as how easily lenders can force repayment, liquidate 
collateral, or take control of distressed firms. Thus, stronger creditors’ rights ensure a higher level 
of monitoring by debtors. In the supply-side view, creditors’ rights have a positive effect on firms’ 
use of debt (La Porta et al., 1998). According to this view, better legal protections enable financiers 
to provide capital to entrepreneurs with reasonable conditions, and this enhances external financing 




social trust can facilitate more debt financing because of the implied understanding between parties. 
Thus, the association between social trust is stronger for firms located in weak creditors’ rights 
environments.  
 H3: Social trust is more positively associated with long-term debt in countries where 
creditor protection is low. 
Trust and Financial Development: It is well-established that a country’s financial development 
is associated positively with its growth (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995). The institutions that 
promote financial development also ease lending and borrowing constraints and eventually 
decrease the cost of debt (Qian & Strahan, 2007; Liberti & Mian, 2010). Extant literature argues in 
support of financial development that plays a crucial part in industrial and firm growth (Demirguc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). From the earlier discussion, I am also aware 
of the positive influence of social trust on financial development and markets. In the next 
hypothesis, I explore the interaction between the two on firm financial leverage. Financial 
development and social trust may complement each other or, as I suggest, could substitute for each 
other. In one study, Putnam (1993) finds that people possess less cash and invest more in stock, use 
more checks, have higher access to credit, and make less informal loans in high trust-worthy 
countries. Hence, one can argue that trust fosters financial development. However, another study 
by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) finds that the effect of trust on financial development is 
stronger if a country’s legal enforcement is weaker and if the country has less educated people. 
Even though existing literature finds that higher social trust results in improved financial 
development on average, I argue that where financial development is lacking, high social trust can 
play a more prominent and positive role in promoting firm leverage use. Hence, I hypothesize that 




H4: Social trust is more positively associated with long-term debt in countries where 
financial development is weak. 
2.3.3. Trust and Firm-Level Factors 
In the final set of hypotheses, I examine how trust interacts with key firm-level variables in 
moderating their impact on capital structure policy. I consider the following fundamental variables: 
tangible assets, profitability, growth opportunity, and financial distress, all of which are considered 
to be first-order determinants of firm capital structure (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Öztekin, 2015). The argument is that trust can 
mitigate some of the underlying risk factors for which fundamental variables proxy. It is 
conceivable that social trust could be viewed by investors and firms as a significant intangible asset 
that can moderate the effects of firm-level factors deemed important by investors and firms as 
determining elements of appropriate leverage policy. First, I consider tangible assets, a key 
determinant of corporate capital structure policy. Tangible assets are positively associated with firm 
leverage, presumably because as a form of collateral, they provide some degree of assurance of 
where funds are being invested and potentially available for recovery in the event of failure. 
Tangible assets also serve as a monitoring device (Rajan & Winton, 1995). In a high trust 
environment, creditors may not rely as much on tangible assets to ensure their interests; therefore, 
I expect tangible assets to be less sensitive to debt financing in high trust economies compared to 
low trust economies. I hypothesize that social trust is less positively associated with leverage if 
firms possess more tangible assets.  
H5: Leverage is less positively associated with tangible assets in countries with higher 
social trust.   
Profitability has been shown to be negatively associated with debt (Titman & Wessels, 1988; 




internal source rather than debt (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In other words, the negative association 
between profitability and leverage is due to the passive accumulation of internal funds by profitable 
firms (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). The negative association is consistent with the Pecking Order 
Theory of capital structure because internally generated funds involve fewer adverse selection 
problems as well as less asymmetric information. I argue that social trust mitigates the adverse 
selection problem between lenders and borrowers, thus moderating the negative association 
between profitability and leverage.  
H6: Leverage is less negatively associated with profitability in countries with higher 
social trust.  
Prior evidence shows that growth (market-to-book) firms are associated with lower debt ratio 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Öztekin, 2015; among others), possibly due to higher agency costs 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). The theory predicts that firms with a higher market-to-book ratio may 
associate with higher financial distress costs and therefore a negative association with leverage. 
Moreover, high-growth firms are exposed to a greater debt overhang problem; thus, I expect 
leverage to be negatively associated with market-to-book ratio (Graham & Leary, 2011). I argue 
that a high trust environment may ameliorate concerns over information asymmetry, thereby 
implying a less negative effect of growth on the debt ratio.   
H7: Leverage is less negatively associated with growth opportunities in countries with 
higher social trust. 
Extant evidence also shows that higher financial distress is associated with lower debt ratio 
(Graham & Leary, 2011). Higher financial distress implies a greater potential for agency costs for 
debt (Timan & Wessels, 1988). This may reflect higher direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy 




environment, creditors may not view these costs to be as significant. Thus, the sensitivity of social 
trust on leverage is higher if firms have higher financial distress.   
H8: Leverage is less negatively associated with financial distress in countries with higher 
social trust. 
2.4. Data and Sample Description 
 
2.4.1.  Data 
Firm-level sample data is the outcome of combining different databases. I collected firm-level 
accounting and stock price data for global firms from COMPUSTAT global.31 The COMPUSTAT 
Global database reports over 24,000 firms and begins at the year 1988. The COMPUSTAT Global 
package consists of international companies except for firms from the U.S. and Canada.32 Due to 
the limited number of observations before 1990, the sample period starts in 1990 and ends in 2018. 
I used several other sources to collect data on other variables. Country-level trust variable as 
collected from the WVS.33  I measured trust as the proportion of respondents who responded 
positively to the following question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?  Following Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2000), I linearly interpolated to get interim values of social trust from one survey to the 
next. If the social trust values of any country were missing in the beginning or ending surveys, then 
I considered the social trust to remain the same for the previous and later periods from the available 
data point. The country-level governance data is from the World Governance Indicators (WGI).34 
                                                          
31 For robustness test, I use a U.S. sample collected from the COMPUSTAT NA database.  
32 I drop the U.S. and Canadian firms from the study in case these firms report in COMPUSTAT global. 
33 WVS is a global network where researchers study changing values and their impacts on social and political 
life. 
34 WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators data for 200 countries. The variables 
collected from the database are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Governance Effectiveness, 




Country-level factors such as GDP, stock and bond market development, inflation, and time 
required for enforceability are from the World Development Indicator (WDI).35 Finally, creditors’ 
rights data and shareholder protection rights index data were collected from La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Djankov et al. (2007). According to La Porta et al. (1998), a creditors’ right score of one is 
assigned for each of the following four components: (1) are there restrictions such as creditor 
consent or minimum dividends for a debtor to file for reorganization? (2) can secured creditors 
seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e., is there an “automatic stay” 
or “asset freeze?” (3) are secured creditors paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm, as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers? (4) does management retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. An affirmative 
(negative) condition for the first three conditions (last condition) imply stronger creditor rights. 
Thus, creditors’ rights index ranges from 0 (weak creditors’ rights) to 4 (strong creditors’ rights). 
The preliminary data sample includes 662,933 firm-year observations collected from 
COMPUSTAT Global. I removed all the regulated (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999). If cash (che), tangibility (ppent), total asset (AT), cash-flow, total book leverage, and total 
debt were missing, I dropped these firm-years from the study. Moreover, I excluded observations 
if the value of cash (che), total assets (AT), and sales were negative. To make this study free from 
small firm bias, I excluded firms that had total assets of less than $1 million U.S. The values are 
inflation adjusted in terms of 2004 dollar value. To eliminate potential reporting bias in the sample, 
I excluded firm-years if one of the following ratios was greater than 1: LTD to total assets, short-
term debt ratio, total debt ratio. I also excluded countries with very few observations. Countries 
having less than 50 firm-year observations and less than 15 unique trading firms were eliminated 
from the final sample. Observations were also dropped if I did not find the legal origin or creditors’ 
rights data in the sample. Outliers may make the results biased; hence, I winsorized all continuous 
                                                          




variables at 1% and 99% to eliminate outliers. Finally, I dropped the firm-year observations if any 
of the control variables were missing. The final sample size stands at 238,933 firm-year 
observations from 32 countries.  
2.4.2.  Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables. The mean and median long-
term debt (LTD) ratios are 0.111 and 0.068, respectively. The market leverage (MktLev), which is 
the total leverage divided by the market value of the firm, averages 0.299, while the median value 
is 0.236. The sample firms’ average tangible assets ratio is 0.309 and the median value is 0.279. 
On average, firms in my sample are growth firms with a mean market-to-book ratio of 1.476 and a 
median of 1.095. The average profitability (net income divided by total assets) of sample firms is 
0.038, while the median value is 0.049. The sample firms’ median R&D expenditure scaled by 
sales is zero and the average value is 0.013. The average Altman Z-score measure of financial 
distress is 1.451 and the median value is 1.559. Lastly, the mean (median) total industry leverage 
of sample firms is 0.223 (0.213).  
Table 2.2 reports mean values for selected variables categorized by country. Firms from Japan, 
India, and the UK dominate my sample. Almost 25.6% (61,220 firm-year observations) of 
observations are from Japan, making it the most participated country. Noticeably, the long-term 
debt ratio of Japanese firms is lower, 10.50%, than that of many other countries. The aggregate 
governance of Japan is in the 85th percentile.36 Average social trust for Japan is 0.375, meaning that 
37.5% of the respondents answered affirmatively that they trust most of the people in the society, 
while the mean trust value of the sample countries is 27.9%. The second dominating country is 
India. Almost 9.23% of observations came from 2,900 unique Indian firms. On average, Indian 
                                                          
36 Aggregate governance is the percentile average of the six governance indicators: Voice and Accountability, 




firms use 14.7% long-term debt ratio in their capital structures. Approximately 19.5% of survey 
respondents from India answered that they trust most of the people in the society, while the 
aggregate governance index of India is in the 44th percentile. The third dominating country with 
respect to firm-year observations is the UK. These firms account for 19,954 firm-year observations, 
approximately 8.35% of sample observations, with an average 10.7% long-term debt ratio in their 
capital structures. The average social trust measure of the UK is 0.296, which is slightly above the 
sample mean.  
Zimbabwe is the least participating country in the sample. Only 60 firm-year observations from 
18 different firms belong to Zimbabwe. Colombian and Argentinian firms are second and third 
least participating firms with 308 and 798 firm-year observations, respectively. Relating to the 
social trust measure, Scandinavian countries are the most trustworthy countries. On average, 71.5% 
of respondents from Norway trust most of the people in the society, and 62.5% of Swedish 
respondents say that the people are trustworthy. On the other hand, Latin American countries 
display the least percentage of trust in society. On average, social trust measures for Brazil, 
Colombia, and Peru are 6.9%, 7.8%, and 8.0% respectively. Figure 1 displays time series graphs 
of social trust and leverage ratio. 
2.4.3. Aggregate Level Flow of Financing for Countries Categorized by Social Trust 
 As a prelude to the main results, I provide a macro-level view of the relationship between social 
trust and sources of external financing. Specifically, using country-level flow-of-funds data, I see 
whether aggregate corporate capital sources are associated systematically with country-level 
differences in social trust.  
 In Table 2.3, I find some interesting results. In the first column, I report the net external 
financing scaled by total financing sorted by social trust tercile. Following the methodology of 




net total equity issued. Total financing is the sum of cash flows from operations and external 
financing. After sorting by trust tercile, I find that external financing scaled by total financing 
increases when trust in a country increases from the lowest tercile to the highest tercile, though the 
association is not monotonic. The results reveal that firms use more external financing when 
country-level trust is higher. In the next columns, I segregate external financing into equity and 
debt sources to see whether there are systematic differences across the country trust terciles.37 I 
present aggregate dollar amounts as well as proportions relative to total assets. Firms in low-trust 
countries issue more equity financing both in dollars and percentage terms. The association of 
equity issuance and trust is negative, meaning that equity issuance decreases with an increase in 
social trust on average. In the next columns, I analyze aggregate debt issue categorized by social 
trust tercile. Long-term debt appears to be the primary source of external financing on average in a 
trust intensive society. The association is monotonically positive across the country trust terciles. 
The mean ratios of long-term debt ratio scaled by total assets also increase with the trust tercile. 
However, the association of short-term debt with social trust is not clear. Though the dollar values 
of short-term debt ratio exhibit positive association with social trust, the mean ratios of short-term 
debt scaled by total assets have no pattern, remaining the same for both low-and high-trust terciles. 
This is not surprising as agency issues may be less severe in the case of short-term debt. These 
results motivate us to study further the association of social trust and leverage ratio, especially long-
term debt.  
                                                          
37 Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001, p. 4, footnote 4), I calculate that equity issue is the sale 
of common stock (sstk) minus purchase of common stock (prstkc) scaled by total asset exceeding 5%. To 
calculate the long-term and short-term debt issue, I track long-term (ltdch) and short-term debt change 




2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Trust and Capital Structure  
I test the hypotheses using a panel regression framework. For the primary hypothesis (H1), I 
regress the long-term debt ratio on social trust along with other firm, industry, and country-level 
attributes. Specifically, I estimate the following regression model: 
   𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 = α +  β1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + γ ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑑𝑐 + 𝑑𝑡 +  ϵ𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 is firm i’s long-term debt scaled by total asset at time t + 1.
38 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 represents the 
measure of social trust as described previously. γ in the above equation represents the vector of 
coefficients of the control variables. Following existing literature, I identify 13 firm, industry, or 
country-level control variables that determine the capital structure of firms. The firm-level controls 
are Firm Size, Fixed Asset Ratio, Return on Asset, Growth Opportunity, Research and 
Development scaled by sales, and Altman Z-score. Industry Mean Leverage is the only industry-
level control. Country-level factors included are as follows: GDP per capita, the Enforceability of 
Contracts, the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Creditors’ Rights, and Stock Market 
Development. The Appendix B.1. contains a detailed description of the variables. Finally, the 
model includes industry, country, and year fixed effects to capture the firm and year unobserved 
fixed effects. 𝑑𝑗  denotes the industry-level fixed effects (to capture the industry unobserved 
variation),  𝑑𝑐  is the country fixed effect, 𝑑𝑡  represents year fixed effects (to capture the year 
                                                          




specific unobserved variation), and ϵ𝑖,𝑡 is the white noise or cluster robust error at the firm-level 
with mean zero and standard deviation of 1.39,40 
 Estimates of Equation (1) are presented in Table 2.4. Columns 1 to 3 display the results with 
different fixed effect combinations in the model. In all the models, I find that social trust is 
positively and significantly associated with long-term debt ratio at the 1% level. The effect is also 
economically significant. In Column 3, the coefficient of 0.038 for social trust suggests that an 
increase in social trust from 25th percentile to 75th percentile (1-IQR change) is associated with a 
long-term debt ratio change of 0.63% (0.038 × 0.167), which is a 5.67% (0.63%/11.1%) increase 
relative to the sample mean leverage of 11.1%. The result supports the view that high trust reduces 
the friction (such as the need for monitoring of the debtors) in the market (Duarte et al., 2012; Meng 
& Yin, 2019), enabling firms to adopt a debt ratio in their capital structures.  
Turning now to the control variables, I find that results are generally in line with prior studies. 
Findings are consistent with Öztekin (2015) that firm size, tangibility, and industry-leverage are 
positively associated with the long-term debt ratio. The empirical findings of size on leverage are 
mixed. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001) find conflicting results due 
to different sample selections. The finding of a positive association between size and leverage is 
consistent with the notion that bigger firms are more transparent and therefore may have a relatively 
lower cost (Byoun, 2008). They may also be more diversified or subject to lower bankruptcy risk 
(Timan & Wessels, 1988). Tangibility shows a positive association (consistent with Rajan & 
Zingales (1995) that is consistent with the fact that tangible assets are used as collateral, making 
them a relatively cheaper source of capital. The two-digit SIC industry mean leverage ratio is also 
                                                          
39 I did not consider firm fixed effect in the models as there is not too much variation of social trust over the 
sample period. For robustness, I tested the model with firm fixed effect along with year fixed effect in a 
separate model and end up with consistent results.  
40  The errors in the model are primarily robust standard errors (Huber-White estimators that adjusted 
heteroscedasticity). For the sake of robustness, I consider firm-level clustering in at least one of the models 




positively associated with leverage in all the models, meaning that firms in the same industry use 
a similar proportion of debt ratio on average. The Altman Z-score is negatively associated with 
leverage, meaning that lower financial distress firms are associated with lower long-term debt in 
capital structures. Lastly, other firm-level controls such as R&D to sales and growth opportunities 
are insignificant if I consider industry, country, and year fixed effects with clustered standard errors.   
Along with the firm-specific factors, I also control for several country-specific factors defined 
in the Appendix B.1. Consistent with the findings of prior research (Öztekin, 2015), I find a positive 
association between leverage and the Rule of Law, Creditors’ Rights, along with Stock Market 
Development. The results indicate that higher governance quality generally induces higher use of 
leverage in capital structures. However, some of the country-level factors, such as Enforceability 
of Contracts and Government Effectiveness display negative association with leverage, perhaps 
due to a higher correlation with other explanatory variables (e.g., Rule of Law). Overall, I find 
consistent coefficients with the previous literature.     
2.5.2. Trust, Institutional Differences, and Leverage 
In this section, I test interaction effects between trust and three measures of institutional 
differences across countries: Governance Quality, Creditors’ Rights, and Financial Development 
(H2-H4). To test these interactions, I modify Equation (1) as follows.  
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 = α +  β1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  β2 ∗ 𝐼𝐸 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐸 𝑋 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  γ ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
 +𝑑𝑗 + 𝑑𝑐 + 𝑑𝑡 +  ϵ𝑖,𝑡                                                                  (2)  
Here, 𝐼𝐸 is a dummy variable if the particular institutional environment of interest is weak, i.e., 
Governance, Creditors’ Rights, and Financial Development. I take the same controls used in 




Leverage, Trust, and Governance: Table 2.5 reports results of H2 by including the interaction 
effect of trust with the country-level measure of Governance Quality.41 To implement the test, I 
create a weak governance dummy (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) equal to 1 if the governance index is below 
the median value and 0 otherwise. I find that the interaction between trust and the weak governance 
dummy is positive. In each of the models in Columns 1 to 3, the interaction term between trust and 
weak governance is positive and significant at the 1% level, supporting hypothesis H2. More 
precisely, from Column 3, the coefficient of the interaction term is 0.082, meaning that if social 
trust increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (1-IQR change), the long-term debt 
ratio changes by 1.37% (0.082 × 0.167) for the firms in the weak governance countries. The results 
are significant both statistically and economically, supporting the hypothesis that the association of 
social trust with leverage is more pronounced for firms located in countries with weak governance.   
Leverage, Trust, and Creditors’ Rights: In Table 2.6, I regress the leverage ratio on social trust, 
interacting it with Creditors’ Rights (H3). To test H3, I create a low Creditors’ Rights dummy that 
is set equal to 1 if the Creditors’ Rights score is ≤ 2 and 0 for Creditors' Rights scores of 3 or 4 (the 
maximum). In the supply-side view, strong Creditors’ Rights encourage firms to take on more debt 
as the supply of debt is higher. I argue that trust in society increases confidence between creditors 
and issuers, which can serve to promote debt use even when Creditor’s Rights at the institutional 
level are weak. Consistent with H3, I actually find that the positive impact of trust on the debt ratio 
is stronger when Creditor Rights are weaker. From Column 3, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is 0.138, meaning that if social trust increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (1-IQR 
change), the long-term debt ratio changes by 2.30% (0.138 × 0.167) for firms in low Creditors’ 
Rights countries compared to high Creditors’ Rights countries. The result is both statistically and 
                                                          
41 I collect governance data from World Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI reports the percentile rank of 
each of the six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Governance Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. To calculate the governance index, I take the 




economically significant and supports the view that trust can ameliorate, to some extent, concerns 
over moral hazard between managers and creditors in economies with weak Creditors’ Rights. 
Thus, markets appear to rely on intangible societal traits in place of formal institutional parameters 
(e.g., Governance and Creditors’ Rights) in optimizing corporate financing policy. 
Leverage, Trust, and Financial Development: The development of financial markets and 
institutions is a critical and inextricable part of economic growth (Levine, 1999). According to 
Liberti and Mian (2010) and Qian and Strahan (2007), financial development eases the lending and 
borrowing constraints with a concomitant decrease in the cost of debt. As with Country Governance 
and Creditors’ Rights, I would like to see whether social trust plays a more substantial role in 
encouraging debt use when Financial Development is not as strong. To test the hypothesis, I create 
terciles based on FinMkt (a proxy of Financial Development as defined in the Appendix B.1) and 
create a dummy variable, 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣 , assigning it a value of 1 for observations that fall into the 
bottom  tercile of Financial Development and 0 otherwise.42  
Table 2.7 reports the regression results of the long-term debt ratio on trust interacting with 
weak Financial Development. The significantly positive coefficient for the interaction between 
trust and weak Financial Development dummy supports the view that social trust as a determinant 
of debt policy is even stronger in weak Financial Development countries. The economic 
interpretation of Column 2 is that the long-term debt ratio increases by 0.23% (0.014 × 0.167) if 
social trust increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (1-IQR change) in the weak 
financially developed countries. Importantly, the association here is not as economically significant 
as for Governance and Creditors’ Rights. It can be interpreted as trust acting as a mediating factor 
                                                          
42 As explained in the Appendix B.1, FinMkt is computed by averaging standardized values of Stock Market 
and Bond Market Development. Stock market development is the standardized average value of market 
capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. Bond 
market development is the average of standardized values of liquid liabilities to GDP and domestic credit for 
private firms to GDP ratios. The results are robust if I take the median value to compute the WeakFin Dev 




that makes more sense for Governance and Creditors’ Rights; conversely trust may be one of the 
many elements that determine Financial Development.   
2.5.3.  Leverage, Trust, and Firm-Specific Factors 
In this section, I introduce firm-level variables and their interaction effect with social trust on 
the leverage ratio. The main hypothesis, which the results reliably support, argues that social trust 
is positively related to the use of debt. Secondarily, I also show that social trust can mitigate the 
negative effects of country-level governance and creditors’ rights on the use of debt. A natural 
extension of the study is whether trust can moderate some of the firm-specific determinants of debt 
use. I argue that trust can mitigate some of the underlying risk factors for which fundamental 
variables proxy. I hypothesize that social trust can moderate the influence of firm proxies that imply 
higher costs of debt (e.g., due to agency or information asymmetry costs), and vice versa. This is 
because social trust acts as a mediator if there exists any firm-level friction, such as high distress 
risk.  
I consider several important firm-level determinants of the capital structure such as Tangible 
Assets, Profitability, Size, Growth Opportunity, and Distress Risk following existing literature 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Frank & Goyal, 2009, 
Öztekin, 2015). To test these predictions, I add an interaction between the high trust dummy 
variable and the selected firm-specific variables. The results are reported in Table 2.8. In Model 1, 
I test the interaction effect of trust with Asset Tangibility. From theory and prior evidence, I know 
that Tangible Assets are positively associated with firm leverage because they provide a degree of 
assurance of how funds are being invested and potential for recovery in the event of failure. In 
Hypothesis H5, I hypothesize that in a high trust environment, creditors may not rely as much on 
Tangible Assets to ensure their interests; therefore, I expect Tangible Assets to be less sensitive to 




between social trust and Tangible Assets is negative, meaning that the association between leverage 
and tangible is less positive in countries with higher social trust.  
Model 2 reports a positive interaction effect between social trust and Profitability. Existing 
literature shows a negative association between Profitability and leverage, consistent with the 
Pecking Order Model that due to information asymmetry, firms prefer to use internal financing 
before accessing debt and other external sources of capital. In Model 2, I find that the association 
of leverage and Profitability is less negative as the interaction term is positive; this offers support 
of Hypothesis H6. Thus, it appears that trust can moderate concerns over agency issues related to 
information asymmetry that restrain use of external debt capital. Next, I test Hypothesis H7 by 
interacting Growth Opportunity with social trust. In Model 3, the interaction between social trust 
and Growth Opportunity is positive, which supports the hypothesis of a less negative association 
between leverage and Growth Opportunity in high social trust countries. The result supports the 
view that despite firm-level opaqueness associated with high-growth firms, creditors are willing to 
supply debt that they otherwise would not because of greater trust between people that translates to 
trust between financial parties. In Model 4, I interact social trust with firm Distress proxies, Altman 
Z-score. Extant evidence shows that Altman’s Z-score is associated with a lower debt ratio. I find 
that the interaction terms for Model 4 are positive and significant at least the 1% level. This means 
that the association of leverage and financial distress is less negative in countries with higher social 
trust, consistent with the hypothesis H8.  Overall, these results imply that the association of social 
trust and leverage is stronger (weaker) if firms’ financial proxies indicate higher costs of debt 





2.6. Robustness and Endogeneity Tests 
2.6.1. Additional Tests 
In Table 2.9, I run several robustness tests to see whether the results are sensitive to (1) alternate 
measures of the leverage ratio, (2) dropping countries with disproportionately large sample size 
(the UK and Japan), and (3) additional firm, industry, and country-level control variables. In 
Column 1, I substitute market leverage for long-term debt ratio in the base model. Market leverage 
is defined as the ratio of total leverage over the market value of the firm (following Chen, Harford, 
& Kamara, 2019). The coefficient is positive (0.018) and statistically significant. Columns 2 and 3 
report the regression results except for the firms from Japan and the UK, the two countries 
contributing the most to the sample. I find that the coefficient of social trust is 0.058 (0.024) for 
long-term debt (market leverage) ratio. Columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the regression adding some 
firm, industry, and country-level control variables. In Column 4, I add individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions measure to test whether the trust 
variable is still robust. I include the cultural traits of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity, and long-term orientation and find that the trust variable is still significantly positively 
associated with long-term debt ratio.43 In Column 5, I control for additional firm, industry, and 
country-level variables but without the Hofstede cultural variables. In Column 6, I augment the 
model in Column 5 with the Hofstede cultural variables. Both models reveal that trust continues to 
be positively associated with the long-term leverage ratio and market leverage ratio. In Columns 8 
and 9, I take excess long-term debt and market leverage as dependent variables and find that the 
associations of social trust and leverage is positive in these two regressions.44 This implies that 
                                                          
43 Following Mogha and Williams (2020), I control f Hofstede culture variables: individualism, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation. The other two factors, power distance and indulgence, 
are not included because these two controls are multicollinear with the previous four factors. 




firms’ deviation from the optimal leverage ratio is also higher if firms are headquartered in high 
social trust countries.   
2.6.2. Endogeneity Test 
Endogeneity is a common concern in almost all corporate finance studies. The main reasons 
for endogeneity are missing variables, misspecification of critical variables, or reverse causality. 
One may argue that the first two points apply to this study. I acknowledge the possibility of 
endogeneity and consider three tests: the instrumental variable approach, propensity score 
matching, and analysis using large changes in trust.  
2.6.2.1. Instrumental Variable Approach 
This approach requires that I find instruments to predict social trust where the instrument is 
presumed to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Importantly, finding appropriate 
instruments is one of the pre-conditions to obtain unbiased estimators. Based on the work of Davis 
(2016) I use rainfall variation as an instrument of social trust.45 The data of rainfall variation is 
collected from Davis (2016), where the author uses rainfall variation as an instrument of 
individualism versus collectivism. He finds that rainfall variation is positively associated with 
collectivist societies; people in higher rainfall variation countries help each other more than in less 
rainfall variation countries. Hence, I use the rainfall variation as an instrument of trust, expecting a 
positive association between trust and rainfall variation. To validate the instrument, I take two 
                                                          
45 Cline and Williamson (2016) use three instruments: pronoun drop, rainfall variation, and genetic distance 
from the U.S. as instruments of social trust. I also test with the three instruments and find the result robust, 
but the instruments do not pass the endogeneity test. The possible reason might be the difference in datasets. 
Cline and Williamson (2016) use cross-sectional data while I use panel data. Using panel dataset increases 
of the number of observations (N). According to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 336), “… the 
overidenfication test statistics will lead us to reject the null hypothesis whenever the sample size is large 
enough.” Thus, even though I use the same instruments from the same datasets (following Cline and 
Williamson, 2016), the null hypothesis of the Hansen J test might be rejected due to the increase in the sample 
size. Considering all this, I take one instrument (rainfall variation) with proper economic intuition to predict 




consideration: adjusted R2 and F-statistics.46 The adjusted R2 is around 20% benchmark and F-
statistics are above the critical 10.0 benchmark.47  
Table 2.10 reports the base regression results using the instrumental variables method. In the 
first column, I report the test statistic that regresses social trust with rainfall variation. I find that 
the coefficient of rainfall variation is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the 
expected direction. In the second stage (Columns 2 and 3), I use the predicted values of trust to 
regress on the long-term debt ratio along with other control variables. The two columns differ in 
the use of fixed effects. I find that coefficients of trust in both the models associate positively with 
long-term debt ratio and the statistics are significant at the 1% level. Hence, the results confirm the 
previous findings that social trust increases the use of long-term debt in the capital structures of 
firms. 
2.6.2.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
The presumption is that firms do not choose their domicile based on social trust; 
consequently, my baseline model can be used to draw a causal inference from social trust to debt 
ratio preference. However, if firm domicile (social trust) is endogenous, then drawing a causal 
inference may be problematic. To mitigate this concern, I use PSM technique. According to 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), PSM has become a popular approach to estimate causal inferences. 
Specifically, the outcome involves speculation about how an individual firm would have performed 
if the firm had not received the treatment. Here, I am concerned about how firms’ leverage ratios 
vary if firms are located in high trust societies. Thus, I create a treatment group consisting of firms 
located in high social trust countries and a control group of firms located in low-trust countries that 
are otherwise equal. I do this by ranking all the countries annually based on their social trust index 
                                                          
46 I take one instrument to predict social trust. Thus, the Hansen overidentification test is not appropriate for 
the just-identified model. 





and then identifying countries in the lowest (highest) quartile as low (high) social trust countries. 
This procedure generates 71,151 firm-year observations in the treatment group and a similar 
number of firm-year observations in the control group. Using this sample, I generate the propensity 
score running a logistic regression with a high social trust dummy as a dependent variable (1 for 
high-quartile firms and 0 for low-quartile firms) and all the independent variables used in the 
baseline regression. I then match without replacement each treatment observation with a unique 
control observation using a caliper of 0.1% to find the closest match.48 After matching, I get 17,639 
firm-year pair observations as treatment and control groups. Using this PSM sample, I re-estimate 
the baseline regression, which is shown in Table 2.11. From Columns 1 and 2, I find that the 
association between trust and the debt ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent 
with previous results. Relative to their matched counterparts in low-trust countries, firms located 
in the high social trust countries use more long-term debt in their capital structures. 
2.6.2.3. Large Change Effect 
Third, I analyze the effect of a large change in social trust on a large change in the leverage 
ratio. The analysis in this section mitigates the lingering concern about whether other country-
specific factors drive the observed association. Practically, the trust of a society tends to change 
very slowly; thus, one may argue that the association may be due to country-level factors other than 
social trust. To overcome this issue, I estimate the large change effect in countries’ trust over a 
longer period of time on changes in the long-term debt ratio. Following Adhikari and Agarwal 
(2016), I employ the following regression in which a five-year change in trust explains the five-
year change in the long-term debt ratio. I create a dummy variable of large and small social trust 
changes over five years based on the terciles. Changes that fall into the highest (lowest) tercile are 
classified as large (small) changes. This is repeated on a rolling five-year basis. The dependent 
                                                          




variable is the change in the long-term debt ratio over the five years on a rolling basis. I then run 
the following model consistent with Adhikari and Agarwal (2016):  
∆5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑡+1 =  β1 + β2𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + β3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + ϵ𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
where ∆5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑡+1 - 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑡−4  and 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) =1 if 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑡 -
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑡−5 is in the top (bottom) tercile of the sample during year t.
49 In Table 2.12, I find that firms 
in countries that experience the largest change in social trust increase their long-term debt ratios. 
Conversely, I also find that the firms in countries that experience the smallest change in social trust 
have a negative association with long-term debt ratios. Both the findings are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The testable hypothesis is β1 − β2 > 0, meaning that firms increase their long-term 
debt ratio if social trust increases significantly. The results offer robust evidence that countries with 
larger social trust changes over the last five years increase their long-term debt ratios. Both 
Columns 1 and 2 show that the difference of statistic tests are positive and significant at the 1% 
level.  
2.6.3. Robustness: Using the U.S. Sample 
The main sample excludes U.S. firms because they would make up an overwhelming 
proportion of the total sample.50 Given the international scope of the study, however, it would be 
considered incomplete if I ignored U.S. firms. Moreover, the empirical results based on global data 
contradict the results of the study of Huang and Shang (2019) for the U.S. Thus, further analysis of 
U.S. data would help provide additional robustness to the findings using a broader global dataset. 
I conduct two sets of tests in this section. In the first test, I simply augment the global dataset with 
U.S. data and re-run the baseline regression model. The second test estimates the relationship 
                                                          
49 I calculate the change on a rolling basis so that the panel structure remains in the sample. 
50 In the preliminary study, I ignore the U.S. sample because it is almost 50% of the total sample. This may 





between leverage and trust for U.S. firms but only using a state-level measure of trust and firms 
located in that state (headquarters). The intent here is twofold. First, despite controlling for a 
number of country-level variables and undertaking several robustness tests, it is still possible that 
the country-level measure of trust may be picking up some other trait or country characteristic. By 
focusing on a single country, I avoid such a criticism. Second, I would like to see whether the 
replication using U.S. data is consistent with the broader findings globally or whether they 
reconfirm the contradictory findings reported by Huang and Shang (2019).    
Table 2.13, Panel A reports the regression results of social trust on the long-term leverage ratio, 
including the U.S. sample with the global sample database. Consistent with the baseline results in 
Table 2.4, I find that social trust associates positively with long-term debt ratio. Columns 1 and 2 
report the alternative fixed effects model, and the coefficients of social trust in both the models are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns 3 and 4 report the instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions taking the same instrument (rainfall variation) used in Table 2.10. I find 
that the coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level.   
Panel B reports the regression results of state-level U.S. social trust on the leverage ratio. As a 
trust measure, I use Putnam’s (1993) state-level trust measure, 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆, based on fraction of people 
in the state that believe most of the people in the society are trustworthy.51 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 is a state-level 
static trust measure meaning that the Putnam measure does not change over time (it is a one-time 
measure). Consistent with the baseline regression, I control for the following variables: size, 
tangible assets scaled by total assets, ROA, market-to-book ratio, R&D to sales, Altman Z-score, 
and mean industry leverage. The variables are defined in the Appendix B.1. Firms’ locations are 
identified by the headquarter locations provided by COMPUSTAT. I control for additional 
                                                          




variables used in Huang and Shang (2019), such as size2 (for capturing nonlinearity). I use U.S. 
data from 1990 to 2018. 
From Panel B, I observe that social trust associates positively with the long-term debt ratio for 
U.S. firms using state-level trust data. In Column 1, I find that the coefficient of trust is 0.051 with 
a significance level at 1%. Column 2 reports the regression coefficients when I take size2 as an 
additional control (as per Huang and Shang, 2016) in the model. The results are consistent. In 
Columns 3 and 4, I adopt an instrumental variable approach taking two instruments for social trust: 
number of times people volunteered per capita and a measure of “most people are honest in the 
society.”52 Both instruments indirectly affect state-level social trust but do not affect the dependent 
variable. First, the number of volunteer activities per year proxies social trust since a trust-intensive 
society constrains opportunistic behavior; thus, individuals voluntarily participate in community 
betterment projects. Moreover, Campbell (2000) states that participating in volunteer activities 
builds social capital. Second, I consider the honesty in the society as an instrument of social trust. 
The Hansen J score of overidentification test shows that the instruments are exogenous. After 
adopting the IV approach, I again confirm in Columns 3 and 4 that social trust and the long-term 
debt ratio are positively related. Overall, the results offer robust evidence that social trust is 
positively associated with the long-term leverage ratio in the U.S. and mirrors my broader findings 
using a global framework. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
The role of social trust as a determinant of capital structure choice has received little attention 
to date. This study provides deeper insight into understanding the role of social trust in borrowing 
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and its implication as a country-level factor. I argue that intangible assets such as social trust can 
also serve as important collateral to increase firms’ debt capacity.  
Overall, the results demonstrate that social trust is a critical country-level factor that determines 
the cost of debt and capital structure. Using a large sample of firm-year data from 32 countries, I 
report a significant positive association between social trust and long-term debt ratio. Furthermore, 
I find that social trust can mitigate the effects of critical institutional factors, including countries’ 
governance quality, creditors’ rights, and financial development. The results offer robust evidence 
of a stronger positive association between social trust and long-term debt when governance and 
creditors’ rights are weak and financial development is low. Additionally, I find that social trust 
moderates the effects of certain firm-level factors that impact firm leverage, including profitability, 
growth opportunity, tangibility, and firms’ distress measures. 
I validate the results by adding additional firm, industry, and country-level factors. The 
association between trust and leverage holds even if when I add more control variables. I also take 
alternative measures of leverage, market leverage, and find that the association between social trust 
and leverage is positive. The tests of endogeneity reveal that the results are consistent with the 
hypotheses if I use instruments and match with similar peer firms. Lastly, the association remains 
robust when I add U.S. data with the global data. This study is perhaps the first study to reveal the 
importance of social trust in the capital structure decisions for global firms. Short-term and long-





Figure 2.1. Trust and Leverage  
This figure reports the time-series pattern of country trust, equity issue, debt issue, and deficit financing. Following Hovakimian et al. 
(2001), the net equity issue is the change of equity over total assets (sstk-prstkc/total assets) greater than 5%. Following Hovakimian et 
al. (2001), the net debt issue is tracked from the change of short-term debt or long-term debt reported in the COMPUSTAT Global. 





Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the mean value of variables for each country. Market leverage is (long-term debt+ short-term debt)/market value of the assets. The long-term debt ratio (LTD) is (dltt/AT). Profitability 
(ROA) is EBIT/AT. Tangibility is Property, plant, and equipment(ppent)/Total Assets (AT). Growth Opportunity is the ratio of market value over book value. Altman Z-score is calculated as 
3.3(EBIT/AT)+1.0(Sales/AT)+1.4(RE/AT)+1.2(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the SIC 2-digit industry mean leverage. N represents the total number of firm-year observations 
for this sample country.    
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Min Max N 
LTD 0.111 0.126 0.000 0.003 0.068 0.178 0.297 0.000 0.497 238,933 
Market Leverage (MktLev) 0.299 0.272 0.000 0.048 0.236 0.493 0.717 0.000 0.962 238,933 
Asset (USD)/1000 1.566 8.113 0.017 0.051 0.175 0.638 2.401 0.003 26.921 238,933 
Tangibility 0.309 0.219 0.039 0.132 0.279 0.447 0.621 0.002 0.888 238,933 
ROA 0.038 0.117 -0.061 0.012 0.049 0.094 0.148 -0.493 0.253 238,933 
Growth Opportunity 1.476 1.221 0.707 0.875 1.095 1.542 2.506 0.467 7.625 238,933 
RnD 0.013 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.035 0.000 0.238 238,933 
Altman Z-Score 1.451 3.286 0.019 0.881 1.559 2.215 2.918 -6.539 5.700 238,933 











Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics: Categorized by Country 
This table presents the mean value of variables for each country. Market Leverage is (long-term debt+ short-term debt)/market value of the assets. The Long-Term Debt ratio is long-term debt 
(dltt)/total assets (AT). Profitability (ROA) is EBIT/AT. Tangibility is (property, plant, and equipment)/AT. Growth Opportunity is the ratio of market value over book value. Altman Z-Score is 
calculated as 3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the SIC 2-digit industry mean leverage. N represents the total number 
of firm-year observations for this sample country. # of Distinct Firms represents how many unique firms prevail in the sample country. Aggregate Governance is the average percentile rank of six 
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Argentina 0.107 0.274 1.224 0.385 0.083 1.725 0.000 1.589 0.215 798 65 0.445 0.190 
Australia 0.083 0.142 0.562 0.341 -0.065 1.858 0.022 -0.984 0.131 17,024 2,145 0.926 0.498 
Brazil 0.167 0.341 2.309 0.338 0.065 2.644 0.002 1.064 0.286 2,951 322 0.519 0.069 
Chile 0.158 0.220 1.656 0.431 0.054 2.986 0.000 1.261 0.240 1,559 143 0.826 0.151 
Colombia 0.100 0.252 3.309 0.448 0.055 1.140 0.000 4.621 0.152 308 35 0.418 0.078 
Egypt 0.066 0.217 0.546 0.391 0.077 1.360 0.000 1.444 0.182 1,110 141 0.268 0.214 
Finland 0.163 0.315 1.481 0.276 0.058 1.466 0.028 1.841 0.244 1,727 151 0.979 0.554 
France 0.126 0.315 3.301 0.182 0.044 1.432 0.018 1.399 0.213 9,710 987 0.843 0.186 
Germany 0.111 0.265 3.386 0.232 0.027 1.514 0.024 1.464 0.189 10,640 992 0.908 0.351 
Hongkong 0.080 0.266 0.763 0.300 0.015 1.445 0.005 0.969 0.190 3,758 687 0.864 0.441 
India 0.147 0.402 0.483 0.340 0.071 1.443 0.005 1.662 0.291 22,057 2,900 0.439 0.195 
Indonesia 0.144 0.328 0.537 0.401 0.073 2.099 0.000 4.401 0.297 4,512 426 0.354 0.398 
Israel 0.145 0.294 0.937 0.204 0.024 2.115 0.049 0.584 0.250 3,080 383 0.688 0.229 
Italy 0.127 0.443 3.093 0.233 0.031 1.257 0.007 1.590 0.259 3,245 345 0.716 0.275 
Japan 0.105 0.328 2.187 0.292 0.044 1.200 0.015 1.864 0.233 61,220 4,093 0.849 0.375 
Jordan 0.057 0.214 0.114 0.408 0.034 1.298 0.001 1.076 0.173 1,034 118 0.500 0.202 
Malaysia 0.082 0.285 0.339 0.349 0.042 1.260 0.004 1.226 0.211 14,300 1,095 0.614 0.087 
Mexico 0.181 0.353 3.574 0.452 0.083 1.364 0.000 1.582 0.251 1,677 136 0.459 0.175 
Netherlands 0.134 0.262 2.939 0.264 0.065 1.610 0.015 1.786 0.220 2,563 242 0.957 0.481 
Nigeria 0.072 0.239 0.270 0.449 0.082 1.819 0.001 1.518 0.204 810 103 0.159 0.167 
Norway 0.206 0.295 1.573 0.330 0.012 2.087 0.015 0.985 0.281 2,674 331 0.965 0.715 
Pakistan 0.121 0.421 0.185 0.465 0.094 1.308 0.001 1.827 0.301 2,892 317 0.213 0.239 
Peru 0.114 0.370 0.659 0.504 0.089 1.186 0.001 1.353 0.203 831 82 0.439 0.080 
S Korea 0.093 0.412 1.612 0.336 0.037 1.179 0.014 2.094 0.273 13,752 1,743 0.728 0.293 
Singapore 0.085 0.269 0.568 0.291 0.027 1.302 0.004 1.205 0.197 8,266 737 0.877 0.283 




Spain 0.160 0.366 4.394 0.324 0.053 1.482 0.006 1.142 0.266 2,201 205 0.788 0.244 
Sweden 0.121 0.230 1.132 0.199 0.004 1.796 0.032 1.239 0.182 4,086 540 0.963 0.625 
Switzerland 0.145 0.263 2.622 0.305 0.051 1.653 0.030 1.558 0.211 3,503 274 0.966 0.438 
Thailand 0.102 0.295 0.453 0.390 0.058 1.446 0.000 1.519 0.258 7,491 621 0.479 0.367 
Turkey 0.090 0.254 1.193 0.328 0.049 1.751 0.005 1.300 0.215 3,052 314 0.479 0.102 
UK 0.107 0.198 1.489 0.285 0.033 1.787 0.022 1.273 0.171 19,954 2,512 0.893 0.296 





Table 2.3. Sources of External Financing Categorized by Social Trust 
This table presents the mean value of total external financing categorized by social trust. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), external financing 
is a fraction of net external funding over total financing (sum of cash flows from operations and net external financing). Net external financing is 
the sum of net total debt issues and net equity issues. External financing is calculated from the aggregate sample of nonfinancial firms reported in 
the COMPUSTAT Global. Net debt issues, and equity issues are calculated following Hovakimian et al. (2001). While net total debt financing is 
the sum of net short-term debt issuance and long-term debt issuance adjusted with the debt reductions, Equity issuance is the change of equity 
(CEQ) greater than 5% in a given year. The mean values are categorized by the trust tercile of low trust, medium trust, and high trust. The mean 
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Low Trust 0.074  122.28  (0.37)  -7.09  (0.09)  -64.68  (0.02)  -71.77  (0.11) 
Medium Trust 0.051  1.89  (0.04)  3.00  (0.01)  -1.13  (0.001)  1.87  (0.01) 





Table 2.4. Base Regression 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and social trust with other control variables. Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents 
saying they trust people when they meet for the first time. Size is the natural log of the total assets (AT) in USD. Tangibility is the Property, Plant, 
and Equip./AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the market to book value of the asset. Altman Z-score is calculated as  
3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 
2-digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception 
of the extent to which agents abide by the rules of society. Governance Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. 
Creditors’ Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization 
to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-
White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 𝑳𝑻𝑫/𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝟏 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trust 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 
 (3.805) (5.684) (3.580) (5.746) 
Size 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (114.941) (56.325) (42.460) (40.073) 
Tangibility 0.129*** 0.081*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
 (90.714) (35.802) (39.414) (38.532) 
ROA 0.011*** -0.005** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
 (5.102) (-2.398) (2.805) (4.009) 
Growth Opportunity -0.001*** 0.001** -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-7.068) (2.265) (-3.608) (0.569) 
RnD -0.085*** 0.001 -0.090*** -0.073*** 
 (-13.334) (0.059) (-6.820) (-5.376) 
Altman Z-Score -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-13.670) (-10.202) (-5.631) (-5.822) 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.422*** 0.284*** 0.434*** 0.414*** 
 (127.892) (62.994) (59.441) (58.234) 
GDP per Capita/ 100,000 -0.007 -0.054*** -0.071*** -0.074*** 
 (-1.561) (-10.137) (-7.730) (-9.008) 
Enforceability of Contracts -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-0.432) (-12.358) (-8.615) (20.670) 
Rule of Law 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (15.209) (12.012) (8.968) (12.801) 
Government Effectiveness  -0.006*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.005** 
 (-5.831) (-17.400) (-6.217) (-2.426) 
Creditors’ Right 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004* -0.005*** 
 (3.071) (3.198) (1.872) (-7.279) 
Stock Market Development 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 (23.630) (7.631) (6.016) (11.172) 
Constant -0.100*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.147*** 
 (-21.160) (-22.532) (-9.459) (-5.338) 
Observations 238,653 238,933 238,653 238,653 
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.661 0.313 0.287 
Ind FE YES YES YES NO 
Country FE NO NO YES NO 
Ind X Country FE NO NO NO YES 
Year FE NO YES YES NO 




Table 2.5. Leverage, Trust, and Governance 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust when the country's governance is weak. The dependent variable is the 
long-term debt ratio. Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents saying that they trust people they meet for the first time. Weak Governance is a 
dummy variable 1 if the aggregate governance is below the median value, 0 otherwise. Aggregate Governance is an index of average percentile 
rank of voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption for each 
country. Size is a natural log of total assets (AT). Tangibility is the Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the 
market-to-book ratio of the asset. Altman Z-score is calculated as 3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D 
scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 2-digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to 
resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception to the extent to which agents abide by the rules of society. Governance 
Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market 
Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market 
capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent VARIABLE: 𝑳𝑻𝑫/𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝟏 (1) (2) (3) 
Trust 0.014* -0.004 -0.004 
 (1.744) (-0.523) (-0.329) 
WeakGovernance (1 if above median, 0 otherwise) -0.017*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (-4.867) (-9.564) (-6.703) 
Trust* WeakGovernance 0.027*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (2.725) (7.860) (5.394) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (120.646) (121.228) (44.107) 
Tangibility/AT 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (24.405) (25.820) (11.244) 
ROA 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (8.048) (8.037) (4.480) 
Growth Opportunity -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-11.916) (-11.821) (-5.954) 
RnD -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (-15.793) (-16.391) (-7.793) 
Altman Z-Score -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-14.541) (-14.660) (-6.126) 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.449*** 0.460*** 0.460*** 
 (133.120) (135.334) (60.534) 
GDP per Capita/ 100,000 -0.017*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (-3.524) (-10.563) (-7.086) 
Enforceability of Contracts -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-2.692) (-12.336) (-9.404) 
Rule of Law 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (11.602) (11.182) (6.971) 
Government Effectiveness  -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.794) (-6.767) (-3.976) 
Creditors’ Rights 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.211) (1.250) (0.917) 
Stock Market Development 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (19.188) (5.536) (4.128) 
Constant -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 (-13.334) (-11.217) (-5.888) 
Observations 238,653 238,653 238,653 
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.282 0.282 
Ind FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES 




Table 2.6. Leverage, Trust, and Creditors’ Rights 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust when the firms located in weak creditors’ rights countries. The dependent 
variable is the long-term debt ratio. Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents saying they trust people they meet for the first time. Low Creditors’ 
Rights is a dummy variable if creditors’ rights are ≤2, 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑇) is the natural log of the total assets (AT).  Tangibility is the Property, 
Plant, and Equip/AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the market-to-book ratio of the asset. Altman Z-score is calculated as 
3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 
2-digit SIC industry. The Enforceability of Contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the 
perception to the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. 
Creditors’ Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization 
to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-
White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Trust -0.033*** -0.018*** -0.018 
 (-4.761) (-2.622) (-1.616) 
Creditors’ Right 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (11.070) (10.710) (8.145) 
Trust * Low Creditors’ Right 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 (15.803) (15.986) (10.580) 
Size 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (120.776) (121.273) (44.206) 
Tangibility 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (24.372) (25.754) (11.220) 
ROA 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (8.019) (8.053) (4.501) 
Growth Opportunity -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-12.468) (-12.405) (-6.253) 
RnD -0.104*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
 (-15.628) (-16.173) (-7.687) 
Altman Z-Score -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-14.575) (-14.696) (-6.146) 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.451*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 
 (134.254) (136.123) (60.848) 
GDP per Capita/ 100,000 -0.009** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (-2.072) (-11.263) (-7.493) 
Enforceability of Contracts -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.752) (-11.783) (-8.946) 
Rule of Law 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (15.825) (14.865) (9.279) 
Government Effectiveness  -0.001 -0.007*** -0.007***  
(-0.671) (-5.935) (-3.286) 
Stock Market Development 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (18.058) (5.761) (4.283) 
Constant -0.108*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (-21.840) (-21.029) (-10.809) 
Observations 238,653 238,653 238,653 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.282 0.282 
Ind FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES 




Table 2.7. Leverage, Trust, and Financial Development 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust when firms are headquartered in weak financial developed countries. 
The dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio. Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents saying they trust people they meet for the first time. 
WeakFinDev is a dummy variable if the country’s FinMkt, financial development index, is below (above) the median. Size is the natural log of the 
total assets (AT). Tangibility is the Property, Plant, and Equip./AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the market-to-book ratio of the asset. 
Altman Z-score is calculated as 3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT) +1.4* (RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage 
is the average total leverage of 2-digit SIC industry. The Enforceability of Contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through 
courts. Rule of Law is the perception to the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance Effectiveness captures the perceptions of 
the quality of public services. Creditors’ Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized 
values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Trust  0.008 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (1.253) (5.474) (3.238) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣 (1 if Fin Mkt is in bottom Tercile, 0 Otherwise) -0.005*** -0.003* -0.003 
 (-3.169) (-1.797) (-1.321) 
Trust* 𝑾𝒆𝒂𝒌𝑭𝒊𝒏𝑫𝒆𝒗 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.014** 
 (5.211) (3.189) (2.332) 
Size 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (117.804) (118.905) (43.785) 
Tangibility 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (21.910) (24.642) (10.830) 
ROA 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (1.326) (1.631) (1.200) 
Growth Opportunity 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (7.927) (7.926) (4.576) 
RnD -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-12.874) (-12.362) (-6.263) 
Altman Z-Score -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.121*** 
 (-16.763) (-17.287) (-8.263) 
Mean Ind. Leverage -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-14.239) (-14.302) (-6.469) 
GDP per Capita/ 100,000 0.448*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 
 (129.026) (131.392) (59.168) 
Enforceability of Contracts -0.006 -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 (-1.270) (-12.907) (-8.885) 
Rule of Law -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-3.504) (-13.028) (-9.853) 
Government Effectiveness  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (12.734) (12.187) (7.529) 
Stock Market Development 0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (6.415) (-4.938) (-2.941) 
Constant -0.076*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
 (-15.557) (-16.172) (-8.264) 
Observations 228,719 228,719 228,719 
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.281 0.281 
Ind FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES 






Table 2.8. Leverage, Trust, and Firm-Specific Factors 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust. The dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio. Trust is the 
percentage of WVS respondents saying they trust people they meet for the first time. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡is a dummy variable 1 if country trust lies above 
the median value, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of the total assets (AT). Tangibility is the (Property, Plant, and Equip)/AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. 
Growth Opportunity is the market to book ratio. Altman Z-score is calculated as 3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+ 1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). 
RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 2-digit SIC industry. The Enforceability of Contracts is the number 
of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception to the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance 
Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market 
Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market 
capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tangibility ROA MkttoBook Altman_Z 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡   0.150
*** 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 (5.770) (0.870) (0.111) (0.891) 
Tangibility 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 
 (36.900) (39.602) (39.410) (39.049) 
Size 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (42.489) (43.671) (42.607) (44.566) 
ROA 0.011*** -0.011 0.011*** 0.008* 
 (2.696) (-1.279) (2.870) (1.852) 
Growth Opportunity -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.751) (-3.011) (-4.424) (-3.294) 
RnD -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.091*** -0.098*** 
 (-7.133) (-7.401) (-6.907) (-7.603) 
Altman Z-Score -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (-5.657) (-6.748) (-5.650) (-8.055) 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.434*** 0.433*** 0.435*** 0.432*** 
 (59.406) (59.277) (59.509) (59.263) 
Tangibility/AT* 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 -0.039
***    
 (-6.860) 
   
ROA* 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 
 0.036***   
 
 (4.158)   
MkttoBook* 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 
  0.002**   
  (2.426)  
Altman_Z* 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 
   0.004*** 
 
   (5.226) 
Constant -0.137*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.130*** 
 (-16.322) (-15.938) (-15.788) (-15.633) 
Country-Level Control YES YES YES YES 
Observations 238,653 238,653 238,653 238,653 
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.314 0.313 0.315 
Ind FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.9. Robustness Test: Market Leverage and Adding Other Control Variables 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust taking additional firm and country-level controls. The dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio and market leverage 
(MktLev). Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents saying they trust people they meet for the first time. Market leverage (MktLev) is calculated as Total Leverage/Market value. The Appendix B.1.  
contains the variable descriptions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators). ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Except for Japan and the 
UK (Cols. 2-3) 
   Additional Firm and Country-Level  
Variables (Cols 4-7) 
Excess Leverage  
(Cols. 8-9) 
VARIABLES MktLev LTD MktLev LTD LTD LTD MktLev ExcessLTD ExcessMkt 
 Trust 0.018* 0.058*** 0.024* 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.024*** 
 (1.721) (8.427) (1.791) (6.093) (5.168) (5.168) (3.774) (5.336) (3.752) 
Size 0.063*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (64.675) (99.019) (60.587) (115.713) (79.127) (79.566) (35.626) (0.011) (9.391) 
Tangibility 0.137*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.006** 0.003* 
 (34.637) (74.277) (40.964) (91.722) (58.457) (58.452) (29.978) (2.152) (1.807) 
ROA -0.031*** 0.006*** -0.033*** 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.011 0.000 -0.004* 
 (-5.438) (2.928) (-4.870) (5.022) (5.096) (5.032) (0.843) (0.007) (-1.647) 
Growth Opportunity -0.031*** -0.002*** -0.059*** -0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** -0.046*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (-65.632) (-10.575) (-137.175) (-7.167) (2.340) (2.217) (-68.293) (0.911) (-8.717) 
RnD -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.226*** -0.090*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.170*** 0.007 -0.017*** 
 (-3.585) (-5.889) (-15.835) (-14.167) (-8.522) (-8.556) (-10.056) (0.587) (-2.741) 
Altman Z-Score -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.000 0.000 
 (-9.539) (-12.078) (-7.564) (-13.781) (-12.074) (-12.061) (-10.285) (-0.476) (1.143) 
Intangible to Asset     0.075
*** 0.075*** 0.058***   
 
    (11.941) (11.942) (8.803)   
Financial Slack     0.049
*** 0.049*** 0.083***   
 
    (12.986) (12.990) (11.970)   
Inventory to Asset     0.019
*** 0.019*** 0.167***   
 
    (6.103) (6.133) (10.613)   
Dividend to Asset     -0.007 -0.007 0.008   
 
    (-0.639) (-0.646) (0.267)   
Tax to Asset     -0.151
*** -0.151*** -0.399***   
 
    (-7.730) (-7.688) (-6.556)   
Cash to Asset     -0.125
*** -0.126*** -0.446***   
 
    (-24.997) (-25.040) (-44.556)   
CF to Asset     -0.236
*** -0.238*** -0.540***   
 
    (-6.781) (-6.800) (-6.795)   
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.555*** 0.433*** 0.851*** 0.434*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.740*** -0.054*** 0.019*** 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Except for Japan and the 
UK (Cols. 2-3) 
   Additional Firm and Country-Level  
Variables (Cols 4-7) 
Excess Leverage  
(Cols. 8-9) 
VARIABLES MktLev LTD MktLev LTD LTD LTD MktLev ExcessLTD ExcessMkt 
HHI     0.005
*** 0.005*** 0.003   
 
    (3.291) (3.056) (0.953)   
          
GDP per Capita/ 
100,000 
-0.091*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.111*** 0.025** 0.003 
(-9.068) (-9.544) (-5.132) (-11.464) (-3.823) (-5.284) (-6.793) (2.112) (0.502) 
Enforceability of 
Contracts 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(-18.567) (-14.046) (-5.207) (-11.577) (-9.012) (-7.890) (-10.129) (-12.583) (-39.617) 
Rule of Law 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.054*** 0.003 0.001 
 (7.630) (7.702) (8.222) (14.371) (8.971) (7.963) (8.752) (0.884) (0.754) 
Government 
Effectiveness  
0.005** -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.008*** 
(2.228) (-4.658) (-4.601) (-11.352) (-6.775) (-7.348) (-0.025) (6.480) (-6.638) 
Creditors’ Right -0.000 0.001 0.007 0.004** 0.010*** 0.009*** -0.022*** -0.005 0.011*** 
 (-0.080) (0.483) (1.280) (2.570) (5.418) (4.773) (-5.090) (-1.569) (7.141) 
Stock Market 
Development 
-0.013*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.004*** 
(-15.371) (2.626) (-6.655) (8.153) (6.165) (5.713) (-1.346) (-6.311) (-7.577) 
R&D Exp Country     0.007
*** 0.006*** -0.056***   
 
    (4.848) (4.501) (-17.424)   
Inflation     -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.002***   
     (-3.919) (-4.107) (6.916)   
Domestic Credit to 
Private Firm/GDP 
    0.002 0.004 -0.034***   
    (0.477) (1.001) (-4.327)   
Private Credit to GDP     -0.000
*** -0.000*** 0.000***   
 
    (-6.923) (-6.704) (4.952)   
Individualism    0.002
***  0.002
*** 0.005***   
 
   (14.939)  (5.682) (7.064)   
Uncertainty Avoidance    
0.001***  0.000 0.002
***   
   (6.152)  (1.152) (4.045)   
Masculinity    -0.001***  -0.000 -0.001**   
    (-4.146)  (-0.896) (-2.441)   
Long Term Orientation 
   -0.000**  -0.001*** -0.001*   
   (-2.141)  (-2.995) (-1.821)   
Degree of 
Individualism 
    0.030
*** 0.024*** -0.036***   
    (7.345) (5.915) (-4.291)   
Degree of Hierarchy     -0.045
*** -0.040*** -0.155***   
 
    (-3.502) (-3.164) (-5.050)   




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Except for Japan and the 
UK (Cols. 2-3) 
   Additional Firm and Country-Level  
Variables (Cols 4-7) 
Excess Leverage  
(Cols. 8-9) 
VARIABLES MktLev LTD MktLev LTD LTD LTD MktLev ExcessLTD ExcessMkt 
 (-14.220) (-20.207) (1.632) (-19.480) (-5.773) (-8.570) (0.576) (1.269) (1.753) 
Observations 238,514 156,118 155,750 238,593 170,608 170,608 170,299 238,235 238,653 
Adjusted R2 0.725 0.326 0.374 0.313 0.336 0.337 0.385 0.010 0.037 
Ind FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.10. Endogeneity Test: Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust adopting an instrumental variable approach. The dependent variable is 
the long-term debt ratio. Trust is the percentage of WVS respondents saying they trust people they meet for the first time. Trust̂ is the predicted 
value of trust in the first stage of regression. Size is the natural log of the total assets (AT).  Tangible is the Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. ROA is 
EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the market-to-book ratio of the asset. Altman Z-score is calculated as: 3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+ 
1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 2-digit SIC industry. The 
enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception to the extent that agents 
abide by the rules of society. Governance Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ Rights are derived 
from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to 
GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. I take Rainfall variation of a country as an instrument of social trust. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  First-Stage Second Stage 
Dependent Variable  Trust LTD 
Trust̂  0.408
*** 0.373*** 
  (27.581) (29.060) 
Size  0.020*** 0.020*** 
  (109.335) (111.110) 
Tangibility  0.063*** 0.062*** 
  (27.815) (27.318) 
ROA  0.027*** 0.026*** 
  (8.598) (8.428) 
Growth Opportunity  -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (-7.141) (-6.329) 
RnD  -0.099*** -0.095*** 
  (-13.700) (-13.266) 
Altman Z-Score  -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (-15.491) (-15.342) 
Mean Ind. Leverage  0.400*** 0.407*** 
  (111.156) (117.059) 
Country-Level Controls  YES YES 
    
Rainfall Variation      0.076***   
           (85.710)   
Constant 0.222*** -0.182*** -0.129*** 
           (68.210) (-43.082) (0.00390) 
Observations            234,882 234,882 234,882 
Adjusted R2             0.5454 0.184 0.202 
F Stat  5,081.27  — 
Industry FE — YES YES 







Table 2.11. Endogeneity Test: Regression-Based on Propensity Score Matching 
The sample contains 35,278 treatment and control firm-year observations from 17,639 matched pairs for the period 1990 to 2018. The propensity 
score matching method is used to generate the sample. I rank the trust annually based on the data in that year. Each year I make quartile portfolios 
and assign High Social Trust is equal to 1 if the trust is in the top quartile and assign 0 when the trust remains in the bottom quartile.  Using logit 
regression to create the propensity score, I regress High Social trust as the dependent variable and all the controls of the baseline regression as 
independent variables. I use the predicted High Social Trust from the logistic regression and match the treatment group (High Social Trust = 1) 
with the control group (High Social Trust = 0) without replacement using caliper 0.001 as a matching criterion. After creating the propensity score-
matched sample, I perform the same baseline regression. The dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡is a dummy variable 1 if the 
social trust is in top quartile and 0 when trust is in the bottom quartile.  Size is the natural log of the total assets (AT) in USD.  Tangibility is the 
Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. ROA is EBIT/AT. Growth Opportunity is the market-to-book ratio of the asset. Altman Z-score is calculated as 
3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+ 1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D scaled by sales. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 
- digit SIC industry. The Enforceability of Contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception 
to the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance Effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ 
Rights are derived from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, 
total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White 
estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES                      (1)                       (2) 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 0.013
*** 0.013*** 
 (10.323) (5.495) 
Size 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (52.455) (28.306) 
Tangibility 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (8.739) (5.379) 
ROA 0.015** 0.015* 
 (2.303) (1.699) 
Growth Opportunity -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.383) (-0.258) 
RnD -0.054*** -0.054** 
 (-3.221) (-2.125) 
Altman Z Score -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-6.478) (-4.777) 
Mean Ind. Leverage 0.406*** 0.406*** 
 (55.157) (34.985) 
GDP per Capita/ 100,000 -0.048*** -0.048** 
 (-3.749) (-2.320) 
Enforceability of Contracts 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (8.277) (5.560) 
Rule of Law 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (6.364) (4.055) 
Government Effectiveness  0.005* 0.005 
 (1.868) (1.246) 
Creditors’ Right -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-6.328) (-3.687) 
Stock Market Development 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (5.566) (4.261) 
Constant -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (-11.850) (-7.602) 
Observations                   35,058                   35,058 
Adjusted R2                    0.274                     0.274 
Ind. FE                     YES                      YES 
Year FE                     YES                      YES 




Table 2.12. Analysis of Large Change in the Country Trust 
This table summarizes the analysis of large changes in country trust on the change of leverage ratio. I use a change of five years of the long-term 
debt ratio as a dependent variable. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡) is a dummy variable 1 when the five years change of trust is in the top (bottom) 
tercile, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES              ∆𝑳𝑻𝑫𝟓𝒕+𝟏              ∆𝑳𝑻𝑫𝟓𝒕+𝟏 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (β1)  0.007
*** 0.005*** 
 (7.206) (3.654) 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∆5𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (β2) -0.004
*** -0.003*** 
 (-5.269) (-3.186) 
Constant -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.472) (-3.153) 
Difference Test: 𝛃𝟏 − 𝛃𝟐 = 𝟎 0.011
*** 0.008*** 
T-stat 9.521 4.666 
Observations             161,259             161,122 
Adjusted R2               0.003              0.006 
Ind FE               NO              YES 
Year FE            YES             YES 



















Table 2.13. Trust and Leverage (Including U.S. Data with the Global Data) 
This table presents the regression results of firm-leverage and country trust including U.S. data with the global sample. Trust is the percentage of 
WVS respondents saying they trust people when they meet for the first time. Panel A presents the regression results including the U.S. data with 
the global sample. I take the same instrument (rainfall variation of a country) of Table 10 to run the instrumental variable regressions in Columns 
3 and 4. Panel B presents the regression results of firm-leverage and U.S. state-level trust. The dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio. 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 is the measure of most people are trusted collected from Putnam (1993). Size is the natural log of the total assets (AT).  Size_sqr is the 
square term of the size to capture the curvature. ROA is EBIT/AT. Market-to-book ratio is market value over book value of the asset. Tangibility 
is the Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 2-digit SIC industry. Altman Z is 
3.3*(EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT). RnD is R&D over sales. In Columns 2 and 4, I control for Size_sqr to capture the 
curvature as additional firm-level controls. Column 3 and 4 report the instrumental variable approach. I take the number of volunteered last year 
per capita and a measure of most people are honest as instruments of 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White 
estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV (Second Stage) IV (Second Stage) 
Panel A: Including U.S. Data with the Global Data 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 0.034*** 0.034***   
 (15.598) (6.533)   
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡̂    0.405*** 0.405*** 
   (29.401) (12.081) 
Firm-Level Controls YES YES YES YES 
Country-Level Controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.181*** -0.181*** 
 (-21.326) (-12.140) (-37.670) (-15.880) 
Observations 305,798 305,798 213,636 213,636 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.275 0.194 0.194 
Ind FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustering NO Firm-Level — — 
Panel B: Only U.S. data 
     
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 0.051
*** 0.045***   
 (3.714) (3.260)   
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡̂ 𝑈𝑆   0.033
*** 0.025*** 
   (5.670) (4.296) 
Additional Firm-Controls NO YES NO YES 
     
Firm-Level Controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.010 -0.056*** -0.062*** -0.156*** 
 (0.575) (-2.956) (-4.061) (-9.009) 
Observations 166,710 166,710 91,733 91,733 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.178 0.177 0.183 
Ind. FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 




 (p-value = 0.574) 
0.739  












It is well established that collateral (tangible assets) is a key determinant of capital structure across 
various economies.53 The universality of tangible assets as a positive determinant of debt ratio has 
been shown to hold across various subsets of countries, e.g., G7 countries (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), ten developing countries by Booth et al. (2001), and 39 countries segregating by developed 
and developing economies by Fan et al. (2012). More recently, Oztekin (2015) examines factors 
that reliably determine the capital structure for global firms. 54  However, none of the studies 
explores the role of tangible assets in the context of the prevailing institutional heterogeneity.55 
                                                          
53 Collateral has played significant role in the history of credit granting (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). 
Though unsecured debt is fairly common now, collateral still plays a sizeable, and arguably even bigger and 
direct role in the granting of credit.  For example, in the US, according to the National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF), 30.3% of business loans were collateralized in 1998. The recent statistics reveals 
that the use of collateral is increasing, i.e., 45% of loans in 2003 were collateralized and 49% of the loans are 
collaterized by the business assets in 2020.     
54 Other prominent international capital structure studies that include collateral as a significant determinant 
are Antoniuo et al. (2008), Kayo and Kimura (2011), among others. 
55 Law and finance literature determines the formal and informal institutions, such as creditors’ rights, 
financial development, corruptions, social trust, and so on, that can explain the financial and economic growth 
of a country. See also Liberti and Mian, 2010; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 




Therefore, the lessons learned from one environment cannot be generalized to other countries 
where the institutions and culture are different. Though the existing literature is vast and rich in 
analyzing the direction of the association between collateral and leverage ratio, the analysis of how 
much variation of this association comes from country-level institutional heterogeneity remains 
unexplored. This paper attempts to examine the impact of asset tangibility on the capital structure 
by exploiting the cross-country institutional heterogeneity. To disentangle the association, I link 
two relevant literature streams- international capital structure and law and finance.  
One of the central features of tangible assets is that they are inherently less informationally 
asymmetric and have higher recovery value (Liberti & Sturgess, 2018). Tangible assets are highly 
desirable to the creditors as a medium of collateral because it can be used as a monitoring device 
(Rajan and Winton, 1998). The law and finance literature provides evidence that some country-
level institutional characteristics, e.g., creditors’ rights, financial development, and so on, ease the 
lending and borrowing constraints and influence the capital structure decisions around the world 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; LLSV, 1997; Qian & Strahan, 2007; and among others). 
Thus, the presence of stronger institutional characteristics reduces the role of collateral because 
both stronger institutional characteristics and collateral serve the common purpose of reducing 
market friction and information asymmetry. Theoretically, the demand for collateral is likely 
different for firms located in the less financially developed countries due to the opacity of 
information and weaker enforcement (Bae & Goyal, 2009; Behr et al., 2011). Other formal and 
informal institutions, i.e., creditors’ rights, country transparency, governance, and so on, may also 
alter the association between tangible assets and capital structure choice. In light of the above 
discussion, the sensitivity of asset tangibility with leverage ratio may strengthen or weaken 
depending upon the country-level factors that reduce or increase the market frictions and 




magnitude of the association between tangible assets and leverage ratio vary with different 
institutional environments?  
In light of the above discussion, I first develop a set of empirical predictions of how 
tangible assets associate differently with the leverage ratio given the heterogeneity of the 
institutional environment. I hypothesize that the association of tangible assets on leverage ratio is 
weaker if the firms are headquartered in strong institutional environments, i.e., stronger creditors’ 
rights, better financial development, good country governance, and higher country-level 
transparency.  
Using firm-year observations of 32 countries spanning from 1990 to 2018, I find that 
tangible assets are less positively associated with the capital structure in stronger creditors’ rights 
countries. I find that the interaction effect between tangible assets and stronger creditors’ rights on 
long-term debt ratio is -0.050, implying a less positive relation between leverage use and tangible 
assets for firms located in stronger creditors rights countries compared to weaker creditors’ rights 
countries. I further find that tangible assets are less positively associated with leverage for firms 
located in countries with strong financial development. The interaction effect between tangible 
assets and strong financial development on market book leverage is -0.016, meaning that the 
association between tangible assets and leverage is less positive in stronger financial development 
countries than weaker financial development countries. Next, I examine the sensitivity of tangible 
assets to leverage conditioned on country-level governance and corruption or transparency. I argue 
that a country's governance and transparency act as informal institutions that may affect capital 
structure decisions. I find that tangible assets are less positively associated with leverage ratio for 
firms in strong governance and more transparent countries. Finally, I test the role of tangible assets 
on leverage during the crisis period. I argue that tangible assets' inherent characteristic of being less 




the crisis period.56 Thus, I hypothesize that tangible assets associate with leverage ratio more 
positively during the crisis period when lending constraints are higher. However, stronger 
institutional characteristics help to ease the lending constraints when the overall market is in crisis. 
In this situation, the association between tangible assets and leverage becomes less positive for 
firms headquartered in the stronger institutional environments. Consistent with this belief, I find 
that the association between tangible assets and leverage is more positive during crisis periods, but 
this association moderates when firms are headquartered in stronger institutional characteristics.  
The cross-country approach to examining the association between tangible assets on 
leverage makes it possible to study the effect of differences in legal environments. This analysis 
fits into both the international capital structure literature and law and finance literature. This paper 
contributes to our understanding of international capital structure and law and finance studies in at 
least two ways. First, to my best knowledge, this is the first study that disentangles the magnitude 
of the association between tangible assets and leverage using a cross-country sample. I argue that 
strong country-level institutional characteristics reduce the market frictions that eventually mitigate 
the lending and borrowing constraints. According to the supply-side view of capital structure, asset 
tangibility and redeployability are the primary drivers of leverage when credit frictions are high 
(Campello & Giambona, 2013). Thus, the expected association between asset tangibility and 
leverage is not uniform for all firms in differential institutional environments. my  study is different 
from previous international capital structure studies of Antoniou et al. (2008), Booth et al. (2001), 
Fan et al. (2012), Oztekin (2015), and Rajan & Zingales (1995) because these studies do not 
disentangle the association of tangibility and leverage with the institutional heterogeneity of a 
country. Further, I supplement Campello and Giambona (2013) by considering country-level 
frictions while they investigate firm-level frictions that create financing constraints to test the 
                                                          
56 The U.S housing crisis of 2007 to 2010 contributed to the global financial crisis. The crisis had severe 
long-lasting consequences for the U.S and European countries. Thus, I define crisis period from the year 




magnitude of the association between collateral and leverage ratio. Second, I contribute to the law 
and finance literature. According to the literature, some institutional characteristics, such as 
creditors’ rights, financial development, transparency, foster economic development. Thus, firm’s 
leverage ratio increases due to the ease of access to external financing. Collateral is one of the most 
important determinants of the capital structure that can mediate the lack of any institutional 
characteristics; thus, the association of collateral on leverage is stronger if firms headquartered in 
the weaker institutional environment countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I survey the existing literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents the data and sample statistics.  Section 3.4 discusses 
the results of the tangible assets' role as a determinant of capital structure across varied institutional 
environments. Section 3.5 provides additional results that take into account endogeneity concerns. 
Finally, section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The aim is to contribute to two different streams of literature; thus, I discuss the pertinent 
literature segregated into these areas: international capital structure and law and finance. 
3.2.1. International Capital Structure 
 Perhaps the study of Rajan and Zingales (1995) is the first that tests the reliable factors of 
capital structure from a global perspective. The study uses the data from seven G7 countries and 
analyzes the capital structure determinants based on the existing theories.57 Though different from 
each other, the characteristics of the G7 countries are more similar than dissimilar because they all 
                                                          





belong to developed countries. The focus of the study is to determine the association of the 
fundamental factors that affect firm leverage choice when the countries are different in accounting 
standards, tax treatment, bankruptcy law, and creditors’ rights, although they do not explicitly 
control for these institutional differences nor do they look at how these institutional differences 
moderate the capital structure determinants. They find that the association between tangible assets 
and book leverage ratio is higher for Japanese firms than for any of the other six countries. They 
argue that this association is higher for Japanese firms because Japan's land value was appreciated 
during the 1980s. Thus, Japanese firms are able to borrow more because of the higher collateral 
value. In another study, Booth et al. (2001) examine the determinants of capital structure for 10 
developing countries. Though they argue that the financial leverage decisions differ significantly 
between developed and developing countries, they find that the determinants are almost the same 
as the developed countries. However, the magnitude of associations is heterogeneous in different 
countries. The variation of association results from the differential tax treatment, bankruptcy 
process, and many others. With regard to tangible assets, they find that the association is positive 
with the long-term debt ratio, while the association is negative for the total debt ratio but as this 
was not the focus of the paper no explanation was provided. Using a broader dataset, Fan et al. 
(2012) segregate the data into two major categories: developing and developed countries. They 
assess the determinants of the capital structure for these two groups and find the association 
between tangible assets and leverage ratio is higher for the developed countries.  
3.2.2. Law and Finance      
 The difference in laws in various countries might explain why firms from different 
countries use different financing sources. According to LLSV (1998), the law varies considerably 
across countries, perhaps due to the heterogeneous legal origin. In their seminal paper, LLSV 
(1998) document that country's legal system influences its bank credit level and its stock market 




developed equity market than civil law countries. The well-developed markets attract firms to 
invest more by financing from the equity market. LLSV (1997) find that countries with poorer 
investors’ protection laws are associated with smaller and narrower capital markets. 
 Besides legal origin there are other relevant institutional characteristics including strong 
financial markets, transparency, and so on. LLSV (1997) document a positive association between 
stronger investor protection rights and financial development, while Rajan and Zingales (1998) find 
that financial development facilitates economic growth. Liberti and Mian (2010) show that 
institutions that promote financial development also ease the financial constraints and lower the 
credit spread. They find that financial development reduces the collateral cost and collateral spread.  
More to the point, financial development enables firms to pledge a broader class of assets as 
collateral. The association is due to the better legal protection and stronger creditors’ rights that 
enable lenders to seize and liquidate specialized forms of assets more efficiently. Moreover, 
countries’ laws shape the association between collateral and leverage ratio. Calomiris et al. (2016) 
find that loan to values of collateral is lower for firms located in the weak collateral law countries.     
One of the important institutional characteristics of a country is the creditors’ protection. 
Djankov et al. (2008) analyze the impact of creditors’ rights on the private credit of 129 countries 
across the world. They find that countries with stronger creditors’ rights are associated with a more 
positive private credit to GDP ratio, and the association is stronger for richer countries. In another 
study, Gu and Kowaleswski (2015) examine the association between creditors’ rights and corporate 
bond markets. They find that stronger creditors’ rights are associated with more developed 
corporate bond markets. LLSV (1997) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) study the 
impact of institutional characteristics on capital structure choice and, among other things, document 




3.2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Previous literature primarily focuses on how tangible assets mitigate firm-level market 
frictions to facilitate debt capacity, but its implication on the country-level frictions has received 
little attention. The use of international data provides a unique opportunity to test whether country-
level factors influence the association between firm-level factors, asset tangibility in this case, and 
leverage ratio. The impact of different institutional structures is important because they may affect 
the country's cross-sectional correlation between leverage and firm-level factors, such as asset 
tangibility. I argue that country-level factors are an important driving force in debt contracting that 
may moderate the association between firm-level characteristics on leverage ratio. First, higher 
creditors’ rights offer greater protection to the lenders that eventually advance financial 
development (Djankov et al., 2007). I argue that creditors’ rights increase creditors' bargaining 
powers; thus, it lowers creditors’ monitoring need (Jayaraman and Thakor, 2013). On the other 
hand, Rajan and Winton (1995), Ono and Uesugi (2009) argue that the collateral can be used as the 
monitoring device. Costello (2019) argues that collateral rights decrease suppliers’ incentives to 
monitor. Thus, both stronger creditors’ rights and collateral serve the same purpose: as a monitoring 
device. In light of the above discussion, I hypothesize that tangible assets are associated more 
positively with leverage when firms are headquartered in the weaker creditors’ rights countries.  
H1. The association of tangible assets with leverage is less (more) positive when creditors’ 
rights are strong (weak). 
Financial development can mitigate market friction by increasing the level of credit and 
the capital market's capacity (Rajan & Zingales, 1998) that eventually lessens the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problem. In other words, financial development is stimulated by institutional 
developments, which ultimately ease the lending and borrowing constraints resulting in reduced 




financial development leads to industrial growth (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998). Moreover, financial development promotes a credit market that eventually 
cultivates lender-borrower associations. Thus, the absence of strong financial development creates 
another type of market friction that makes debt financing expensive. I argue that the presence of 
tangible assets reduces this type of market friction and increases debt capacity. Hence, I 
hypothesize that the association of tangible assets with leverage is stronger in weaker financial 
development environments than stronger financial development environments. I argue that firms 
located in stronger financial development countries rely less on tangible assets than firms in weaker 
financial development countries. 
H2. Other things remaining the same, the association of tangible assets and leverage is 
less (more) positive for firms located in stronger (weaker) financial development countries.  
According to La Porta et al. (1996), the country-level governance indicators, such as the 
judicial system, anti-corruption efforts, voting rights, accountability, and political stability, 
improves countries’ economic development. Other studies show that firm policy and risk-taking 
decisions are also determined by the country-level governance variables (John, Litov, & Yeung, 
2008). Previous capital structure literature also emphasized the importance of a country’s legal 
environment, such as firms using more leverage if they are headquartered in stronger formal 
institutional environments (Cheng & Shiu, 2007). I suggest that tangible assets and governance are 
both substitutable with each other because both ease lending constraints. Thus, the importance of 
tangible assets in the capital structure policy is less prominent for firms that are headquartered in 




tangible assets associate less positively with the leverage ratios if firms are located in strong 
governance countries. 
H3. Other things remaining the same, the association of tangible assets and 
leverage is less (more) positive for firms located in stronger (weaker) governance countries. 
Another cross-country market friction is transparency. By country-level transparency, I 
mean the availability and reliability of information about a country’s public and private sectors. A 
country is transparent when the business and government practices are open, the power is well-
distributed, social trust is higher, and there exists a low level of corruption. Country-level 
transparency lowers the information asymmetry as Stiglitz (2000) argues transparency is another 
name of information, so greater transparency becomes a way of minimizing information asymmetry 
in the market. Transparency has been shown to attract capital, reduce capital market volatility, and 
lessen the severity of the financial crisis (Gelos and Wei, 2005).   They also state that during volatile 
times, international investors may be more likely to rush into the less opaque countries 
(International Monetary Fund, 2001). Higher country-level transparency acts as an invisible 
institution that decreases the information asymmetry and lowers banks' risk-taking (Houston et al., 
2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that agency cost between lenders and managers arises 
when the potential for asset substitution is higher. The asset substitution problem may become more 
acute in less transparent countries because of less effective monitoring and governance. I argue that 
macro-level transparency promotes financial development and encourages both lenders and 
borrowers to engage in debt contracting. I further argue that lenders place greater reliance on 
tangible assets to overcome deficiencies associated with less transparency. Thus, the higher 
proportion of fixed assets complements the lack of transparency in the country.  
H4. Other things remaining the same, the association of tangible assets and leverage is 




3.3. Data and Sample Description 
3.3.1 Data 
The sample consists of firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT Global database for the 
years 1990 through 2018. COMPUSTAT Global database contains accounting data for countries 
other than North America (the U.S. and Canada) with over 24,000 firms.58 I use a series of country-
level control variables collected from a variety of sources. Country-level governance data is 
collected from World Governance Indicators (WGI).59 Among other country-level factors, the 
following factors are collected from World Development Indicators (WDI), i.e., GDP, stock and 
bond market development, inflation, and time required for enforceability. 60 The creditors’ rights 
data is from La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007). Creditors’ rights index ranges from 0 
to 4, where 0 represents the weakest rights and 4 represents the strongest. Each of the four 
components adds 1 to the index value if the component is present in the country. The components 
of creditor rights are as follows: MGMT_NOT_ STAY (captures the ability of creditors or courts 
to replace the incumbent management during bankruptcy), NO_AUTOSTAY (equals one if the 
bankruptcy code prohibits an automatic stay on assets), RESTRICT_REORG (equals one if the 
bankruptcy code prevents management from unilaterally filing a reorganization plan), and 
SECURED_FIRST (equals one if secured creditors' claims are given absolute priority relative to 
the government or employee claims). Finally, I use the mergers and acquisition data from SDC 
platinum to calculate a measure of asset redeployability.61  
                                                          
58 In case I find any North American firms in the study, I drop them. 
59 Almost 200 countries that report the aggregate and individual governance indicators are recorded in the 
WGI project. I collect six variables from the database: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Governance Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
60 WDI reports time-series governance data for 217 countries. 
61 I use SDC platinum to calculate the historical mergers and acquisition transaction value of the completed 
mergers and acquisition deals. I obtain the value of all M&A activity involving publicly traded targeted firms 




The raw data sample in the study includes 662,933 international firm-year observations 
from the COMPUSTAT Global database. I then apply a series of filters. Following Morellec et al. 
(2018) and other international studies, I drop all the regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and 
financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). I also drop firm-year observations from the study if the key 
variables, e.g., cash, tangibility, total asset, cash-flow, total book leverage, total debt, are missing. 
I also exclude firm-years if cash, total assets, and sales are reported with negative values. I also 
eliminate firms with excessive debt ratios that are likely due to reporting errors.  Specifically, I 
drop firms with ratios that exceed one for the following leverage measures: long-term debt ratio, 
short term debt ratio, and total debt ratio. To keep the sample free from small firm bias, I exclude 
firms if the total assets' value is less than USD 1 million on an inflation-adjusted basis relative to 
2004, the midpoint of the database. Consistent with other international studies, I eliminate countries 
with too few firms and firm-year observations. I exclude countries with less than 50 firm-year 
observations and less than 25 unique firms reported in a given year. Finally, I only consider 
countries included in the La Porta et al. (1997), the source of data for creditors’ rights. The final 
sample comprises of 239,730 firm-year observations ranging from 1990 to 2018 of 32 countries.  
3.3.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.1 reports the country-wise summary statistics of the asset tangibility and leverage 
ratios. Asset tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. I use 
three leverage ratios: long-term debt ratio (long-term debt scaled by total assets), total debt ratio 
(long-term plus short-term debt scaled by total assets), and market leverage ratio (total leverage 
scaled by the market value of firms).  Firms from Japan, India, UK, and Australia make up the 
largest proportion of sample observations. The highest number of observations comes from Japan 
accounting for 25.53% of firm-year observations, and Japanese firms possess a comparatively 
lower percentage of fixed assets in their asset portfolio. The use of leverage in Japan is 




of the capital is from debt financing. The sample’s second-largest representation comes from India, 
with 22,689 firm-year observations accounting for 9.50% of the total sample size. Indian firms also 
possess more fixed assets than the mean value and use 14.50% and 28.60% long-term debt and 
total debt ratio in the capital structure, respectively. On the other hand, firms from Peru retain 50% 
of the total assets portfolio as fixed assets. Surprisingly, these firms use less debt in the capital 
structure. Indonesian firms use the most debt in the capital structure, and these firms retain a higher 
level of fixed assets as well.   
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of selected variables categorized by creditors’ 
rights. I find an almost monotonic negative association between creditors’ rights and long-term 
debt ratio. The higher the creditors’ right, the lower the long-term debt ratio, which is consistent 
with previous findings of Cho et al. (2014). On the other hand, the tangible asset ratio does not 
associate with the creditors’ rights. I find that firms belonging in the highest and lowest creditors’ 
rights environments use less fixed assets than firms in the moderate creditors’ rights environment. 
Presumably, firms belonging to the higher creditors’ rights environment use less tangible assets 
because higher creditors’ rights facilitate easy access to credits with affordable collateral 
conditions. On the other hand, weak creditors’ rights may discourage lenders from extending loans 
with collateral as the lack of creditors’ rights increases the liquidation cost. Table 3.3 provides 
further clarification of this association. Liquidation rights afford the lenders the authority of 
liquidating the fixed assets when the firms become distressed. Table 3 reports that the higher the 
liquidation right, the less the long-term debt to tangibility ratio is. This intuitively suggests that 
lenders in the higher liquidation environment demand more collateral to issue long-term debt. The 
higher liquidation right facilitates lenders repossessing the fixed assets and liquidating them to 
recover the loan if the firms become distressed.  
Table 3.4 shows the relation between tangible assets ratio and long-term debt ratio 




proportion of fixed assets at 32.8%, whereas the Nordic firms use the least at 25.6%. Noticeably, 
though the Nordic firms possess less tangible assets, they use more long-term debt in the capital 
structure. These firms use almost 15.7% long-term debt in their capital structure, while English-
origin countries use 10.6% long-term debt on average. French firms possess the second-highest 
proportion of tangible assets in the asset portfolio. On average, these firms own 30.5% of tangible 
assets and use 13.1% of long-term debt in the capital structure.  
 Table 3.5 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the regression 
analyses. The mean (median) total value of assets in USD is 1,560.83 (173.33) million. On average, 
the proportion of fixed assets in the sample is 0.308, while the median value is 0.279. The sample 
firms are growth firms with a mean market to book value of 1.478 and a median value of 1.096. 
The proportions of short-term debt and long-term debt are almost identical. On average, the long-
term debt ratio is 11.1%, while the mean short-term debt ratio is 10.8%. Almost 22.2% of capital 
is raised from debt, and the 50th percentile of the debt ratio is 19.6%. 
 
3.4. Methodology and Results 
3.4.1 Basic Model  
To investigate how tangible assets associated with leverage, I estimate variants of the 
following model: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐸 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐼𝐸 +





Where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 is the firm i’s long-term debt ratio, book leverage, or market leverage at year 
t+1. 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  represents the proportion of fixed assets in the asset portfolio. 𝐼𝐸 
(Institutional Environment) is the proxy for formal and informal institutions, e.g., creditors’ rights, 
financial development, governance, and transparency. 𝛾  in the above equation represents the 
coefficients of the control variables. Consistent with Frank and Goyal 2009; Oztekin, 2015; Rajan 
and Zingales 1995, and many others, I initially use 13 firm, industry, or country-level control 
variables. The firm-level controls are size, return on asset, growth opportunity, R&D expenditure, 
and distress measure. Mean industry leverage is the only industry-level control variable. Country-
level controls include GDP per capita, enforcement of law, the rule of law, governance 
effectiveness, creditors’ rights, and stock market development. The variable descriptions are 
provided in ndix B.1. 𝑑𝑖  denotes the firm or country level fixed effects and 𝑑𝑡 represents year fixed 
effects, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the white noise or firm-level clustered robust error with mean zero and standard 
deviation of 1.62  
In estimating the above model, I address potential endogeneity due to missing unobserved 
variables and reverse causality. As noted above, in the base model, I consider firm and year fixed 
effects that take care of firm and year level unobserved fixed components. I acknowledge that 
taking fixed effects does not mitigate the endogeneity problem entirely. Hence, I consider an 
instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity issue further.63 I detail this in section 5.  
 Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.6 present baseline estimates of equation (1) using long-term debt 
ratio as the dependent variable but excludes the interaction term.  The columns differ in the 
                                                          
62 I did not consider industry fixed effect in the models as the firm and country-level fixed effects sufficiently 
capture the time-invariant missing variables in the model. Including the industry fixed effect in the same 
model will make the model multicollinear. For robustness, I test the industry fixed effect along with year 
fixed effect in a separate model and end up with consistent results.  
63 Following Ortiz Molinnna and Phillips (2014), I take the following instruments: Financial Slack, and Total 
M&A activities in the industry, and mean industry tangible assets. The details of the variable description are 




combination of fixed effects applied. As expected, I find the association between tangible assets 
and leverage is positive and significant at a 1% level in all the columns. I report the inter-quartile 
range (IQR) change effects on the leverage in the square bracket. The row displays the percentage 
change in leverage relative to its sample mean if tangibility increases from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile. In column 3, I find that the coefficient for tangible assets is 0.0815, meaning that if 
the tangible assets ratio increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (1-IQR change), the 
long-term debt ratio changes by 2.58% (0.0815 x 0.316), which is a 23.20% (2.58%/11.1%) 
increase relative to the sample mean leverage of 0.111. The result is both economically and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Columns 5 and 6 report model estimates where the dependent 
variables are total book leverage and market leverage, respectively. I find that the association of 
tangible assets and leverage is positive and significant economically and statistically at the 1% 
level. Economically, if tangible assets increase by 1-IQR, then the total leverage changes by 
16.44% and the market leverage changes by 14.35%. These findings support the previous evidence 
that tangible assets positively associate with the leverage ratio (Campello & Giambona, 2013; 
Ortiz-Molina & Phillips, 2014).  
Next, I discuss the association between leverage and some of the control variables.  
Consistent with Oztekin, 2015, I find that firm size and industry leverage are positively associated 
with the long-term debt ratio. The positive association re-affirms the notion that the larger firms 
use more long-term debt because of being transparent, having a lower cost of debt (Byoun, 2008), 
being more diversified, and having lower bankruptcy costs (Titman & Wessels, 1988). I find that 
more profitable, higher growth, more innovative, and less distressed firms use less long-term debt 
in the capital structure. Overall, the results are consistent with the existing literature. 
Firms’ financing decision is also contingent upon other industry and country-level factors 
besides the firm-level factors. The results offer consistent findings with prior literature. I find 




market development. Thus, the result affirms the effectiveness of the rule of law of a country on 
leverage decisions. The better rule of law promotes firms to use more long-term debt. However, I 
find some surprising evidence of a negative association between leverage and governance quality, 
perhaps, due to the stronger correlation among the country-level factors. 
   
3.4.2 The Association of Leverage and Tangible Assets Under Different Formal and Informal 
Institutions 
3.4.2.1. Creditors’ Rights 
By creditors’ rights, I mean how easily creditors can repossess assets to liquidate in default 
or take measures to re-organize the firms. As argued in the hypothesis section, higher creditors’ 
rights can moderate the demand for collateral from creditors. In stronger creditors’ rights 
environments, creditors have greater bargaining power over firms in distress, which eventually 
reduces market friction.64 Under this scenario, collateral reliance as a safety valve should be less in 
a stronger creditors’ rights environment. Table 3.7 estimates equation 1 with a creditors’ rights 
dummy variable and an interaction term with tangible assets.  Columns 1 to 3 report the association 
between the three leverage ratios and tangible assets and tangible assets’ interaction with stronger 
creditors’ rights dummy.  I find that the interaction terms between creditors’ rights and tangibility 
are negative across all three leverage ratios. In column 1, the negative interaction coefficient 
suggests that tangible assets are less associated with the long-term debt ratio in stronger creditors’ 
rights countries compared to their weaker creditor rights’ counterparts. The results imply that when 
tangible assets increase from the 25th percentile to 75th percentile (1-IQR change), the long-term 
debt ratio changes by 1.90% ((0.110-.050) x 0.316). On the other hand, for firms located in the 
                                                          
64 According to La Porta et al. (1997), creditors’ rights ranges from 0 to 4, and it has four components: 
MGMT_NOT_ STAY, NO_AUTOSTAY, RESTRICT_REORG, and SECURED_FIRST. Strong creditors’ 




weaker creditors’ rights countries, the long-term leverage increases by 3.47% (0.11 x 0.316) if the 
tangible assets increase by 1 IQR. The results are robust if I consider other types of leverage ratios.   
3.4.2.2 Financial Development 
Financial development promotes credit markets that cultivate lender-borrower 
associations. As I argued earlier, financial development reduces market frictions enabling more 
robust and lower-cost credit markets. Thus, the importance of tangible assets in alleviating market 
frictions is less pronounced in countries with strong financial development. Consequently, I expect 
the association between tangible assets and leverage to be weaker (stronger) for firms located in 
stronger (weaker) financially developed countries.  The findings in table 3.8 report the interaction 
effect between strong financial development and tangible assets on the leverage ratios.65 Columns 
1 to 3 report the interaction effect using different measures of leverage. The hypothesized effect is 
observed only in the case of market leverage and not in the other two measures.  In column 3, I find 
that the interaction between tangible assets and strong financial development is negative, 
suggesting that tangible assets associate less positively with market leverage ratio, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H2. More specifically, the market leverage ratio increases by 4.00% if 
tangible assets increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th in strong financial development 
countries. In comparison, the association is 4.51% when firms are headquartered in weak financial 
development countries.  
3.4.2.3 Governance:  
Table 3.9 reports results of H3 by including the interaction effect of tangible assets with the 
country-level measure of Governance Quality.66 To implement the test, I create a strong governance 
                                                          
65 Strong financial development is a dummy variable if the financial market development value is above the 
mean value, 0 otherwise. 
66 I collect governance data from World Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI reports the percentile rank of 




dummy (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) equal to 1 if the governance index is above the median value, and 
0 otherwise. I find that the interaction between tangible assets and the strong governance dummy 
is negative across all three leverage measures, though the results are not statistically significant in 
the case of market leverage. For columns 1 and 2, the interaction term between tangible assets and 
strong governance is negative and significant at the 1% level, supporting hypothesis H3. More 
precisely, from Column 1, the coefficient of the interaction term is -0.016, meaning that if tangible 
assets increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (1-IQR change), the long-term debt 
ratio changes by 2.27% (0.072 × 0.316) for the firms in the strong governance countries. On the 
other hand, the long-term debt changes by 2.78% by a one IQR change of tangible assets in weak 
governance countries. Using the book leverage ratios, the results are significant both statistically 
and economically, supporting the hypothesis that the association of tangible assets with leverage is 
less pronounced for firms in countries with strong governance.   
3.4.2.4 Transparency 
 Table 3.10 reports the regression results of tangible assets and interaction with more 
country-level transparency on the leverage ratio. I collect the country transparency data from the 
website of Transparency International. Transparency International reports global country-level 
transparency index. The reporting scheme has been changed after the year 2012; thus, the index is 
not comparable in the pre and post-change regimes. Hence, I create a percentile index for each 
country each year, which is comparable year by year.67 In all the models, the interaction variables 
are negative and statistically significant. Column 1 reports that the interaction between tangible 
assets and more transparent country dummy is -0.029. Economically, a one IQR change of tangible 
                                                          
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. To calculate the governance index, I take the 
average of the percentile rank of all the governance indicators.  
67 According to the Transparency International, corruption is defined as: “1. Public servants demanding or 
taking money or favors in exchange for services. 2. Politicians misusing public money or granting public 





assets is associated with an approximately 2.43% increase of long-term debt in more transparent 
countries, while the association is 3.34% in less transparent countries. Column 2 reports that the 
interaction coefficient between tangible assets and more transparency dummy is negative 0.023, 
meaning that the total leverage changes by 3.50% if tangible assets change by 1 IQR in more 
transparent countries. In the last column, I report the coefficients of market leverage. More 
specifically, the market leverage increase by 3.70% if tangible assets change from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile. On the other hand, the market leverage increase by 5.31% by a one 
IQR change of tangible assets in more transparent countries. 
 
3.5. Endogeneity and Robustness Test 
3.5.1. Endogeneity  
Endogeneity concern is common but serious in corporate finance studies. In this study, I 
address the potentiality that the decision of a firm’s leverage and possession of tangible assets may 
be endogenously associated with each other. The endogeneity may arise due to omitted variables 
or reverse causality. To tackle this concern, I use an instrumental variable (IV) method taking the 
instruments following Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014). 
I take three instruments for tangible assets: Total M & A activity of the firm’s industry 
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴), financial slack of the competitors (𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌), and mean industry tangible assets. 
First, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴 captures how much M&A transactions occur in the firm’s industry in a given year. 
The intuition to add this variable as an instrument is because higher M & A transactions in an 
industry correspond to higher asset liquidity. Thus, asset liquidity decreases the transaction costs 
of tangible assets during financial distress, which makes tangible assets appealing due to their 
higher liquidation value. I collect M&A transaction data from SDC platinum. Following Ortiz-




competitors increases the resale value of the tangible assets. The higher the competitors’ financial 
slack (𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑢𝑦), the higher the demand of the tangible assets if a particular firm is in distress. 
I take the minus average book leverage of the rivals in the industry (3 digits SIC code industry) 
averaged over the previous three years on a rolling basis. Lastly, I also use mean industry (FF 49 
industry) tangible assets (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔). The intuition of including the industry average tangible 
assets is because of its low correlation with firm’s leverage ratio and its high correlation with a 
firm's tangible assets. I expect positive signs for all the instruments in the first stage. 
Table 3.11 reports the base regression results using the instrumental variables method.68 In 
the first stage, I find that the directions of the instruments are consistent with the predictions. I find 
that coefficients of both 𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑢𝑦   and 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔  are positive and significant. To 
validate the instruments, I adopt three parameters. First, the 𝑅2, which is higher than the 20% level. 
Second, F-stat is also well above the threshold level of 10.00. Third, the Hansen J test could not 
reject the null hypothesis meaning that the instruments are exogenous. I also report the second stage 
of the 2SLS instrumental variable regression. Columns 1 to 3 report the interaction between 
tangible assets and strong creditors’ rights dummy variables. I find that the results are robust with 
the main results that I find in table 7. Columns 3 to 6 present the interaction effect of tangible assets 
and strong financial development. Consistent with the previous finding, I find the interaction 
coefficients are negative. Columns 7 to 9 report that the interaction coefficients of predicted values 
of tangible assets and strong country governance are negative, meaning that the association between 
tangible assets and leverage is less positive in stronger governing countries.  In columns 10 to 12, 
I report the interaction effect of tangible assets with more country transparency dummy and find 
                                                          
68 Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014) use US firms in their observations. In their study all three instruments are 
positively associated with tangible assets. However, in my first stage regression, I also got positive 
association except one insignificant coefficient in the case of 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴.  This could be because merger and 
acquisition data for many countries may not be as comprehensive as for the US.  However, the second stage 




the associations are negative, consistent with previous findings. Overall, the results are robust with 
the findings throughout the study.  
3.5.2. Crisis Period 
 In this section, I use the global crisis period as a potential exogenous shock to test the 
robustness of findings. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the use of collateral backed 
secured debt increased substantially.69  Access to credit became more constrained during the crisis. 
The prime reason for the scarcity of credit is greater information asymmetry. In this situation, firms 
with collateral (tangible assets) maybe more appealing as they are less information asymmetric 
potentially enhancing their borrowing capacity (Hart and Moore, 1994). Thus, the association of 
tangible assets with leverage is hypothesized to be more positive during the crisis period due to the 
higher uncertainty level. I argue that the association between tangible assets and leverage during a 
financial crisis will be less positive for firms headquartered in stronger institutional environments, 
such as stronger creditors’ rights, stronger financial development, and higher country-level 
transparency.  
 Table 3.12 shows the association between tangible assets, leverage ratios, and crisis period 
in the heterogeneous institutional environment. The results show that the association of tangible 
asset on leverage is stronger during the crisis period in all columns. In columns 1 to 3, the triple 
interaction term, 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 is negative, meaning 
that even though tangible assets play a prominent role during the crisis period, the association is 
less positive if firms are headquartered in the strong creditors' rights environment. In columns 4 to 
6 focusing on financial development country, I find that the triple interaction coefficients are 
negative and significant for total book leverage and market leverage. Consistent with prior results, 
                                                          
69 Corradin, Heider, and Hoerova (2017) state that the use of collateral, in European bond market, to back 




in columns 7 to 9, I find that the association between leverage and tangible assets is less strong for 
firms in stronger governance countries during the crisis periods. Lastly, columns 10 to 12 report 
the association between tangible assets and leverage for the more transparent countries during the 
crisis period. I find robust evidence that the role of tangible assets in the leverage decision is less 
prominent for firms of more transparent countries during the crisis period. 
3.6. Conclusion  
This study argues that the association of tangible assets with the leverage ratio is not 
uniform, but it varies from country to country due to institutional heterogeneity. The study 
contributes to both the international capital structure literature as well as the law and finance 
literature. Previous international capital structure studies only examine the direction of the 
association between tangible assets and leverage. Since tangible assets are considered as the single 
most important determinant of the capital structure (Campello & Giambona, 2013), the association 
of tangible assets on leverage needs to be further explored. In this study, I disentangle the 
association in a global context with heterogeneous institutional environments.  
 I find that the association of tangible assets with the leverage is less positive for firms 
located in stronger creditors’ rights, stronger financial development, stronger governance, and more 
transparent countries. The findings are consistent with the viewpoint that the association is less 
positive in these countries because of the reduced market frictions and lower informational 
asymmetry. Lastly, I also analyze the association between tangible assets and leverage during the 





Figure 3.1. Tangible Assets and Leverage (each Categories) 
This figure presents the mean tangible assets and leverage ratio. Panel A, B, C, and D report the Total Leverage, market leverage, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio with tangible assets in each 






Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics: By Country 
This table presents the mean value of variables for each country.  TotalLev is (Long-term debt+ Short Term Debt)/AT. 𝐿𝑇𝐷 is long-term debt scaled 
by total assets. MktLev is (Long-term debt+Short-term debt)/(DLC+DLTT+MktEqu).  𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 is property, plant, and equipment scaled 
by total assets. N represents the total number of firm-year for this sample country.  
  𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕  TotalLev LTD  MktLev N 
ARGENTINA 0.385 0.217 0.107 0.274 798 
AUSTRALIA 0.340 0.129 0.083 0.142 17106 
BRAZIL 0.338 0.286 0.167 0.340 2951 
CHILE 0.431 0.240 0.158 0.220 1559 
COLOMBIA 0.448 0.147 0.100 0.252 308 
EGYPT 0.391 0.178 0.066 0.216 1114 
FINLAND 0.276 0.242 0.163 0.315 1727 
FRANCE 0.182 0.212 0.126 0.315 9711 
GERMANY 0.232 0.190 0.110 0.265 10642 
HONGKONG 0.300 0.188 0.080 0.266 3758 
INDIA 0.337 0.286 0.145 0.396 22689 
INDONESIA 0.401 0.296 0.144 0.327 4515 
ISRAEL 0.203 0.256 0.145 0.293 3084 
ITALY 0.233 0.257 0.127 0.439 3245 
JAPAN 0.292 0.231 0.105 0.328 61220 
JORDAN 0.407 0.174 0.056 0.214 1038 
MALAYSIA 0.349 0.207 0.082 0.285 14302 
MEXICO 0.452 0.251 0.181 0.352 1677 
NETHERLANDS 0.264 0.220 0.134 0.262 2563 
NIGERIA 0.451 0.200 0.072 0.236 827 
NORWAY 0.330 0.281 0.206 0.295 2674 
PAKISTAN 0.465 0.298 0.121 0.420 2920 
PERU 0.504 0.200 0.114 0.370 831 
S KOREA 0.336 0.271 0.093 0.411 13752 
SINGAPORE 0.291 0.197 0.085 0.269 8267 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.315 0.157 0.088 0.205 4001 
SPAIN 0.324 0.264 0.160 0.364 2201 
SWEDEN 0.199 0.183 0.121 0.230 4089 
SWITZERLAND 0.305 0.213 0.145 0.262 3503 
THAILAND 0.390 0.255 0.102 0.295 7491 
TURKEY 0.328 0.217 0.090 0.254 3056 
UK 0.285 0.171 0.107 0.198 19962 





Table 3.2. Summary Statistics: Categorized by Creditors’ Rights 
This table presents the mean value of variables categorized by creditors’ right. TotalLev is the sum of long-term debt (dltt) and short-term debt (dlc) scaled by total assets (AT). Long-term debt ratio (LTD) 
is long-term debt scaled by total assets. MktLev is (DLC+DLTT)/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). Profitability is EBIT/AT.𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. Mkt to Book 
is the ratio of market value over book value. Creditors’ rights data is collected from La Porta et al. (1997). 
Creditors’ 







0 0.245 0.215 0.322 0.132 1.400 2.400 
1 0.322 0.238 0.325 0.126 1.604 2.374 
2 0.314 0.246 0.332 0.119 1.390 1.567 
3 0.313 0.201 0.270 0.095 1.487 4.120 















Table 3.3. Summary Statistics: Categorized by Liquidation Index 
This table presents the mean value of variables categorized by liquidation rights. Tangibility is the Property, Plant, and Equip/AT.  TotalLev is the 
sum of long-term debt (dltt) and short-term debt (dlc) scaled by total assets (AT). The long-term debt ratio is long-term debt/AT. MktLev is 
(DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). Creditors’ rights data is collected from LLSV (1997). 
 
Liquidation 















0.263 0.228 0.326 0.139 0.528 
Std. 
Dev 0.217 0.165 0.273 0.127 - 
N 15577 15577 15577 15577 15542 
 
 
     
Mean  
1 
0.300 0.211 0.284 0.108 0.360 
Std. 
Dev 0.211 0.184 0.259 0.120 - 
N 106817 106817 106817 106817 106391 
 
 
     
Mean  
2 
0.322 0.232 0.309 0.110 0.341 
Std. 
Dev 0.224 0.193 0.282 0.131 - 


















Table 3.4. Summary Statistics: Categorized by Legal Origin 
This table presents the mean value of variables categorized by legal origin. Total Lev is the sum of long-term debt (dltt) and short-term debt (dlc) 
scaled by total assets (AT). LTD is a long-term debt/AT. MktLev is DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu l). 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is the Property, 




Rights TangibileAssets TotalLev 
 
MktLev LTD 
English 2.912 0.328 0.209 0.269 0.106 
French 1.218 0.305 0.237 0.315 0.131 
German 2.177 0.292 0.232 0.330 0.106 


















Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the major variables used in the study. Total Book Leverage is (Long-term debt+ Short Term Debt)/AT. LTD (STD)raio is long-term debt or short term 
debt/AT. Market Leverage is (DLC+DLTT)/(DLC+DLTT+MktEqu). Profitability is EBIT/AT. TangibileAssets is property, plant, and equipment/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book 
value. RnD is R&D scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage 
of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide by the rules of 
society. Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ right is derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized 
market capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev P1 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99 N 
Total Book Leverage 
(TotalLev) 0.222 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.196 0.348 0.488 0.738 239,730 
Market Leverage (MktLev) 0.298 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.235 0.493 0.716 0.959 239,730 
Long-term debt ratio (LTD) 0.111 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.068 0.178 0.297 0.497 239,730 
Short term debt ratio 0.108 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.069 0.166 0.281 0.471 239,730 
Tangibility/ Total Assets 0.308 0.219 0.002 0.039 0.131 0.279 0.447 0.621 0.888 239,730 
Total Assets (USD) 1560.825 8100.416 2.518 16.650 50.096 173.328 634.296 2392.065 26840.537 239,730 
Profitability 0.043 0.250 -0.560 -0.061 0.012 0.050 0.095 0.153 0.371 239,730 
Mkt to Book 1.478 1.225 0.467 0.706 0.874 1.095 1.543 2.512 7.625 239,730 
RnD 0.013 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.035 0.238 239,730 
Altman Z 1.443 3.320 -6.611 0.010 0.877 1.557 2.214 2.917 5.691 239,730 
Mean Industry Leverage 0.223 0.100 0.040 0.110 0.154 0.213 0.278 0.354 0.519 239,730 
GDP per Capita/100000 0.265 0.178 0.005 0.016 0.086 0.280 0.385 0.468 0.725 239,730 
Enforceability of contracts 348.476 298.184 60.000 60.000 75.000 360.000 425.000 600.000 1445.000 239,730 
Rule of Law 1.029 0.742 -0.857 -0.063 0.456 1.312 1.626 1.773 1.966 239,730 
Government Effectiveness 1.120 0.735 -0.766 -0.019 0.647 1.291 1.706 1.884 2.229 239,730 
Creditors’ Right 2.325 0.967 0.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 4.000 239,730 








Table 3.6. Base Regression  
This table presents the regression results of firm leverage and tangibility with other control variables. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  is a natural log of total assets. 
TangibleAssets is Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D 
scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. 
Leverage is the average total leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute 
through courts. Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the 
perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ rights data is collected from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the 
averaging standardized market capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. 
TotalLev is (DLC+DLTT)/AT. MktLev is (DLC+DLTT)/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD is Long-term Debt/AT. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 LTD LTD LTD TotalLev MktLev 
Dependent VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
          
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.1289*** 0.0805*** 0.0805*** 0.1145*** 0.1341*** 
 (90.5747) (35.7064) (19.4366) (20.0573) (18.7459) 
 [36.68%] [22.91%] [22.91%] [16.29%] [14.19%] 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.0156*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0401*** 0.0618*** 
 (107.4910) (56.4134) (30.0884) (28.4744) (34.5240) 
Profitability 0.0163*** -0.0047** -0.0047 -0.0123 -0.0306** 
 (6.9573) (-2.3375) (-1.4639) (-1.5318) (-2.5269) 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.0003* 0.0005** 0.0005 -0.0014** -0.0306*** 
 (1.7522) (2.1618) (1.3549) (-2.4559) (-37.6225) 
𝑅𝑛𝐷 -0.0713*** 0.0009 0.0009 0.0174 -0.0675*** 
 (-11.1644) (0.0984) (0.0617) (0.7794) (-2.6517) 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍 -0.0040*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0043*** -0.0045*** 
 (-14.0053) (-10.2816) (-4.5273) (-3.4029) (-3.2788) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.4174*** 0.2849*** 0.2849*** 0.5374*** 0.5656*** 
 (134.0178) (63.2126) (35.5962) (51.0726) (39.7129) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎/100000 -0.0518*** -0.0436*** -0.0436*** -0.0700*** -0.1492*** 
 (-16.0312) (-8.4332) (-4.6843) (-5.4086) (-8.5661) 
Enforceability of contracts  0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (44.4493) (-12.5044) (-7.5441) (2.7350) (-8.4712) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤 0.0320*** 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 0.0065 0.0212*** 
 (29.9166) (12.5884) (6.8051) (1.4077) (3.3853) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  -0.0075*** -0.0206*** -0.0206*** -0.0283*** -0.0122*** 
 (-8.6425) (-17.5907) (-8.9515) (-8.8218) (-2.7468) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  -0.0044*** 0.0037*** 0.0037* 0.0018 -0.0089** 
 (-16.7983) (2.9239) (1.8660) (0.6328) (-2.0785) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.0088*** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0004 -0.0159*** 
 (17.5633) (7.5625) (4.7929) (0.3999) (-11.6586) 
Constant -0.1271*** -0.1038*** -0.1038*** -0.0883*** -0.0994*** 
 (-34.5301) (-22.1401) (-13.2444) (-7.9642) (-6.4438) 
      
Observations 238,653 238,933 238,933 238,933 238,514 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2851 0.6607 0.6607 0.7394 0.7248 
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Ind FE YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 





Table 3.7. Creditors’ Right 
This table presents the regression results of firm leverage, tangibility, and creditors’ right with other control variables. Strong Creditors’ Right is a 
dummy variable when the creditors’ right index is 3 or 4, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of total asset.  TangibleAssets is Property, Plant, and 
Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 
1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage 
of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the 
perception of the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. 
Creditors’ rights are derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized market capitalization values to 
GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is DLC+DLTT/AT. MktLev is 
DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD  is long-term Debt/AT. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) 
or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
LTD  TotalLev  MktLev  
(1) (2) (3) 
        
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 -0.020*** 0.040*** 0.121*** 
 (-2.869) (3.816) (14.589) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.110*** 0.142*** 0.182*** 
 (16.044) (15.396) (28.758) 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔′𝑹𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.079*** 
 (-6.060) (-4.146) (-9.952) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.061*** 
 (30.292) (28.333) (65.939) 
Profitability -0.005 -0.013 -0.031*** 
 (-1.537) (-1.570) (-5.598) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 0.000 -0.001** -0.031*** 
 (1.001) (-2.451) (-65.790) 
𝑅𝑛𝐷 0.002 0.014 -0.078*** 
 (0.160) (0.617) (-5.043) 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.580) (-3.347) (-8.714) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.288*** 0.534*** 0.556*** 
 (35.936) (50.692) (67.458) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎/100000 -0.038*** -0.072*** -0.159*** 
 (-4.127) (-5.587) (-16.179) 
Enforceability of contracts  -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-6.780) (2.640) (-15.136) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤 0.026*** 0.003 0.010*** 
 (7.686) (0.682) (2.768) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.012*** 
 (-8.938) (-8.732) (-5.041) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  0.013*** -0.003 -0.028*** 
 (6.838) (-1.050) (-10.214) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.003*** 0.001 -0.015*** 
 (4.793) (0.598) (-17.794) 
Constant -0.124*** -0.092*** -0.094*** 
 (-15.991) (-8.792) (-10.453) 
    
Observations 238,933 238,933 238,514 
Adjusted R-squared 0.661 0.740 0.725 
Firm FE YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 




Table 3.8. Financial Development 
This table presents the regression results of firm leverage, tangibility, and financial development with other control variables. Strong FinDev is a 
dummy variable when the financial market development is above the median value, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of total assets.  
TangibleAssets is Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D 
scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. 
Leverage is the average total leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute 
through courts. Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the 
perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ rights are derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging 
standardized market capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is 
DLC+DLTT/AT. MktLev is DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD is Long-term Debt/AT. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
(Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable:  
LTD TotalLev MktLev 
(1) (2) (3) 
     
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.080*** 0.112*** 0.143*** 
 (16.998) (17.510) (17.777) 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣 -0.003*** 0.002 0.001 
 (-2.842) (1.266) (0.239) 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝑫𝒆𝒗 0.004 0.007 -0.016*** 
 (1.382) (1.653) (-2.775) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.061*** 
 (29.497) (28.191) (33.515) 
Profitability -0.004 -0.011 -0.028** 
 (-1.224) (-1.254) (-2.213) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 0.000 -0.001** -0.031*** 
 (1.200) (-2.404) (-37.040) 
𝑅𝑛𝐷 0.011 0.022 -0.062** 
 (0.736) (0.942) (-2.318) 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.765) (-3.614) (-3.555) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.283*** 0.533*** 0.571*** 
 (34.753) (50.021) (39.425) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎/100000 -0.040*** -0.074*** -0.100*** 
 (-4.281) (-6.042) (-6.023) 
Enforceability of contracts  -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** 
 (-7.768) (2.408) (-7.898) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤 0.024*** 0.006 0.020*** 
 (6.882) (1.197) (3.099) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (-10.018) (-8.678) (-5.961) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  0.003 0.003 -0.014*** 
 (1.334) (0.974) (-3.186) 
Constant -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.076*** 
 (-12.138) (-8.080) (-4.897) 
    
Observations 228,994 228,994 228,582 
Adjusted R-squared 0.663 0.742 0.727 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 





Table 3.9. Governance 
This table presents the regression results of firm leverage, tangibility, and country-level governance with other control variables. High Governance 
is a dummy variable when the country-level governance is above the median value, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of total assets.  
TangibleAssets is Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D 
scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. 
Leverage is the average total leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute 
through courts. Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the 
perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ right is derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging 
standardized market capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is 
DLC+DLTT/AT. MktLev is DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD  raio is Long-term Debt/AT.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  
LTD TotalLev MktLev 
(1) (2) (3) 
     
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.088*** 0.127*** 0.139*** 
 (18.110) (18.294) (15.353) 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.011*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (6.147) (0.293) (-0.226) 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.010 
 (-3.200) (-3.604) (-1.065) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.062*** 
 (30.181) (28.540) (34.569) 
Profitability -0.005 -0.012 -0.031** 
 (-1.474) (-1.548) (-2.533) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 0.001 -0.001** -0.031*** 
 (1.373) (-2.539) (-37.647) 
𝑅𝑛𝐷 0.001 0.015 -0.069*** 
 (0.060) (0.673) (-2.697) 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.497) (-3.406) (-3.280) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.285*** 0.537*** 0.565*** 
 (35.628) (51.020) (39.702) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎/100000 -0.047*** -0.070*** -0.149*** 
 (-5.062) (-5.403) (-8.546) 
Enforceability of contracts  -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-7.358) (2.613) (-8.537) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤 0.021*** 0.008* 0.022*** 
 (6.197) (1.679) (3.476) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.010** 
 (-10.052) (-7.479) (-2.223) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  0.003 0.002 -0.009** 
 (1.548) (0.894) (-1.993) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.003*** 0.000 -0.016*** 
 (4.655) (0.458) (-11.676) 
Constant -0.103*** -0.095*** -0.103*** 
 (-13.060) (-8.607) (-6.626) 
    
Observations 238,933 238,933 238,514 
Adjusted R-squared 0.661 0.740 0.725 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 




Table 3.10. Country Transparency 
This table presents the regression results of firm leverage, tangibility, and the country's transparency measure. MoreTranspCountry is a dummy 
variable of 1 when the CPI score of a country is above the median value, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of total assets.  TangibleAssets is 
Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D scale by sales. 
Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. Leverage is the 
average total leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. 
Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality 
of public services. Creditors’ rights are derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized market 
capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is DLC+DLTT/AT. MktLev 
is DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD is Long-term Debt/AT. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) 
or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable:  
LTD TotalLev MktLev 
(1) (2) (3) 
     
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.106*** 0.134*** 0.168*** 
 (15.455) (14.328) (13.060) 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 0.014*** 0.008** -0.002 
 (5.519) (2.310) (-0.319) 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒆𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒑𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.051*** 
 (-4.771) (-2.751) (-4.326) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.065*** 
 (28.920) (27.923) (35.376) 
Profitability -0.004 -0.013 -0.031** 
 (-1.292) (-1.533) (-2.436) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 0.000 -0.001** -0.030*** 
 (1.090) (-2.462) (-36.410) 
𝑅𝑛𝐷 0.009 0.020 -0.059** 
 (0.621) (0.898) (-2.310) 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.699) (-3.709) (-3.457) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.272*** 0.524*** 0.555*** 
 (32.685) (47.240) (37.136) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎/100000 -0.033*** -0.076*** -0.175*** 
 (-3.394) (-5.749) (-9.852) 
Enforceability of contracts  -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** 
 (-7.026) (2.360) (-4.324) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤 0.026*** 0.011** 0.043*** 
 (7.070) (2.134) (5.951) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (-6.468) (-7.567) (-5.230) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠’ 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  0.002 -0.000 -0.019*** 
 (1.157) (-0.141) (-4.651) 
Constant 0.002** -0.001 -0.015*** 
 (2.439) (-1.126) (-10.531) 
 -0.118*** -0.091*** -0.150*** 
Observations (-13.760) (-7.363) (-8.800) 
Adjusted R-squared    
Firm FE 214,914 214,914 214,527 
Year FE 0.665 0.742 0.730 




Table 3.11. Endogeneity Test: 2SLS  
This table presents the second stage regression results of firm leverage and tangibility taking the instrumental variable approach. The leverage ratio is the dependent variable. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is a natural log of total assets.  TangibleAssets is 
Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of market value over book value. RnD is R&D scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt 
value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception 
of the extent that agents abide the rules of society. Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ right is derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the 
averaging standardized market capitalization values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is DLC+DLTT/AT. MktLev is DLC+DLTT/(DLC+DLTT+ MktEqu). LTD  
is Long-term Debt/AT. I take three instruments: number of competitors in the 3 digit SIC industry (NoPotBuy), financial slack of the competitors in the SIC 3 digit industry (MNLPotBuy). Natural log of M&A transaction in the 
3digit SIC industry in the last year (𝐿𝑛(𝑀&𝐴)𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦).  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   
First Stage 
LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  0.175*** 0.167*** 0.236*** 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.191*** 0.068*** 0.019** -0.023** 0.269*** 0.202*** 0.198*** 
  (28.652) (18.284) (19.369) (25.833) (16.017) (16.304) (11.360) (2.245) (-2.000) (22.023) (11.941) (8.667) 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  -0.026** 0.023 0.089***          
  (-2.109) (1.213) (3.548)          
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  -0.048*** -0.073*** -0.090***          
  (-8.130) (-8.702) (-8.128)          
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑣     0.006*** -0.003 -0.013***       
     (3.810) (-1.063) (-4.239)       
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑣     -0.013*** -0.012* 0.015       
     (-2.644) (-1.699) (1.640)       
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒        0.009*** 0.000 -0.006    
        (5.101) (0.029) (-1.498)    
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒        -0.010* -0.026*** -0.004    
        (-1.918) (-3.512) (-0.359)    
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦           0.053*** 0.021*** -0.055*** 
           (10.659) (3.052) (-5.813) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗  𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛           -0.129*** -0.074*** 0.003 
           (-11.040) (-4.662) (0.147) 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑀&𝐴 0.00006             
 (0.07)             
𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌 0.0002***             
 (3.331)             
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔 0.890***             
 (122.41)             
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 111,742 111,742 111,742 111,569 111,742 111,742 111,569 128,723 128,723 128,508 103,331 103,331 103,166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.231 0.225 0.304 0.231 0.224 0.304 0.240 0.228 0.300 0.231 0.223 0.305 
Ind.  FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J Test 1.632             




Table 3.12. Robustness Test: Crisis Period 
This table presents the association between tangible assets and leverage during the housing crisis periods in the heterogeneous institutional environment. The crisis period is a dummy variable 1 when the data point is 
either in 2007,2008,2009 or 2010. The leverage ratio is the dependent variable. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is a natural log of total assets. TangibleAssets is Property, Plant, and Equip/AT. Profitability is EBIT/AT. MkttoBook is the ratio of 
market value over book value. RnDis R&D scale by sales. Altman Z is equal to 1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT+0.6*Mkt value of equity + 1.0*Sales.  Mean Ind. Leverage is the average total 
leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perception of the extent that agents abide the rules of society. 
Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditors’ rights are derived from La Porta et al. (1997). Stock Market Development is the averaging standardized market capitalization 
values to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization ratios. TotalLev is (DLC+DLTT)/AT. MktLev is (DLC+DLTT)/(DLC+DLTT+MktEqu). LTD is Long-term Debt/AT. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber-White estimators) or clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev LTD TotalLev MktLev 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                          
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.107*** 0.141*** 0.180*** 0.078*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.130*** 0.161*** 0.086*** 0.126*** 0.138*** 
 (29.260) (30.068) (28.002) (29.431) (31.534) (30.082) (22.293) (21.799) (18.822) (30.902) (33.844) (26.838) 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.047*** -0.008*** -0.013*** 0.039*** -0.010*** -0.027*** 0.074*** -0.007*** -0.017*** 0.026*** 
 (-7.061) (-5.525) (10.405) (-3.097) (-4.190) (8.339) (-3.038) (-6.252) (11.665) (-2.852) (-5.603) (5.609) 
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝑿 𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 0.012*** 0.003 0.011** 0.003 0.008** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017** 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.007* 0.015*** 
 (4.548) (1.051) (2.208) (1.070) (2.225) (3.140) (2.590) (2.324) (3.081) (3.478) (1.845) (2.759) 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 -0.009** 0.037*** 0.090***          
 (-2.006) (6.601) (11.528)          
HighCreditorsRights X 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.074***          
 (-9.716) (-7.419) (-9.142)          
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦X𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.015***          
 (5.810) (2.970) (5.430)          
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝑿𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝑹𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 
X 𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 -0.020*** -0.005 -0.029***           
(-4.694) (-0.900) (-3.887)          
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣    -0.002** 0.002** 0.002       
    (-2.511) (2.081) (1.024)       
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣 X 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛    0.006** 0.009*** -0.009**       
    (2.418) (3.136) (-2.280)       
CrisisDummy X  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣    0.002* -0.001 -0.005**       
    (1.756) (-0.801) (-2.047)       
CrisisDummy X  𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝑫𝒆𝒗 X 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔    0.001 -0.013** -0.038***       
    (0.251) (-2.555) (-5.245)       
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒       0.011*** -0.000 -0.006***    
       (9.467) (-0.187) (-2.700)    
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 X 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛       -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.003    
       (-4.205) (-5.626) (-0.464)    
CrisisDummy X 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒       0.002 0.004** 0.015***    
       (1.288) (2.118) (5.499)    
CrisisDummy X 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 X 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔       -0.016*** -0.011** -0.025***    
       (-3.841) (-2.189) (-3.467)    
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦          0.014*** 0.006** -0.005 
          (7.020) (2.344) (-1.269) 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 X 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛          -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.043*** 




𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 X 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦          0.003 0.011*** 0.024*** 
          (1.080) (3.406) (4.746) 
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 X 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒆𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒑𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 
 X 𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔          -0.015** -0.017** -0.033*** 
          (-2.299) (-2.239) (-2.857) 
             
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
             
Observations 238,933 238,933 238,514 228,994 228,994 228,582 214,914 214,914 214,527 238,933 238,933 238,514 
Adjusted R-squared 0.661 0.740 0.725 0.663 0.742 0.727 0.665 0.742 0.730 0.661 0.740 0.724 
Ind FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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A.1. Dynamic Panel Model 
Table B.1 columns 1 and 2 report the results using equation (2). I find that lag book 
leverage is positively and significantly associated with book leverage with the coefficient of 0.813, 
meaning that firms’ previous years leverage associates current year’s leverage by 81.30%. The 
coefficient of lag market leverage is 0.73 and significant at the 1% level. In Blundell Bond system 
GMM, the coefficients of lag dependent variables are the measure of (1-𝜆) where 𝜆 represents for 
SOA.  
 
A.2. Financial flexibility, low tangible assets, and investment  
 For the sake of robustness, I perform a separate test of whether financial flexibility and low 
tangible assets are associated negatively with the investment. I find that the interaction effect is 





Appendix A.1. Dynamic Modeling  
This table presents the dynamic regression model using the lag dependent variable as one of the regressors. I use the system GMM method to 
estimate the dynamic capital structure. The independent variables are as follows. Tangible assets scaled by the total assets is the variable of interest. 
ROA is EBIT/AT. Market to book is the market value scaled by book value. RnD/Sales is the R&D scaled by sales. RnD_Dummy is 1 if R&D 
expenditure is positive, 0 otherwise. Mean Ind. Leverage is the average book leverage of 2 digit SIC industry. The enforceability of contracts is the 
number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Rule of Law is the perceptions of the extent that agents abide by the rules of society. 
Governance effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services. Creditor rights are the rights of the creditors. Stock Market 
Development is the averaging standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market 
capitalization ratios. BookLev is long term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. MktLev is long term debt plus short-term debt scaled 
by long term debt plus short term debt plus market value. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted robust (Huber-White estimators). ***, **, 
and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  
 System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.813***  
 (37.847)  
𝑴𝒌𝒕𝑳𝒆𝒗  0.730*** 
  (31.298) 
Tangible Assets 0.018** 0.023* 
 (1.987) (1.677) 
Size 0.003 0.002 
 (1.630) (0.497) 
ROA -0.009 -0.007 
 (-0.957) (-0.429) 
MkttoBook 0.002 -0.006** 
 (0.905) (-2.498) 
RnD/Sales -0.089* -0.308*** 
 (-1.802) (-4.934) 
RnD_Dummy 0.001 0.010 
 (0.215) (1.383) 
Altman Z 0.001 0.001 
 (0.782) (1.220) 
Mean Industry Leverage -0.074 -0.192** 
 (-0.707) (-2.209) 
GDP per Capita/100000 0.113 0.075 
 (1.483) (0.687) 
Enforceability of contracts  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.995) (3.077) 
Rule of Law -0.022 0.054 
 (-0.922) (1.505) 
Government Effectiveness  0.010 -0.077** 
 (0.497) (-2.443) 
Creditors’ Right  0.040*** 0.076*** 
 (2.867) (3.351) 
Stock Market Development 0.009 -0.009 
 (1.578) (-1.188) 
Constant -0.155*** -0.025 
 (-2.579) (-0.334) 
Number of Obs. 149,859 149,475 
Year FE YES YES 
Wald Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 




Appendix A.2. Financial flexibility, Low Tangible Assets, and Investment 
This table presents the panel regression for the Q-model of investment as specified in Eq. (4). The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣 is the sum 
of CAPEX, R&D expense, and sells and general expenditure scaled by total assets. 𝐶𝐹 is the cash flow scaled by total assets. FF2 is the firm's 
financial flexibility if a firm is under-levered for the previous two consecutive years. 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is the dummy variable 1 if the asset 
tangibility is lower than the industry median value. 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 is the market value plus total debt minus current debt scaled by gross PPENT following 
Andrei et al. (2019). Column 4 reports the 2nd stage of instrumental variable approach taking the following instruments: number of potential buyers 
(𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦), financial slack (𝑀𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦), total M & A activity of the firms’ industry (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀&𝐴), and SIC 2 digit mean industry leverage. T-
values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust standard errors or clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients 
are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled FE FE 
      
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 0.662*** 0.268 
0.653*** 
 (3.041) (1.423) (2.891) 
𝐹𝐹2 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (2.781) (4.175) (2.619) 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 0.131*** 0.050 0.120*** 
 (7.613) (0.993) (3.842) 
𝐹𝐹2*𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.097*** -0.046* -0.100*** 
 (-3.406) (-1.647) (-2.840) 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 0.007* 0.001 -0.002 
 (1.682) (0.088) (-0.183) 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏*𝑭𝑭𝟐 -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.012*** 
 (-3.430) (-3.384) (-2.836) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 
 (1.929) (1.088) (1.648) 
Constant 0.076 0.094*** 0.051 
 (1.408) (2.965) (1.220) 
 
   
Observations 90,975 90,975 90,910 
R-squared 0.592 0.835 0.598 
Year FE NO YES YES 
Ind. FE NO NO YES 





Appendix B.1. Variables Description 
Variable Descriptions Source 
Firm-level variables 
Altman Z score 3.3*EBIT/AT)+1.0*(Sales/AT)+1.4*(RE/AT)+1.2*(WC/AT), where AT= total assets COMPUSTAT global 
Book leverage 
(BookLev) 
Long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC) to total assets net of cash 
(che) 
COMPUSTAT global 
CAPX The ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to total assets. COMPUSTAT global 
Debt issue Following Frank and Goyal (2003),  (Book Debtt−Book Debtt−1/Total Assets>5% COMPUSTAT global 
CF Income before extra-ordinary items +Depreciation and Amortizations+ Extra ordinary 
items and discontinued operations+ deferred tax+ equity in net loss-earnings+ other funds 
from operations+ gain (loss) from sale of PPE 
COMPUSTAT global 
Debt Issue Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), the net debt issue is tracked from the 
change of short-term debt or long-term debt reported in the COMPUSTAT Global. 
COMPUSTAT Global 
Declining Profitability Declining profitability if the firm’s EBIT declines from the previous year for the previous 
three consecutive years 
COMPUSTAT global 
Deficit Financing (Dividend + Investment + △WC-CF)/Total Assets COMPUSTAT global 
DEVi,t+1
∗  TargetLevi,t+1 − ActualLevi,t. Where TargetLevi,t+1 is the predicted value from eq (2). COMPUSTAT global 
Equity Issue Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Sale of common stock minus purchase 
of common stock scaled by total assets >5%. 
COMPUSTAT global 
Excess Leverage Following Chen et al. 2019, I calculate excess leverage as the error of the regressions 
using equation (1). 
COMPUSTAT Global 
External Financing External financing is a fraction of net external funding over total financing (sum of cash 
flows from operations and net external financing) 
COMPUSTAT Global 
FF2 If firms are under levered for the previous two consecutive years, then FF2 is 1, and 0 
otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT global 
FinMkt Measures total financial market development and is computed by averaging standardized 
values of Stock Market and Bond Market Development 
WDI 
Financial Slack Cash (che)/ Lag Total Assets COMPUSTAT Global 
HighTangible A dummy variable is equal to 1 if tangible assets is higher than the industry median value, 
0 otherwise 
COMPUSTAT global 
Higĥtangible A dummy variable is equal to 1 if predicted tangible assets is higher than the industry 
median value, 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT global 
Large∆5Trust (β1) Large∆5Trust    is a dummy variable 1 when the five years change of trust is in the top  
tercile, 0 otherwise 
World Value Survey 
(WVS) 
Ln(M&A)Industry The natural log of the merger and acquisition value in the 3 digit SIC industry SDC Platinum 
LTD Long term debt ratio. DLTT/AT COMPUSTAT Global 
Market Leverage 
(MktLev) 
Following Chen, Harford, and Kamara (2019), MktLev=(long term debt+short term 
debt)/(long term debt +short term debt+market value) 
COMPUSTAT global 
Mean Industry Lev Average book leverage of 2 digit SIC industry COMPUSTAT global 
Mean Industry Tangible Mean tangible assets of Fama French 49 industries COMPUSTAT global 
Market to Book 
(Growth opportunity) 
The market value of assets to book value of total assets (AT). The market value of assets is 
equal to the market value of common equity (fiscal year-end price (PRCC_F) times shares 
outstanding (CSHO), plus total assets (AT) minus book value of common equity (CEQ). 
The market value of equity for firms is calculated using the December closing price 
(PRCCD) multiplied by the total number of common shares outstanding for the issue 
(CSHOC). If the current figure for common shares outstanding as of the company’s fiscal 
year-end is missing, the previous year’s value is used. 
COMPUSTAT global 
MNLPOT Minus average book leverage of the rivals in the industry (3 digits SIC code industry) 
averaged over the previous three years 
COMPUSTAT global 
Over Leverage A dummy variable is equal to 1 if Levi,t̂ −  Levi,t < 0, 0 otherwise COMPUSTAT global 
Profitability (ROA) EBIT scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT global 
R&D R&D expenditure scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT global 
R&D expenditures R&D expenditure (XRD) to sales (SALE). If R&D expenditure is missing, I follow the 
tradition to set the missing value to zero, over year t. 
COMPUSTAT global 
ROA EBIT/AT COMPUSTAT Global 
Size Ln(Total Assets) COMPUSTAT global 
Size_sqr Size square COMPUSTAT Global 
Short-term debt ratio Leverage due within 1 year COMPUSTAT global 
Small∆5Trust (β2) Small∆5Trust is a dummy variable 1 when the five years change of trust is in the bottom 
tercile, 0 otherwise 





Tangibile Assets PPENT/AT COMPUSTAT global 
Target D/A Target leverage ratio predicted after equation (2) COMPUSTAT global 
Tobin Q Market value / gross property, plant, and equipment, following Andrei et al. (2019). COMPUSTAT global 
TotInv CAPEX, plus R&D, plus Sells and general expenditures scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT global 
TotM&A Total M&A transactions occuring in firm’s industry in a given year SDC platinum 
Under Leverage A dummy variable is equal to 1 of Levi,t̂ − Levi,t > 0, 0 otherwise COMPUSTAT global 
Working capital the ratio of current assets less current liabilities less cash and marketable securities scaled 
by total assets 
COMPUSTAT global 
∆BookLevi,t+1 Change of book leverage at t+1 COMPUSTAT global 
∆MktLevi,t+1 Change of market leverage at t+1 COMPUSTAT global 
Country-level Variables 
Aggregate governance  Sum of percentile rank of all the six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Governance Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
corruption.  
World Governance 
Indicators (WGI)  
Bond Market 
Development 
Measures financial intermediary development and equals the average of standardized 





The index of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, uses a rank 
of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean 
Transparency 
International databases 
Creditor rights The sum of four 0-1 indicator variables that evaluate whether there is no automatic stay on 
assets (NO_AUTOSTAY), whether secured creditor paid first (SECURED_FIRST), 
whether there are restrictions on going into reorganization (RESTRICT_REORG), and 
whether management stays in the reorganization (MGMT_NOT_STAY) (measured at the 
country-level) 
La Porta et al.1997) 
and Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer 
(2007) 
CrisisDummy Dummy variable 1 if the data point is in the year 2007 to 2010, 0 otherwise  
DEBTMKT Measures financial intermediary development and equals the average of standardized 
values of liquid liabilities to GDP and domestic credit for private firms to GDP ratios. 
(Source: Brockman and Unlu, 2009) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Degree of Hierarchy 
(DOH) 
If people believe they should follow the instructions of superiors of doing a particular job. WVS 
Degree of 
Individualism (DOI) 
If people believe they need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts. WVS 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Firm/GDP 
Domestic Credit to Private Firm scaled GDP WDI 





It is computed by averaging standardized values of STKMKT and DEBTMKT.  World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP per Capita/100000 GDP per capita scaled by 100000 WDI 
Governance 
Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
HHI Sum of (sale/SIC 2 digits industry sale)^2 COMPUSTAT Global 
HighTrust HighTrustis a dummy variable 1 if the social trust is in top quartile and 0 when trust is in the 
bottom quartile. 
World Value Survey 
(WVS). 
Individualism The degree to which people in a society are integrated into a group Hofstede Insights 
Inflation GDP deflator WDI 
Log GDP per capita Natural log of GDP per capita (WDI) database. 
Long Term Orientation As Hofstede notes: "Long Term Orientation stands for the fostering of 
virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift 
Hofstede Insights 
Low Creditors’ Right A dummy variable if creditors’ rights are 0,1 or  2, and 0 otherwise. La Porta et al. (1998) 
Masculinity Represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material 





MGMT_NOT_STAY Captures the ability of creditors or courts to replace the incumbent management during 
bankruptcy 
LLSV (1997) 




NO_AUTOSTAY Equals one if the bankruptcy code prohibits an automatic stay on assets La Porta et al.1997) 
Rainfall Variation The covariance of rainfall for each country Davis (2016) 
RESTRICT_REORG Equals one if the bankruptcy code prevents management from unilaterally filing a 
reorganization plan 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
Rule of law The rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 





Research and Development % of GDP WDI 
SECURED_FIRST Equals one if secured creditors' claims are given absolute priority relative to the government 
or employee claims 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
STKMKT Measures stock market development and is computed by averaging standardized values of 
market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded to market 
capitalization ratios.  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Strong Creditor rights A dummy variable is equal to 1 if the creditor rights index is 3 or 4, 0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1997) 
StrongCreditors’Rights A dummy variable of 1 if Creditors’ rights are 3 or 4, 0 otherwise. La Porta et al. (1997) 
Strong FinDev A dummy variable of 1 if financial development is above the median, 0 otherwise WDI 
Trust The ratio of the sum of positive response to total response of the following question 
‘‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?” 
World Value Survey 
(WVS) 
TrustUS Most people are trusted  Putnam (1993) 
Uncertainty Avoidance A society’s tolerance for ambiguity Hofstede Insights 
Weak Creditor rights A dummy variable is equal to 1 if the creditor rights index is 0,1, or 2, 0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1997) 
WeakFinlDev A dummy variable if the country’s FinMkt, financial development index, is below (above) 
the median 
WDI 
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